are too valuable to be entrusted to such a preca

rious guard.

THE Danes cannot be accused of the fame perfidy. But all circumstances confidered, it is more to be admired, that thofe rovers did not fecure a better establishment in England. They were poffeffed of a great power by fea; even to the number of a thousand ships and upwards; and found England without a navy, and enervated by the separate interests of many petty princes.

HOWEVER, what struggles and bloodshed did both these invaders meet with before they conquered? it was near three hundred years before the Saxons could obtain the abfolute fovereignty of this island: and why, because they neglected the marine, and refted their only strength on a land army; army; and the Danes by the fame unpardonable piece of policy, loft the crown in less than half a century.

It will little avail to produce William the Norman, to fhew, that England is to be easily conquered by an invader. For, at the fame time, it must not be forgot, that he, by fetting up a title to the crown, under the countenance of the Confeffor's will, was affured of many friends on the island; and that he fought against one, who had ufurped the throne, who fell in battle, and left him in poffeffion of the whole power of the realm; and almoft without a competitor.

SHOULD

SHOULD we trace the attempts of latter ages! what does history relate of thofe many and bloody invafions from Scotland? which never could fucceed farther, than in the plunder and burning of a few towns on the borders; or in the murder of the innocent and defencelefs.

The fuccefs of the French King, against King John, is foreign to our argument. There bellibus barons were in poffeffion of all the strong holds of the kingdom; they invited him over; they received him upon their lands; the whole hation were terrified with the Pope's interdict, and thereby fuperftitiously deterred from taking arms in defence of their fovereign. But even then the Gallic power could not maintain the ufurpation; fcarce a Frenchman escaped the fword; and the undeceived Britons pursued their revenge to the conqueft of the crown of France.

THE memorable years 88, in two fucceeding centuries, furnish us with examples of the difficulty, which deters our moft powerful and inveterate enemies from wafting their treasure and risking their fhips and men against a country, that is feparated by nature from the rest of the world. The Spaniards, in 1588, loft the fineft fleet that ever before plowed the ocean. The flower of their nobility were cut off, and an incredible quantity of warlike ftores that had employed all Spain, Italy, and Flanders for feveral years to collect together, were entirely deftroyed by attempting to conquer this little inland. COULD

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COULD there be a worse profpect for England? and at a time when the King of Spain was endeavouring, by affurances of peace, to furprize the nation, unarmed and unprovided against a foreign enemy. This invincible Armada had been the work of four years, and was commanded by the best veteran officers that could be picked out of Naples, Sicily, Lombardy, Flanders, Germany, Spain, and the Indies. It even failed from Lifbon, and was defcried at the chops of the channel, before its perfidious intention was discovered.

WHAT did Elizabeth in these circumstances? did fhe feek for aid in foreign troops? did the bargain for an army of Ruffians to march into Flanders; or of Saxons, Heffians, or of any foreign ftate to make a diverfion on the continent, or to pass over into England? was it not better policy in that Queen to take example at the misfortunes of her predeceffors, who had called in foreign aid? it was all one to her British spirit by whom her fubjects fhould fall; by an army of Spaniards, her enemies, or by an army of foreigners paid with English money. Her councils confulted the natural strength of the nation, and the propereft means of defence, both by fea and land. The fleet was judged the chief fupport; and one of ninety fail was fitted out with all neceffaries within fifty days. Her own fubjects, whofe affections fhe had fecured, by placing her confidence in them alone, and whofe liberty and property were at ftake, were the best fol

diers

diers fhe could raife. She was not afraid of putting arms into hands that had fought for her, themselves, and their country, and were content to be disbanded, as foon as the danger was blown over. What must become of England in such circumstances, had it been thus furprized under an administration, whofe councils would have difarmed the fubjects; loaded them with taxes to maintain subsidiary armies; and confumed the appointments for the navy in the quixotism of an army, in a country where Britain had nothing to rifk? what could be more worthy of imitation than the expedition, appointments and oeconomy in this crifis, when England was in the greatest danger of being crushed under a foreign invafion? a navy was got fit for action in fifty days: twenty-thousand men were thought a fufficient ftrength to difpute with the enemy on the fhore, if any should escape the fleet; and both were paid off when the fervice was performed. It is true; no age can vie with the expedition fhewn in our prefent naval armaments: but is the money appropriated to support the fleet; religiously applied? is the fleet properly stationed to distress the enemy and to guard our coafts? are the subjects properly armed? is not our liberty? is not our property? is not our religion? is not our King left in the power of a mercenary army? has the money that should be applied to guard our coafts, been given to a few German princes to keep up a standing army in British pay? are those contracts H 2

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temporary, so as to be annulled when they become burdenfome to England; or when their fervice is not required? are they to be kept in pay for feveral years, whether they are wanted or not? is it ever in their power to defend England from an invafion? what jealousy? what heartburning? what quarrels have not enfued, when our national troops have been obliged to join thofe fubfidiaries: and when the ill-judged policy of a late miniftry brought them into England? I appeal to the behaviour of the Swiss that were driven out of Newcastle in the year 1715, and to the mock campaign made by the Dutch in 1745; when after the extraordinary charge of transportation, &c. they were under fuch engagements to France, as tied their hands from acting in our caufe, when they received the pay, and eat the bread of Britain.

THE year 1688, you'll fay, when the Prince of Orange landed in the weft, is a proof that. England may be invaded. Yes: but to what fhall we charge the fuccefs of that invasion? was that Prince to be confidered in the light of a French King, whose interest is our ruin? was he not invited to protect our liberties and to preferve our religion? this was the act, not of a foe, but of a people jealous of their fovereign; of a people whom the King had. difarmed; and threatened to keep in fubjection by an Irish army, and a foreign aid: which cannot be the cafe under a family established on the throne, by the wisdom and interest of that very prince,

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