those perfidious auxiliaries, that took the pay, and deserted the service of our former Kings?

SHOULD it be urged in favour of fuch meafures, that have always been hurtful to Britain, that the spirit of the nation is not to be trusted: that an army of mercenaries is neceffary to curb the difaffected: and that the ballance of power in Europe cannot be kept up without a confiderable army of auxiliaries on the continent in British pay. Let me tell you, these arguments are mere pretences.

ALL attempts against any country either by invafions or infurrections muft rife from a government's pursuing bad measures: by which difcontent and difaffection are fowed among the people and where an enemy cannot depend on the powerful affiftance of a diffatisfied people, there can be no fear of an invafion. And I dare vouch for the loyalty of my countrymen fo far, that if the miniftry would not terrify them with a standing army, daily augmenting within their bowels; nor with an army of auxiliaries living upon the vitals of Britain, at a vaft expence from year to year; the civil officer would be able to lock up every difaffected perfon in the kingdom. But who can answer for the behaviour of a people, who are naturally brave and true to their King and country, and provoked by a ministry that shall misreprefent them to their Sovereign, and empeach their fidelity by taking away their arms, and load them with taxes and other oppreffions, which

always

always are, and always must be the confequences of ftanding fubfidiary armies! Britons are naturally jealous of their liberties: and as the continuation of a ftanding army from year to year has, before now, made them despair of preferving those liberties by any peaceable method; may not the fame caufe produce the fame effect? And though that very army in which King James II. put his confidence, joined in the difaffection, and thereby prevented the lofs of our liberties; we cannot always depend upon fuch a difpofition, as to forfake the governor bent upon enflaving the subject; becaufe the only principle of a mercenary foldier is blind obedience, and an entire fubmiffion to the orders of his commanding officer.

As to the argument founded upon the ballance of power: I fhall always be ready to aid thofe powers on the continent, which are in real danger, and to fuccour the diftreffed in the moft effectual manner. But who are the powers now in danger, and that call upon us for help and to whofe aid an army of Ruffians and Coffacks are to march? are they our allies in Germany? is the prefent difpute with France about the trade, navigation, and limits of our colonies in America to be decided by a battle upon the Rhine? or by an invafion of Saxony, Holland, Bavaria, Heffe, the Dukedom of Wolfenbuttle, or the Electorate of Hanover? can France pretend the leaft colour to disturb the tranquillity of Germany, because Great Bri

tain

?

tain makes reprisals at fea for her depredations and encroachments in North America? does not the constitution of the empire, and the natural tie of felf-prefervation, unite all those petty princes against all invaders of their liberty and property and, if I am rightly informed, their force when united, can at this time muster five hundred thousand men. A match more than fufficient to maintain the ballance of power on the continent! is it not notorious that we do not hire forces to defend, and add ftrength to our allies in danger of being attacked? but with a generofity not to be equalled in former ages, and the richest states, we have paid them for their own forces, and for forces, not levied on our account, but fuch as the neceffities of their own fituations will not fuffer them to be without. If they are threatened by France, proceed with the deftruction of her navigation; and her riches, ftrength, and ambition will dwindle away; and neither Germany, England, nor any other power will have any thing to fear from that quarter.

BESIDES they are all as much, and more interested in the preservation of that ballance than we are: and if it fhould happen to appear in any real danger, they certainly would, as in times paft, unite under the eagle in their own defence, without waiting for a bribe from the lion. But fince it is demonftrated to be in the power of the invincible arms of Britain by fea, to obftruct and ruin the trade and navigation of

France,

France, and thereby make the ballance preponderate on our fide: if we with an impolitic prodigality force bribes and penfions upon every Prince in Europe, who fhall be mean enough to accept thereof; it requires not the gift of prophecy to foretell, that this nation will foon be reduced to an incapacity of feeding her neceffitous neighbours, and will have nothing left for her own prefervation, but her native courage and bravery.

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No.15. SATURDAY, November 15. 1755

Four things our NOBLE fheweth unto me; King, Ship, and Sword, and power of the Sea. English Policy, ap. HACKLUIT.

its contents, as being the first gold fpecie of this kingdom; and from its infcription, which is the King of England on fhipboard, brandishing his fword in defence of his dominion and sovereignty of the seas.

WHILE

WHILE this coin was current, it was a standing record of this nation's right to the British feas; of the means by which it is to be preferved; and infpired Britons with a true fenfe of their national advantages, and with courage to maintain that dominion or power, without which they can be no longer a nation: for, according to the fame poet, the true process of English policy is this :

Cherish merchandize, keep the admiralty;
That we be mafters of the narrow fea.
For, if this fea be kept in time of werre
Who can here pafs without danger and wo?
Who may escape, who may mischief differre?
What merchandize may we not let to go?

THIS was the fyftem of all the monarchs of this kingdom, that either have chastised our enemies, or protected their fubjects in their just rights and liberties. But I wish there were no reasons to suspect a decay of this policy from the time this noble has been discontinued in our current coin: except we may hope from the vigour of the prefent miniftry, that there will be no more time loft in fruitless negociations and time-serving treaties. How near does the prefent method of feizing the ships of France, for her hoftilities in America, approach to that standard of found policy? how happy shall this nation be under fuch councils, influenced by a king, who regards no intereft, but that of his fubjects,

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