CHAPTER XIX

ENGLAND AND JAPAN

THE general remarks on Japan which have preceded will have prepared the ground to some extent for an examination of the special question of British and Japanese relations. It is a question which cannot be lightly considered, since it is already regarded with grave concern by those who understand the extremely complex situation to-day existing in the Far East - a situation which contains every possibility and impossibility that human beings can think of, and which will present many new features as soon as the war comes to an end. On the actual value of the relations which then exist between England and Japan, much in Asia will depend; and as the subject is a lengthy one, only certain features of it can be rapidly considered.

Americans are sometimes apt to suppose that, because Commodore Perry with his frigates and brigs induced Japan to emerge from a seclusion which had lasted for centuries, it was the United States which opened up the country and developed the trade and resources of the Island Empire in the

'fifties, 'sixties, and 'seventies of the last century. Nothing could be more incorrect.

Previous to the coming of Perry, England had made a number of unsuccessful attempts to enter into direct negotiations with the Shogun's Government; but as the opening of China was then being forced almost entirely by England, it was impossible for her at that time to bestow sufficient attention on Japan. And, as Commodore Perry made Hongkong his base, it must be assumed that a close understanding then existed between the two AngloSaxon Powers. Just as it was from the coasts of China that the United States ships made their way to Japan, so it was from these coasts that British officials and British merchants steamed east immediately after the first Japanese treaties had been signed, and established themselves at the Japanese ports. Lord Elgin, Admiral Sir James Sterling, Sir Rutherford Alcock, Sir Harry Parkes, these are a

few of those who, having been first associated with China, went subsequently to Japan during the 'fifties and 'sixties to place matters there on the same footing as in the Celestial Empire. And behind these British officials came British merchants and small traders in some numbers, who monopolised the Japan trade and made English the lingua franca of the open ports.

The consideration of China and Japan, from the British official and merchant point of view, as countries falling into the same class and demanding the same treatment was therefore not unnatural.

Coming from China, Englishmen were brought into contact with a people far inferior in commerce to those they had just been dealing with, and, whatever other qualities the Japanese possessed, the population was rated for the time being as an inferior one. Thus men of the stamp of Sir Harry Parkes held that it was a misconception on the part of the Japanese to consider extra-territoriality per se as a derogation from national sovereignty, and to chafe under the bonds of this peculiar system. Parkes was pleased to point out constantly that throughout the Middle Ages in Europe, different degrees of extra-territoriality had been the rule rather than the exception. He argued that the Jews had been more or less under their own jurisdiction; that the clergy were almost entirely independent of territorial laws; that the Hanse and other towns had their special privileges; and, thus continuing in this strain, one of the most brilliant Englishmen who has ever come to the Far East remained a firm upholder of extra-territoriality to the end.

Not until Japan succeeded in inducing the popular imagination to detach her from direct association with China, and until British Ministers Plenipotentiary uncontaminated by the China point of view began to be appointed to Japan, did English official opinion realise that other times demanded other customs. By the end of the 'eighties it was understood that the old method of treating Japan was dangerous; and viewed in its proper light, the treaty of commerce and navigation, to which refer

ence has already been made, which was finally concluded between England and Japan in 1894, must be rated as fully as important an instrument as the Alliance Treaty of 1902. It is curious for

students to note that the time between these two British treaties which have done so much for Japanese advancement is eight years, which is approximately the same period as elapsed between those other two attempts to arrest Japan's progress - the 1895 intervention and the 1903-4 derogatory negotiations which ended in war.

In spite of the fact, therefore, that Admiral Sterling's fleet was only the second to negotiate with Japan half a century ago, it was England and no other country which eleven years ago gave the signal authorising Japan to take her proper place in the comity of nations -a signal which no other Power had dared to give. But the part which England played in 1895 was one not lost on Japan. Japan had turned then to England, and expected, after the treaty of 1894, that some support would be given against the triplicate of powers which menaced her with armed strength in order to enforce the return of the Liaotung to China. But England remained silent, though Japan must have understood that the idea of applying the slicing process to China was distasteful in the extreme to a Power which but a few months before had surrendered certain privileges because Japan was intent on adopting everything which was honourable and sound.