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val armament would be neceffary to cover our American empire, from the encroachments of the French, out of their generous confidence in the throne, voted His Majefty not only a large fum for that purpose, but likewife gave him a vote of credit for the fum of one million sterling, in expectation that it should be applied, if needful, for the fame fervice. Hoftilities have been commenced, and very large fquadrons have been mann'd and fitted out with an alacrity and expedition, not to be equalled in former times. I hope there will be no reason to complain of a neglect in the my, much lefs of a mifapplication in the payment of thofe fums, dedicated by the genius of Britain to the gods of the feas. The bare mifapplication of public money is a crime that calls aloud for parliamentary enquiry; though it be certain, that the minifter acted therein according to the beft of his judgment for the nation. But fhould it appear, that the money appropriated to diftrefs the enemy in the most effential part; to reduce him to reason by ruining his trade by fea, has been paid for other purposes; and that the present armament by fea is thereby left to be provided for by the next feffions, it will be difficult to quit the advisers of fuch a mifapplication, from a crime little inferior to that of raising money without the power of parliament.

SHOULD a minifter, in contempt of parliament, advife the expending of the national treasure in

the

the payment of penfions, which fome call fubfidies, to foreign ftates, under a pretence of their furnishing Great Britain with a powerful land army, at a time and in a country, where we have no enemy to fear; ought he not to be removed from the king's councils, and receive a punishment adequate to his crime?

SUBSIDIES of all kind, when mis-timed, and uncapable of doing us any fervice, must be very hurtful to this nation. And therefore it ought not to be once furmifed, that fuch measures will be fupported in favour of any country or perfon, whom the want of them may affect; fo long as it is the intereft of Great Britain, and our King, to confine our defence to a naval war.

NOR are we to believe all reports of extraor dinary fubfidies, I mean, fubfidies contracted with princes on the continent, when there is no war in view in thofe quarters; and which can answer no purpose that is good to Britain. I remember it was charged upon a late minister, that he prevailed with the parliament to allow an annual fubfidy for Heffian troops, and applied the same to very ruinous and destructive uses, fuch as the corrupting the electors and their representatives in parliament. And it tends greatly to the difquiet of the people, who, judging by appearances, are apt to be jealous of thofe councils, which advife and confent to the enlifting, for indeed, that is the true meaning of hiring, fubfidiary forces in time of peace. G 3

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HOWEVER, fhould it upon enquiry fo turn out, that we find an attempt has been made to wreft that facred treasure to buy the friendship, alliance, and aid of Ruffia, Saxony, Bavaria, Heffe, and Wolfenbuttle; let us with all loyalty and decency exprefs our diflike thereof. Let us give Cæfar his due; but at the fame time maintain the rights of a free people.

It is well known, that Britain has no poffeffions on the continent of Europe; and that without confent of parliament fhe is not to engage in any war in defence of foreign dominions. But to take foreign troops into British pay, on condition only to cover, or make a diverfion in favour of any dominions on the continent, without the confent of parliament, carries the appearance of a war within the prohibition of the act of fettlement for it is as burdenfome to the people of this nation to pay fubfidiary armies in time of peace, as if war was proclaimed.

If it be once allowed, that the King has a right to take foreign troops into British pay; and to draw upon the exchequer for the payment of thofe fubfidiary-contracts, there is an end to the power of parliament; who in fuch a cafe would be obliged to ratify His Majefty's keeping up a ftanding army on the continent, without limitation of numbers, and to raise money to pay them; or the treafury muft difcharge the royal draughts out of the money already appropriated; which is, in my humble opinion, no lefs crimi

nal

nal than the attempt to raise money without parliament. For, he muft fplit the hair, who fhall prefume to fhew the difference, between transferring the money raised for neceffary uses, to other purpofes; and those measures condemned in former times, when bad minifters filled the fovereign's coffers by indirect means.

crown.

Ir is the privilege of a prince to make war for the honour and defence of the British But he is reftrained from raifing money and making war, where and when the honour and property of Great Britain is not concerned in the quarrel. And it is incumbent upon a wife and free people not to arm the crown with any powers, under the best princes, which may be employed by a bad one

to the fubverfion of their liberties, and the eftablifhment of his own will for law.

HENCE We may fairly argue, that if ever the minifter of a King of Great Britain fhould be found, either fo abandoned to the intereft of his country, and to his duty to the throne, as to advife, or agree to the mifapplication of public money, and to the taking foreign troops into British pay without the previous confent of parliament, he ought either to be removed from the royal · prefence, and punished by the guardians of our liberties; or our conftitution will be in danger of ruin. For whenever a parliament shall be come fo corrupt and regardless of the intereft of the people, as to approve of fuch meafures,

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and protect the evil counsellors from a deserved cenfure, what must become of the balance of power in our government? is not the ratifying fuch measures an acquiefcence in the king's power to raise forces, without the consent of parliament? is it not at least, investing him with a powerful standing army? and had this nation a King inclined to take the advantage; what force? what authority could prevent his bringing them into Britain, to fupport whatever tyranny a corrupt minifter might advise him to ufurp?

WERE it poffible for a minifter to ftain his wisdom and integrity, in his first setting out, by efpoufing the errors of his predeceffor, and fupporting the validity of those contracts, what would be the fruits to be expected, or rather dreaded from those bloffoms? power is generally maintained by the fame means it is acquired and if this is to be the price paid for a fmall fhare of it; what can be the purchase of the remainder, and the confequences of fuch a bargain? fhould the minifter fcreen himself behind the throne, and plead the honour of the crown for an affair, which as a Briton and a reprefentative of the people he could not defend, there will be no project, though ever fo extravagant and ruinous, but fome future minifter may avail himself of the fame pretence; lug the parliament into his guilt, to share the odium of the nation, and to protect instead of punishing the mifcreant that dares to impose

upon