insert an article in the Convention by which the three Powers bound themselves not to interfere with the form of government established in Mexico. When it appeared that these suspicions were only too well based, that Napoleon had not only determined to overthrow the Mexican Republic, but actually had his nominee, the unfortunate Archduke Maximilian, in waiting, there was nothing left for the English Government but to withdraw themselves from the Convention, and their small force of 700 marines from the expedition. At least there was no hesitation on the part of the Cabinet, and they extricated themselves from a dangerous enterprise without loss of dignity.

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CHAPTER XV.

POLAND AND SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.

1863-1865.

The Polish Rebellion-Policy of the Cabinet-The proposed European Congress The Schleswig-Holstein Question-Motives of the Powers-English advice to Denmark-The Cabinet determines on eutrality-The Conference of London-Lord Palmerston on the state of Europe-The Danish debate-Palmerston's last victoryThe General Election of 1865-Lord Palmerston's last illness and death-Conclusion.

FROM the hour of the withdrawal of the English contingent from the Mexican expedition to the last day of his life, Lord Palmerston never laid aside his distrust of the Emperor Napoleon. It became a fixed idea with him, and when opportunities presented themselves for reconstituting the alliance of the Western Powers he deliberately rejected them. Such an opportunity was the Polish rebellion of 1863. The cause of the insurgents, gallantly maintained against overwhelming numbers, was extremely popular in England; it was favoured by statesmen of all shades of opinion, and was the theme of enthusiastic resolutions passed at swollen mass meetings. Food for eloquent periods was especially to be found in the proceedings of the new

un

Nor should we have
France would have

Prussian Minister, Herr von Bismarck, who had turned the occasion to his own ends, and at the same time prevented the spread of the rebellion, by proposing to the Russian Chancellor and the proposal was gladly accepted that the two Governments should sign a convention authorising the troops of each nation to cross their respective frontiers in pursuit of fugitive rebels. This grim method of exterminating the revolt aroused a perfect storm of indignation throughout the country; and a war for the liberation of Poland would doubtedly have been very popular. gone to the battle without allies. plunged enthusiastically into the struggle, for affection for the Poles had been for centuries a national proclivity, and her ruler was drawn in the same direction by the double consideration that the reconstruction of Poland was a Napoleonic tradition, and that success on the Vistula would detract attention from the failure imminent in Mexico. As there was no fear of the movement extending into Galicia, the Austrian Government would certainly not have departed from a friendly neutrality.

Lord Palmerston made no secret of his sympathies with the insurgents. He wrote a letter to Baron Brünnow in which he bluntly told him that he regarded the Polish rebellion as the just punishment inflicted by Heaven on Russia for her numerous attempts to stir up revolution in the Christian Provinces of the Porte. In the House of Commons he was equally outspoken against Prussia. He hoped that the February convention would not be carried into execution, "because such an interference of Prussia with what was then passing in Poland would excite, as it had already excited, great condemnation everywhere, and if that

conventional interference were followed by acts it would cast discredit on the Government of Prussia." But the Prime Minister and his colleagues were determined not to commit themselves to any threat of intervention. They thoroughly distrusted the Emperor of the French, and declined his invitation to address, in concert with Austria, a violent note of remonstrance to the Prussian Government. The Premier, in a letter to the King of the Belgians, described the invitation as a trap. They felt, also, that it was useless to engage in a war of which the object would have been the establishment of Poland as an independent State, when the dissensions among the insurgents proved that the basis for such a State was altogether wanting. Under the circumstances, the diplomatic action of the three Powers was barren of result. Lord Palmerston helped to frame some able despatches the aim of which was to convince Prince Gortschakoff that the promises of a constitution made to the Poles at the Congress of Vienna had never been carried out; Austria took the lead in declaring that Poland was a source of never-ending disquietude to Europe; and the three Powers agreed upon six suggestions of reform which they urged in concert upon the Russian Government. But, unaccompanied by a menace of war, their remonstrances at Berlin and St. Petersburg were not treated with much respect, and signally failed to ameliorate the lot of Poland.

Lord Palmerston was quite as adverse to the next adventure of the Emperor of the French, his proposal that the treaties of 1815 should be submitted to a European Congress. It was known that Napoleon had been brooding over the idea for many years, and when it was at last put into shape it certainly contained a certain amount of plausibility. There was justice in

his contention that most of the arrangements of the treaties of Vienna were destroyed, modified, misunderstood, or menaced. But directly Lord Palmerston's keen intellect played round the proposal he saw its absurdity. He pointed out in the House of Commons that unanimity was extremely unlikely, and that a single dissentient voice would upset every suggestion before the Congress. In a letter to the King of the Belgians he described the assembling of a Congress as a measure inapplicable to the present state of Europe. With regard to past modifications of the treaties, some, such as the independence of Belgium, and the creation of the kingdom of Italy, required no sanction; others, such as the annexation of Cracow by Austria, we should not care to sanction. With regard to the future, an infinite number of squabbles and animosities would arise, especially if possible changes of territory were taken into consideration-for instance, if France were to ask for the Rhine provinces, Austria for Bosnia or Moldo-Wallachia, Spain for Gibraltar. The Congress was, therefore, curtly declined by Earl Russell in the name of our Government, and the Emperor had to digest his mortification as best he could.

Thus, while the Northern Powers were united, those of Western Europe were hostile and divided. Bismarck had everything in his favour when he proceeded to tear up the Treaty of London and to force on the solution of the Schleswig-Holstein question. Viewed by the light of later experience, it is impossible to pronounce that treaty to have been other than a mistake. It was drawn up without sufficient knowledge and precautions; it attempted to perpetuate a wholly obsolete state of affairs. In the end, the separation of the Duchies from Denmark was a benefit to Europe. But it would be