Firms, Organizations and Contracts: A Reader in Industrial OrganizationPeter J. Buckley, Jonathan Michie Oxford University Press, 1996 - 475 頁 The operations of the firm lie at the heart of studying business and business economics. This volume brings together the classic articles analysing the role of firms and the relations between them, focusing particularly on the increasingly widespread idea that a firm is based on a set of internal and external contracts. The book will be an invaluable tool for teachers and students of business, economics and management. The editors' introduction provides an accessible overview, and Nobel prizewinner, Ronald Coase, contributes a foreword.Chapters cover the theory of the firm, markets and industrial organisation and joint ventures, networks, clans and alliances. |
內容
Introduction and Overview | 1 |
The Nature of the Firm | 40 |
The Organization of Industry | 59 |
Production Information Costs and Economic Organization | 75 |
Managerial Behavior Agency Costs | 103 |
The Governance of Contractual | 168 |
An Economists Perspective on the Theory of the Firm | 199 |
MARKETS AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 219 |
Vertical QuasiIntegration | 320 |
A Preliminary Study | 339 |
Goodwill and the Spirit of Market Capitalism | 359 |
JOINT VENTURES NETWORKS AND CLANS | 383 |
Joint Ventures | 410 |
New Concepts for New Forms | 429 |
Markets Bureaucracies and Clans | 442 |
Past Present and Future | 459 |
Cooperative Agreements and the Organization of Industry | 276 |
Interpenetration of Organization and Market | 293 |
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常見字詞
agency costs Alchian analysis assets bargaining behavior bondholders bonding buyer capital claims co-operation co-operative agreements co-ordination Coase competition corporate debt decision discussion effects efficient employees equilibrium equity ex ante example exchange existence expansion path factors factors of production financing firm firm's Fisher folk theorem function hierarchical important incentive increase indifference curve individual industry inputs interdependence intermediate internal interorganizational investment involved Japan Japanese joint venture activity labor large customer limited manager manager's marginal market transactions Marks and Spencer monitoring Monopolies Commission nexus of contracts non-pecuniary benefits operation optimal organization organizational output owner owner-manager ownership parties partners perfect competition performance price mechanism principle problem profit purchase relational contracting relationship reputation resource allocation risk role seller share specific strategy supplier supply team production tion trading transaction costs trust utility vertical integration wealth Williamson workers