Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, and IraqJHU Press, 2009年3月1日 - 344 頁 Following World War II, Americans expected that the United States would wage another major war against a superpower. Instead, the nation has fought limited wars against much weaker states, such as North Korea, North Vietnam, and Iraq. This revised and updated edition of Presidential Decisions for War analyzes the means by which four presidents have taken the nation to war and assesses the effectiveness of each president's leadership during those conflicts. Gary Hess recreates the unfolding crises in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq to probe the reasons why Presidents Truman, Johnson, George H. W. Bush, and George W. Bush and their advisors decided in favor of war. He compares the performance of the commanders-in-chief and evaluates how effectively each understood U.S. interests, explored alternatives to war, adhered to constitutional processes, and built congressional, popular, and international support. A new conclusion points out, that unlike the administrations of Truman, Johnson, and the elder Bush, George W. Bush's White House actively sought to change the international order through preemptive war and aggressive democracy building. Fully revised and featuring an examination of how each of the presidents learned from history and juggled the demands on diplomacy, this comparative study of presidential war-making elucidates how effective executive leadership—or its absence—directly affects the outcome of wars. |
搜尋書籍內容
第 1 到 5 筆結果,共 71 筆
... army had invaded South Korea. An urgent phone call from Secretary of State Dean Ache-son at 11:20 PM. on Saturday, June 24, told Truman that forces of the Communist government of North Korea had crossed the thirtyeighth parallel that ...
... army. And, most ominously, no one knew whether the Korean crisis would trigger World War III. Truman was beginning a week of intense decision making that would take the United States into war in a country that few Americans could have ...
... the proposal and instead called for the mutual withdrawal of troops, which would work to Soviet advantage, since they had trained and equipped a large army in the northern zone. Facing an impasse, the United States appealed.
... army of about 125,000 men. The United States delayed the withdrawal of its troops from South Korea until June 1949. By that time, it had built a ROK army of some fifty thousand men, which was considered adequate to deter an attack. The ...
... army's concern, Bradley and army Chief of Staff Gen. J. Lawton Collins urged that, if ground forces were required, Truman should order mobilization. Should Congress be consulted? Truman decided that he, Acheson, and Johnson should meet ...
內容
Decision by Indecision | |
America keeps | |
The Strategy | |
This aggression | |
The Imperatives | |
Time is not | |
History Overpowers | |
Bibliographical Essay | |
Index | |