GOVERNMENT DEPARTS L SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS SECOND SESSION ON INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT TESTIMONY OF GEN. MARK W. CLARK AUGUST 10, 1954 ᏢᎪᎡᎢ 21 Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary UNITED STATES WASHINGTON: 1954 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota, Chairman ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland PAT MCCARRAN, Nevada* OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECU ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana, Chairman ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey PAT MCCARRAN, Nevada* JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi ALVA C. CARPENTER, Chief Counsel and Executive Director J. G. SOURWINE, Associate Counsel *The Honorable Pat McCarran participated actively in the work of the subcomm until his death on September 28, 1954. II INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS TUESDAY, AUGUST 10, 1954 UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, D. C. bcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to notice, in the caucus the Capitol, Senator William E. Jenner, chairman, presiding. t: Senators Jenner, Watkins, Hendrickson, Welker, McCarnston, and McClellan. present: Alva C. Carpenter, counsel; J. G. Sourwine, counsel Senate Judiciary Committee; and Dr. Edna Fluegel, professaff member. CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order. Clark, would you please take the witness stand? Will you to testify, sir? Do you swear that the testimony given in ing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the help you God? CLARK. I do. SWMONY OF MARK W. CLARK, GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY (RETIRED) CHAIRMAN. General Clark, your bravery, acumen, and achievethe military service of your country have won for you the ved tributes that have marked your distinguished career— re I can only add, for myself and my colleagues, that it is privilege and a pleasure to meet again so illustrious a soldier. another phase of your activity for which I doubt that you ved official decorations-but I know that it has required a al kind of courage to speak when you might have remained try to alert the American people to the enveloping dangers action was frowned upon, to continue to speak out and to Bears with which such service is too frequently rewarded. sed the American people in 1947 on the basis of your exnegotiating with the Russians-and events have demonat you were right. Again in your first book, Calculated pointed out that the Russians "wanted to keep things boilthere is nothing the Soviets would not do to achieve world but that "when confronted with strength and deterthey stop, look, and listen." Your words were not heeded. again you have addressed the American people, in your second P book. From the Danube to the Yala, in even more pressing and measured terms. There you say: Gradually as I watched the Russians make importam gains 2: our e in Europe, an easy, frightening suspicion entered my mnd I could & concessions favorable to the Russians had beer made. I had the evidez Communlets had been planted in our Arsy to try to sup the power of the States through well-conceived campaims to demotiline for guit5. Lagging fear was that perhaps Communists had worked their way so dees our Government on both the working and planning jerels that thes we to exercise an inordinate degree of power in shaping the mouse of Ame the dangerous postwar era. I could not help windering and worrying w we were faced with open enemies across the conference talk and Lidden e who sat with us in our most secret connells. I note that the uneasiness you experienced in Europe La augmented by your assignment in the Far East, where, under in tions, you signed "an armistice without victory": an armistice you point out, the Communists needed and we wanted beca lacked the determination to win. You further state: I fully agreed with MacArthur that we should not have allowed the e sanctuary north of the Yaiu. I never charged my opinion. The ti decision in Korea was the day the Chinese Government threw its legiez the fighting. * Why did "the mightiest and most benevolent power on earth "little by little for a short bit of tranquillity, a false dream of rity"? Whence came "these concessions to weakness and fear" v "frustrated and bedeviled Americans who had to execute policy seas after the war"? You describe the process weil: In Austria, in Germany, and in Korea I watched the Communists strug advance their campaigns by methods short of a war that would involve Ri the seat of Communist power. In each country I felt that we of the free tackled the problems individually, worked to tidy up one nasty situation time, without fully meeting the enormity of the master plan designed to de 118. In each country our enemies used each conflict, big or little, as an inc to promote their campaign, to gain a little ground, to sow seeds of disser among us, to frighten some more people on the edge of the Iron Curtain. And everywhere we improvised. We counterpunched. We waited, anxio to see what the Russians would do next. They ied and we followed. But why? Were no voices raised in warning and in protest? our sons not fight to win with the same courage Americans have alw fought to win? Why were our wise men rejected; why did bunglers and worse prevail? Why was victory denied? Who these fabricators of fear who serve the enemy so well, who, wi undermining our national morale, our will to victory, give aid comfort to the enemy by advertising our imagined weakness and consequent strength? After each concession, each defeat, ther the appearance of new resolve-next time we will stand firm. then the "softening up" process begins all over again. Why? A who? And when and how will it end? A That you have pondered these questions with grave distress is cl from your published statements. We of this subcommittee share yo concern and your uneasiness. It is for that reason that we have ask you to appear here today. Our concern is with the present dange and the future. If we are not to succumb to the Red wave of th future, if this time the past is not to be prolog to onrushing disaste we must scrutinize our recent history closely to identify the possib subversion, the gross unrealism, and the unadulterated stupidity tha arbrought this great Nation to such grave jeopardy that our secuour very existence, is menaced. Geral Clark, you have served this great Nation in war and in and again in war in Africa, in Europe, and in the Far East. ast tragic decade you have had the anxieties and the frustraf the man out front, at the conference table, as well as on the eld. Today we are asking you to share with us your knowledge, servation, and your judgment, in still another implementation dedication you made many years ago: "Duty, honor, country." eral Clark, will you give for us your full name? ral CLARK. My name is Mark Wayne Clark, general, United Army, retired. I am the president of The Citadel, a military of South Carolina, located at Charleston, S. C. CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carpenter, you may proceed with the quesof General Clark. CARPENTER. Would you give us a brief description of your past : Cerences? al CLARK. I was raised as an Army brat. My father was in ce, graduated from West Point. I went to West Point in Upon graduation in 1917, I served as a company commander of in World War I in France. I was in the army of occupation many. I went through the routine duties of an officer in peacetending all of our service schools. Before World War II, I was ym Washington with General McNair when they set up the Ground Forces. I went overseas with General Eisenhower as his deputy in 1942 and. I was his deputy in the North Africa invasion. I was Even command of the Fifth Army, a new army to be organized th Africa, and subsequently commanded it at Salerno. I was and of the Fifth Army and the Fifteenth Army group which ned the Fifth and Eighth Armies during the campaign in Italy the time that we took the surrender of the Germans in May en was designated as the American commander in Austria and h commissioner of my Government. After 5 years of wartime and immediate postwar service in Europe, I came home and nded the Sixth Army on the west coast and later was the chief Army Field Forces which had the responsibility of training Army and from that position was assigned as the commander in of the Far East and the United Nations Command in Korea and I signed the armistice in July of 1953, I decided that after s of service that was a good time to turn in my soldier's suit. sted retirement. I have retired and I now am located in a pursuit of training young men for future service to their CARPENTER. I would like to go back now to the Italian campaign. consulted in regard to the Italian situation prior to Moscow Teheran Conference? CLARK. No, sir; I was not. CARPENTER. Were you ever consulted on American policy toaly while the fighting was in progress? CLARK. Yes, to some extent. Although I did not have a al adviser at my headquarters, General Eisenhower did at the |