temporizing with the fappers of government; invite them to join in the grand cause of liberty, and explain to them the maxims of the modern tory, grounded on that fyftem of politicks, which is to guard the throne from a corrupt ministry, and to maintain the rights of the people againft every system of which has, or may oppower, pofe them.

F. Q

SATURDAY, August 30th, 1755

Having gained the power they became fuch tyrants, that the reign of former oppreffors feemed a golden age, when compared with the arbitrarinefs and exaction of thefe pretended deliverers; which made the Sicilians think them much more happy, who expired in flavery, than thofe, who lived to fee fuch a difmal freedom.

BRI

PLUT. Life of Timoleon.

RITONS, no lefs than the Sicilians, have frequently been reduced to bemoan the approaches of arbitrary power, and to complain of a ufurpation on their rights and privileges by corrupt minifters, Can any people remain filent, when their reprefentatives prostitute the power, committed to them by their conftituents for the public fafety, to the bafe purposes of enriching themselves, by facrificing their trust to

the

1

the will of a weak or wicked statesman? fuch an unnatural traffic with their liberties, leaves only the name of freedom; while, by flow degrees, it brings on a lafting flavery. Or, can a free conftitution be out of danger, where one part of it lays wait to destroy the energy of another? or where the legislative power is, or may be corrupted by the executive? a free people may, for a while, be reduced to a neceffity of fubmitting to the hard circumftances of the Sicilians, when their freedom has been fo artfully invaded, as not to be prevented; or fo forcibly, as not to be immediately refifted: But history will inform us, that fuch invafions feldom go unrevenged. There are no people that ever bound themselves over to the power of another, without referving a natural right to refift violent aggreffors; and to use, every legal method to maintain and recover their liberty, and to punish thofe, that would oppress them, according to the nature of their offence. Nor am I obliged to foreign writers; our own nation will furnish too many examples, in which there have been minifters of state, who, without any regard to the true intereft of the king and fubject, and the honour of the nation abroad; and, indeed, without.confulting the fatal confequences thereof, have ventured to try the dangerous experiment: dangerous to themselves; fatal to the throne, when a majority could not be fecured and always ruinous to their country: the reigns of Charles I. and James II. will afford fufficient proof.

BUT,

BUT, if the miniftry of those unfortunate kings had been expert in the practice of fplitting and multiplying employments, and instead of one lord treasurer had found out the neceffity of having five or fix lords of the treasury; and feven lords of the admiralty inftead of one lord high admiral, obfequious to the mandates of the court; we might never have heard of a minifter, who loft: his head for attempting to establish arbitrary power; nor of a king brought to the block; or of one obliged to abdicate three crowns, for ufurping prerogatives, to which they were not intitled by the laws of the realm. It was not the fword, but the conqueror's engagement to govern the people of England according to their ancient laws, which confirmed him upon the throne. Alfred the founder of the monarchy had declared, that the English nation was as free as the thoughts of man: and shall it be recorded of this enlightened age, that there has been a time when Britons were fo degenerate and regardless of their freedom, as to fell it for a price? or to prefer retirement and ease to à vigorous defence of their liberty and property? Who can, without indignation, relate the original attempt of the ministry under James I. to pack a parliament, as the most infallible method to deprive the people of their liberties, and to establish arbitrary power in the prince? could they have gained a majority of place-men or penfioners to the crown, their scheme might have been very easily carried into execution. For, what could prevent a wicked

minister,

minifter, guarded with plenipo's, confuls, agents, admirals, generals, commiffioners, directors, captains; and, even fo low as, with clerks in fome public offices, to invade the liberties, and to drain the property of the fubject, under the political cant of ferving the king? by this means the executive would ufurp the legislative power, contrary to the great charter of the peoples rights and privileges. And fuch an unconftitutional union first brings on difaffection among the opprefied; then penal laws; and fometimes a standing army to quell their spirits, and to force them to fubmit to the minifterial yoke. Therefore,

THEY, who have thus been attacked by a corrupt administration, always diftinguished between that way of governing, which, by art and power, tends to the deftruction of the constitution; and that regal government, which gives life to the refolutions of the great national council: and not only discountenances, but delivers up to the refentment of the people, those court harpies, who make a prey of majesty, and devour the subject under fair pretences; and those traiterous, infinuating parasites, who endeavour to inspire into his facred breaft an unworthy jealoufy of his people.

A fovereign thus qualified is always in poffeffion, not only of the crown, but of the fortunes and hearts also of his fubjects. And the prince that regards not the injuries of his people, nor gives himself concern about the mal-practices of his minifters, is no less a tyrant, than one, who

rules

provided they be can

in we chufe a nnected with I be his chief become of the: his place at the er, and is to be The fubjects; he which is always ; and join in all me to the nation; y an ignorant over

bearing, or an avaricious minifter of ftate. Such a fpurious representative is the offspring of corruption: And what can be expected from him, but an obfequious readiness at all times to reconcile and justify the most contradictory measures of his patron, and to vote his crude and indigefted dreams into laws? and what would be the fa tal confequence to the nation, should there ever be returned a majority of fuch members? the doors of that place, where our complaints ought to be heard and redreffed, would, in the end, be for ever shut against us.

THE fame reason that made Britons defirous to establish their liberty, muft make them folicitous to preserve it; and, as in the cafe of the revolution, fet them, who watch for our security, above the imputation of difloyalty or faction. So that in all proposals and schemes of government, the real patriots should never engage themselves beyond