146 Janusz Ziółkowski, a sociology professor, from 1980 an activist of NSZZ "Solidarity," member of KO appointed by the Chairman of NSZZ "Solidarity," "Roundtable" participant, from June 1989 a senator.

147 National Assembly (the joint Sejm and Senate) elected the president.

148 Jerzy Urban, the government press spokesman. 149 By abstaining or giving an invalid vote, it reduced the majority needed to elect the president.

150 Witold Trzeciakowski, an economist, advisor to NSZZ "Solidarity," member of KO appointed by the Chairman of NSZZ "Solidarity," "Roundtable" participant, minister without portfolio in the Mazowiecki government, chairman of the Economic Council.

151 The OKP ultimately did not adopt a motion on voting discipline in the presidential election, leaving the decision up to its members. On 19 July Gen. Jaruzelski won the election by the majority of one vote. 7 OKP members deliberately turned in invalid votes, thus enabling Jaruzelski's election.

152

Władysław Baka, an economist, Politburo member, deputy chairman of the Council of State.

153 Roman Malinowski, president of the Main Committee of ZSL, together with L. Wałęsa and J. Jóźwiak from SD was a signatory of a statement of 17 August 1989 on the formation of the "Solidarity"-ZSL-SD coalition.

154 Aleksander Bentkowski, a defense attorney, ZSL activist, Justice Minister in the Mazowiecki government. 155 Ireneusz Sekuła, from October 1988 to August 1989 vice premier in the Mazowiecki government, chairman of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers, PUWP "Roundtable" participant, from June 1989 a Sejm deputy.

156 Leszek Piotrowski, a defense attorney, advisor to NSZZ "Solidarity" in Upper Silesia, "Roundtable"participant, from June 1989 a senator.

157 Józef Bąk, a peasant, from June 1989 a Sejm deputy (no party affiliation).

158 Kazimierz Olesiak, member of ZSL leadership, from October 1988 to August 1989 vice premier in the M. Rakowski government, "Roundtable" participant.

159 Jan Eugeniusz Świtka, an SD activist, from June 1989 a Sejm deputy.

160 PAX-a "satellite" Catholic group toward the PUWP.

161 Unia Chrześcijańsko-Społeczna [A ChristianSocial Union] a Catholic "satellite" group toward

PUWP.

162 SIS-Serwis Informacyjny of "Solidarity."

163 Adam Michnik. On 3 July 1989, Michnik published an article in Gazeta Wyborcza titled, "Your president, Our premier," postulating the formation of the government by the "Solidarity" camp.

164 Refers to the democratic transformation in Spain after the death of Franco in 1975.

165 Aleksander Kwaśniewski, an activist of PUWP and the youth movement, in 1988-1989 an minister and chairman of the Socio-Political Committee of the Council of Ministers, "Roundtable" participant, from January 1989 chairman of the Polish Social Democratic Party, since 1995 president.

166 The Triumvirate: President Wojciech Jaruzelski, Premier Czesław Kiszczak, CC PUWP First Secretary Mieczysław Rakowski.

167 Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor to President Carter.

168 On 2 August 1989 the Sejm entrusted formation of government to Czesław Kiszczak. OKP deputies voted against that resolution. Eventually Kiszczak failed to form a government.

174

Jerzy Jóźwiak, a lawyer, chairman of the Central Committee of SD, together with L. Wałęsa and R. Malinowski from ZSL was a signatory of a statement of 17 August 1989 on the "Solidarity" - ZSL - SD coalition.

175 Józef Piłsudski, a marshal, Chief of State in the years 1919-1921, after a military putsch in May 1926 he actually ruled Poland till his death in 1935. He had never been president nor- with the exception of a brief period (1926-1928 and in 1930)-prime minister, but he held the function of Chief Inspector of Military Forces.

176 Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Bronisław Geremek, Jacek

By Hans-Hermann Hertle

E

ast Germany's sudden collapse like a house of cards in fall 1989 caught both the political and academic worlds by surprise.' The decisive moment of the collapse was undoubtedly the fall of the Berlin Wall during the night of 9 November 1989. After the initial political upheavals in Poland and Hungary, it served as the turning point for the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe and accelerated the deterioration of the Soviet empire. Indeed, the Soviet Union collapsed within two years. Along with the demolition of the "Iron Curtain" in May and the opening of the border between Hungary and Austria for GDR citizens in September 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall stands as a symbol of the end of the Cold War, the end of the division of Germany and of the continent of Europe.3

Political events of this magnitude have always been the preferred stuff of which legends and myths are made of. The fall of the Berlin Wall quickly developed into "one of the biggest paternity disputes ever" among the political actors of that time, and it is not surprising that the course of and background to the events during the night of 9 November 1989 still continue to produce legends.

Was the fall of the Berlin Wall the result of a decision or intentional action by the SED leadership, as leading Politburo members claimed shortly after the fact? Was it really, as some academics argue, "a last desperate move to restabilize the country," "a last desperate effort to ride the tiger, control the anger and the ebullience, that had challenged the government"?? Or was it, as disappointed supporters of the GDR civil rights movement suspected, the last revenge of the SED, designed to rob the civil rights movement of its revolution? Did Mikhail Gorbachev or Eduard Shevardnadze order the SED leadership to open the Berlin Wall, or was Moscow completely surprised by the events in Berlin? Were the Germans granted unity by a historical mistake, "a spectacular blunder," or "a mixture of common sense and bungling"?" Did four officers from the Ministry for State Security (MfS, or Stasi) and the Interior Ministry, the authors of the new travel regulation presented at the fateful November 9 press conference, trick the entire SED leadership?12 And if the MfS was involved, could the fall of the Wall have been the Stasi's "opus magnum," as supporters of conspiracy theories want us to believe?13 The fall of the Wall-a final conspiracy of the MfS against the SED state?

Sociology and political science did not predict the collapse of the GDR, other Eastern bloc regimes, or even of the Soviet Union itself.14 Since 1990, post-mortem analysis of the communist system has taken place, but this is problematic methodologically. The Sovietologist Bohdan Harasymiw said, "Now that it has happened (...) the collapse of communism is being everywhere foreseen in

retrospect to have been inevitable." He labeled this thinking "whatever happened, had to have happened," or, more ironically, "the marvelous advantage which historians have over political scientists." "15 Resistance scholar Peter Steinbach commented that historians occasionally forget very quickly "that they are only able to offer insightful interpretations of the changes because they know how unpredictable circumstances have resolved themselves."16 In the case of 9 November 1989, reconstruction of the details graphically demonstrates that history is an open process. In addition, it also leads to the paradoxical realization that the details of central historical events can only be understood when they are placed in their historical context, thereby losing their sense of predetermination.17 The mistaken conclusion of what Reinhard Bendix calls "retrospective determinism"-to view events "as if everything had to come about as it ultimately did come about,"18-as well as the opposing view, which seeks to grasp historical change as a random accumulation of "historical accidents,"19 can only be avoided by connecting structural history (Strukturgeschichte) and the history of events (Ereignisgeschichte), as will be attempted to a certain extent in the following essay. This paper focuses on the conditions and modalities of specific decision-making situations in 1989, through the reconstruction of the intended and actual course of events. It also examines the contingencies which helped to bring about the fall of the Wall, removing one of the most important underpinnings of the SED state. The analysis will primarily concentrate on the central decision-making bodies of the party and state apparatus, their perceptions of the problems, and their actions.20

The paper is based on the documentary evidence from the relevant East German archives, specifically the SED Archive, as well as the archives for the Council of Ministers, the MfS, and Ministry of the Interior. The archival sources are supplemented by approximately 200 interviews with the “main actors" from both German states, the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and France, who were involved in the political and military decision-making process.21

It is generally accepted that developments and changes in the politics and economics of East Germany can only be analyzed within the framework of the political and economic relations "triangle" linking the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic, and the GDR. In addition, relations between the superpowers, i.e. the international context, cannot be ignored.22

The internal and external conditions that contributed to the rapid collapse of the GDR after the fall of the Wall

developed during the ostensibly stable Honecker Era (1971-1989), gradually corroding the pillars upon which the political system was based. The Soviet empire had been in decline for at least a decade, the GDR economy was on the brink of ruin, the "leading role" of the party was exhausted, the SED leadership had become senile, the party cadre was worn down by years of crisis management, the ideology had become a hollow shell, and the security police were politically disoriented. Structural factors of the crisis restricted the range of possible decisions and options for action available to the SED leadership in the fall of 1989, but did not predetermine the actual course of events. The two most important factors were the exhaustion of the Soviet global strategy and the economic decline of the GDR.

The existence of the GDR as a state was, above all, legitimated by an outside force. The state's existence was based on the military, economic, and political guarantee provided by the Soviet Union as well as the USSR's imperial claim and will to power. The signs that the Soviet global strategy had run its course had increased since the early-1980s, and the superpower was increasingly unable to provide the necessary means of support for its empire.23 Mikhail Gorbachev himself made it perfectly clear that the economic problems in his country had forced him to introduce political reforms after he took power in the Soviet Union in 1985, and affected its relationship with the satellite countries.24 The Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) General Secretary first distanced himself from the Brezhnev Doctrine in November 1986 at a meeting of the party leaders of the COMECON [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] member countries. He proclaimed "the independence of each party, its right to make sovereign decisions about the problems of development in its country, its responsibility to its own people" as unalterable principles of the relations among the socialist states.25 It was not his intention at that time to dissolve the alliance; rather, the new principles of independence and autonomy of the national parties, equal standing in relations (with the USSR), and voluntary cooperation were designed to place the socialist community on a more solid basis. Gorbachev was still convinced in 1989, according to his closest foreign policy advisor, that "he would be able to reduce the confrontation [with the West] and retain competing sociopolitical systems.”26

After 1986, it became increasingly clear that, due to the economic crisis, the Soviet leadership was forced to agree to Western demands at the East-West talks in Vienna. The United States and its alliance members made progress in disarmament negotiations, expansion of trade and economic aid contingent upon Soviet compromises on human rights. To the disgust of the SED leadership, Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze demonstrated their desire to create "peaceful and positive conditions abroad for domestic political reforms" in the Soviet Union without consulting with their allies.27

Furthermore, in the opinion of the SED leadership, these far-reaching compromises on human rights issues would come at the expense of the Soviets' allies.

Conversely, SED General Secretary Erich Honecker's state visit to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in September 1987, something the CPSU had blocked for years, fueled the Soviet leadership's fears of a GermanGerman rapprochement and detente behind their backs. Finally, sources inside the SED Politburo fully informed Moscow about the GDR's desolate economic situation and its financial dependency on the West, especially the Federal Republic.28 The German-German summit accelerated a change in Soviet policy toward Germany (Deutschlandpolitik) and served as an important turning point in the relations among Moscow-East Berlin-Bonn. The Soviet-West German relationship began to flourish. The German-German relationship on the other hand, stagnated.29

The wide-ranging declaration of intent in the GermanGerman "Joint Communique" of September 1987, particularly the creation of a mixed commission for further development of economic relations, proved to be a farce within a few months.30 Rather than increasing, GermanGerman trade decreased in 1987 and 1988. One last aspect that still flourished was the SED's policy of using human beings as bargaining chips. In May 1988, the Federal Republic increased its lump sum payment from DM 525 million to DM 860 million for the 1990-1999 period in return for the GDR's easing of travel restrictions for East Germans visiting the West. In all other respects, however, Bonn restricted its relations with East Berlin to the minimum that was diplomatically necessary and, above all, non-binding. In the course of 1988, Moscow and East Berlin each grew increasingly uneasy about the other's intentions. At the conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) follow-up meeting in Vienna. in January 1989, the signatory states pledged to observe the right of every individual "to travel from any country, including his own, and the unrestricted (right) to return to his country." The GDR had signed similar international agreements many times before without ever putting them into effect domestically. But in Vienna, initially under steady pressure from the Soviets, it agreed to guarantee this right by law and to allow observation of its implementation.31 Soviet foreign policy forced domestic political obligations on East Berlin that, if implemented, would threaten at least the stability, if not the existence, of the GDR by softening its rigid isolation from the outside world.

The main source of domestic instability for the SED regime was the desolate state of the economy. In 1971, together with the CPSU, the SED had changed its economic strategy to the so-called "policy of main tasks," which was memorably formulated in 1975 as the "unity of economic and social policy."32 The SED leadership's promise of welfare-state measures-such as a housing-construction