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Schabowski: (Looks through his papers...) That comes into effect, according to my information, immediately, without delay (looking through his papers further).

Labs: (quietly)...without delay.

Beil: (quietly) That has to be decided by the Council of Ministers.

Question: (...Many voices...) You only said the FRG, is the regulation also valid for West Berlin?

Schabowski: (reading aloud quickly) "As the Press Office of the Ministry... the Council of Ministers decided that until the Volkskammer implements a corresponding law, this transition regulation will be in effect."

Question: Does this also apply for West Berlin? You only mentioned the FRG.

Schabowski: (shrugs his shoulders, frowns, looks at his papers) So... (pause), um hmmm (reads aloud): "Permanent exit can take place via all border crossings from the GDR to the FRG and West Berlin, respectively."

Question: Another question also: does that mean that effective immediately, GDR citizens-Christoph Janowski, Voice of America does that mean that effective immediately, all GDR citizens cannot emigrate via Czechoslovakia or Poland?

Schabowski: No, that is not addressed at all. We hope instead that the movement will (um) regulate itself in this manner, as we are trying to.

Question: (many voices, incomprehensible question) Schabowski: I haven't heard anything to the contrary. Question: (many voices, incomprehensible) Schabowski: I haven't heard anything to the contrary. Question: (many voices, incomprehensible) Schabowski: I haven't heard anything to the contrary. I'm expressing myself so carefully because I'm not up to date on this question, but just before I came over here I was given this information. (Several journalists hurry from the room.)

Frage: Mr. Schabowski, what is going to happen to the Berlin Wall now?

Schabowski: It has been brought to my attention that it is 7:00 p.m.. That has to be the last question. Thank you for your understanding.

(um...) What will happen to the Berlin Wall? Information has already been provided in connection with travel activities. (um) The issue of travel, (um) the ability to cross the Wall from our side, ... hasn't been answered yet and exclusively the question in the sense..., so this, I'll put it this way, fortified state border of the GDR.... (um) We have always said that there have to be several other factors (um) taken into consideration. And they deal with the complex of questions that Comrade Krenz, in his talk in the addressed in view of the relations between the GDR and the FRG, in ditto light of the (um) necessity of continuing the process of assuring peace with new initiatives.

And (um) surely the debate about these questions (um) will be positively influenced if the FRG and NATO also agree to and implement disarmament measures in a similar manner

to that of the GDR and other socialist countries. Thank you very much.

[Source: Author's transcript of television broadcast. Translated for CWIHP by Howard Sargeant.]

DOCUMENT No. 9

Verbal Message from Mikhail Gorbachev to Helmut Kohl,

10 November 1989113

As you, of course, know, the GDR leadership made the decision to allow the citizens of East Germany unrestricted travel to West Berlin and the FRG. It is understandable, that this decision was not an easy one for the new leadership of the GDR. At the same time, the decision underlines the fact that deep and fundamental changes are taking place in East Germany. The leadership is acting in a concerted and dynamic manner in the interests of its people, and they are opening a dialog with various groups and levels of society.

Statements from the FRG made against this political and psychological background, designed to stimulate a denial of the existence of two German states and encourage emotional reactions, can have no other goal than

destabilizing the situation in the GDR and subverting the ongoing processes of democratization and the renewal of all areas of society.

We have received notice that a meeting will take place today in West Berlin, in which official representatives of the FRG and West Berlin will participate. A meeting is planned in the capital of the GDR at the same time.

With the current situation of de facto open borders and huge numbers of people moving in both directions, a chaotic situation could easily develop that might have unforeseen consequences.

In light of the time pressure and the seriousness of the situation, I thought it necessary to ask you, in the spirit of openness and realism, to take the extremely pressing steps necessary to prevent a complication and destabilization of the situation.

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/319. Translated for CWIHP by Howard Sargeant.]

DOCUMENT No. 10

Verbal Message from Mikhail Gorbachev to François Mitterand, Margaret Thatcher and George Bush,

10 November 1989

In light of the rather extreme situation currently taking place in the GDR, its capital city, and in West Berlin, and in reference to what I consider the correct and forward-looking decision by the new East German leadership, I have just sent a verbal message to Chancellor Kohl. I consider it necessary to inform you of the contents of the message as well.

According to our information, a meeting is taking place today in West Berlin in which official representatives of the FRG and West Berlin will participate. A parallel meeting is planned in East Berlin. With the current situation of de facto open borders and huge numbers of people moving in both directions, a chaotic situation could easily develop that might have unforeseen consequences.

I have appealed to Chancellor Kohl to take the extremely pressing steps necessary to prevent a complication and destabilization of the situation.

Our ambassador in Berlin was instructed to contact the representatives of the governments of the three Allied powers in West Berlin. I hope that you will also contact your representatives so that the events do not take an undesirable turn.

In general, I would like to emphasize that deep and fundamental changes are currently taking place in East Germany. If statements are made in the FRG, however, that seek to generate emotional denials of the postwar realities, meaning the existence of two German states, the appearance of such political extremism cannot be viewed as anything other than attempts to destabilize the situation in the GDR and subvert the ongoing processes of democratization and the renewal of all areas of society. Looking forward, this would bring about not only the destabilization of the situation in Central Europe, but also in other parts of the world.

I would like to express my hope that you receive this news with understanding.

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/319. Translated for CWIHP by Howard Sargeant.]

***

DOCUMENT No. 11

Information about the Content of a Telephone Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl,

11 November 1989114

The conversation took place on 11 November on the Chancellor's initiative.

The Chancellor said he wanted to respond to the verbal message from Mikhail Gorbachev, which he had received at the beginning of the meeting in West Berlin the previous day.

Helmut Kohl stated that the FRG welcomed the beginning of reforms in the GDR and hoped that they could be carried out in a calm atmosphere. He said: "I reject any radicalization and do not wish to see any destabilization of the situation in the GDR."

The Chancellor admitted that the majority of East German citizens that had crossed the borders to the FRG in the last few days did not want to stay in West Germany forever. He also assured him [Gorbachev] that the leadership of the FRG did not seek this either. Kohl said a mass resettlement to the FRG would be an absurd development. "We want the Germans to build their futures in their current homes." Kohl informed him [Gorbachev] that he was preparing for a meeting with Krenz at the end of November. In this context he mentioned that, given the current conditions in East Germany, the new GDR leadership should work dynamically to implement the reforms.

Mikhail Gorbachev emphasized that the current profound changes in the world would take different forms and occur within varying shape and intensities in different countries. It was necessary for all sides to maintain stability and to take a balanced approach.

[Gorbachev:] Overall, the basis for mutual understanding was improving. We were growing closer, which was very important.

As far as the GDR is concerned, the current leadership has a far-reaching program. All those questions, though, have to be worked through carefully, which required time.

I understand that all Europeans, and not only they, are following the events in the GDR. This is a very important point in world politics. But it is also a fact that the FRG and the Soviet Union, for historical reasons as well as due to the character of their current relationship, also have a greater interest in this development.

Naturally, every change is accompanied by a certain degree of instability. When I speak of maintaining stability, I mean that all sides should think through their actions very carefully.

I believe, Mr. Chancellor, that we are currently experiencing a historic change to different relationships and a different world. We should not allow careless actions to damage this change. Under no circumstances should the developments be forced in an unpredictable direction, which could lead to chaos. That would not be desirable under any circumstances.

Therefore I take very seriously what you told me during our conversation. I hope that you will use your authority, your political weight and your influence to keep others within the boundaries required to meet the demands of the time.

Kohl agreed with Gorbachev's statements. According to

him, the FRG government had discussed this question in this spirit.

The Chancellor emphasized his interest in maintaining contact, including with regard to the situation in the GDR.

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/319, pp. 12-19. Translated for CWIHP by Howard Sargeant]

Dr. Hans-Hermann Hertle is a research fellow with the Center for Contemporary History Research Potsdam and and expert consultant for the Bundestag Commission on Social and Political Change in the Neue Länder.

1

' The paper is based on the following works by the author: Hans-Hermann Hertle, Der Fall der Mauer: Die unbeabsichtigte Selbstauflösung des SED-Staates, 2nd edition (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1999); Chronik des Mauerfalls, 8th edition (Berlin: Ch. Links, 1999); HansHermann Hertle and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan, eds., Das Ende der SED. Die letzten Tage des Zentralkomitees, 4th edition (Berlin: Ch. Links, 1999); Hans-Hermann Hertle/Kathrin Elsner, Mein 9. November. Der Tag, an dem die Mauer fiel (Berlin: Nicolai, 1999).

2 See Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).

3 For the international aspects of German unification, see the seminal work by Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press, 1995); also see Werner Weidenfeld (with Peter Wagner und Elke Bruck), Außenpolitik für die deutsche Einheit: Die Entscheidungsjahre 1989/90 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1998); Karl Kaiser, Deutschlands Vereinigung (Bergisch-Gladbach: Bastei-Lübbe, 1991); and Konrad H. Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity (New York: Oxford Press, 1994).

4

* Mary E. Sarotte, "Elite Intransigence and the End of the Berlin Wall," German Politics 2:2 (August 1993), p. 270. 5 See Egon Krenz, Wenn Mauern fallen (Wien: Neff, 1990); idem, “Anmerkungen zur Öffnung der Berliner Mauer im Herbst 1989," Osteuropa 4 (1992), pp. 365-369; Günter Schabowski, Das Politbüro (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1990); idem, Der Absturz (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1991).

"James A. McAdams, Germany Divided: From the Wall to Reunification (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 199. Similar arguments may be found in Frank A. Ninkovich, Germany and the United States: The Transformation of the German Question since 1945 (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1995), p. 163, and Catherine McArdle Kelleher, "The New Germany. An Overview", in Paul B. Stares (ed.), The New Germany and the New Europe (Washington: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 16.

7

Charles S. Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 161.

8 See Friedrich Schorlemmer, "Frieden vor Einheit sagen," in Peter Neumann (ed.), Träumen verboten. Aktuelle Stellungnahmen aus der DDR (Göttingen: Lamuv, 1990), p. 54.

'See Sunday Times, 19 November 1989; Don Oberdorfer, The Turn From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union 1983-1990 (New York: Poseidon Press, 1991), p. 363; Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston/Toronto/London: Little, Brown, 1993), p. 134; Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 468.

10 Mary Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR 1949-1989 (Oxford: New York, 1995), p. 259. "Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name (New York: Vintage Books 1993), p. 345.

12 See Cordt Schnibben, "Diesmal sterbe ich, Schwester," Der Spiegel, No. 42, 8 October 1990, pp. 102109; Friedrich Kurz, Die sieben Mythen der Wiedervereinigung (München: Ehrenwirth, 1991), pp. 165

191.

13 See, e.g., Henryk Broder, "Eine schöne Revolution," Die Zeit, No. 3, 16 January 1992.

14 Even Zbigniew Brzezinski, one of the few analysts who predicted the end of communism, considered the GDR a stable state. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Failure. The Birth and Death of Communism in the 20th Century (New York: Macmillan, 1989).

15 Bohdan Harasymiw, Soviet Communist Party Officials: A Study in Organizational Roles and Change (Nova Science Publishers, 1996), p. IX.

16 Peter Steinbach, "Deutsche Systemumbrüche im 20. Jahrhundert," Das Ende der SED: Die letzten Tage des Zentralkomitees, pp. 13-14.

17 Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1992), p. 258.

18 Reinhard Bendix, Freiheit und historisches Schicksal (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1982), p. 65.

19 For an example, see Claus Offe, "Wohlstand, Nation, Republik" in Hans Joas and Martin Kohli, eds., Der Zusammenbruch der DDR (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1993), p. 296.

20In the following presentation, aspects of the relationship among the party's leadership, its functionaries, and its members, the analysis of security policy, the development of ideology, the political behavior of the population in the years prior to 1989, and the genesis and policies of the reform and citizen movements will not be emphasized.

21 The documents of the government of the Federal Republic, in contrast to the readily available documents of the GDR, still fall under the usual restriction that they not

be released for thirty years. A selection of relevant documents is printed in Dokumente zur

Deutschlandpolitik. Deutsche Einheit 1989/90, compiled by Hans Jürgen Küsters and Daniel Hofmann (Munich: R.Oldenbourg, 1998).

22 Mary E. Sarotte demonstrates the knowledge gained by taking the international context of apparently exclusive German-German relations into consideration in her exemplary study on the international context of the basic treaty negotiations (1969-1973) in Deutschland Archiv 6 (1997), pp. 901-911. For her complete study, see Mary E. Sarotte, The East German Ruling Regime and Ostpolitik in the Context of Superpower Détente, 19691973, New Haven, 1999, dissertation ms.

23 For an analysis of the decline of the Soviet Union, see Hannes Adomeit, Imperial Overstretch: Germany in Soviet Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1998).

24 See Mikhail Gorbachev, Erinnerungen (Munich: Goldmann, 1996).

25 Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO-BArch), DY 30/IV2/1/658; see Daniel Küchenmeister, ed., Honecker-Gorbatschow: Vieraugengespräche (Berlin: Dietz, 1993), pp. 14-15.

26 Anatoli Tschernajew, Die letzten Jahre einer Weltmacht: Der Kreml von innen (Stuttgart: Deutsche

Verlags-Anstalt, 1993), p. 245.

27 Eduard Schewardnadse, Die Zukunft gehört der Freiheit (Hamburg: Reinbek, 1991), p. 106.

28 See Hans-Hermann Hertle, "Der Sturz Erich Honeckers: Zur Rekonstruktion eines innerparteilichen Machtkampfes," in Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Peter Steinbach and Johannes Tuchel (eds.), Widerstand und Opposition in der DDR (Cologne: Böhlau, 1999), pp. 327-346.

29 For a representation of the Federal Republic's Deutschlandpolitik in the 1980s, see Karl-Rudolf Korte, Deutschlandpolitik in Helmut Kohls Kanzlerschaft. Regierungsstil und Entscheidungen 1982-1989, (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1998).

30 The communiqué is printed in Ein Erfolg der Politik der Vernunft und des Realismus (East Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1987), pp. 37-38.

31 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, "Concluding Document of the Vienna CSCE Conference. Vienna, 15 January 1989, "Deutschland Archiv 4 (1989), pp. 467-69.

32 The seventh SED Party Convention in 1971 proclaimed the "increasing of the people's material and cultural standard of living on the basis of a high rate of development of socialist production, increasing the effectiveness of scientific-technical progress and increased work productivity as the main task."

33 M. Rainer Lepsius, "Die Bundesrepublik ein neuer Nationalstaat?," Berliner Journal für Soziologie 1 (1994),

Excerpt from the Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev,
11 October 1989

Wednesday, 11 October 1989

I have read the record of conversation of M.S. [Gorbachev] with Honecker in Berlin. I spoke with him [Gorbachev] about this. [Georgy] Shakhnazarov was present. M.S. [Gorbachev] called Honecker an "asshole" [mudak]. He, Gorbachev added, could have said to his [East German] lieutenants: I have undergone four operations, I am 78 years old, the stormy time requires too much strength, let me go, I have done my job. Then he might have kept his place in history.

Shakh[nazarov] and I voiced our doubts that even if he had done so he would have kept his place in history. 2-3 years ago it might have been possible. Today he has already been cursed by his people... The Politburo [of the SED] is in session for the second day in Berlin. [Honecker's future successor Egon] Krenz has promised "to raise a question" about changes to our Ambassador [Vyacheslav Kochemassov] for transmittal to Gorbachev. Honecker warned him: [If you do it] you will become my enemy.

However, Krenz seems to have taken the step. What is about to happen?

[Source: Notes of Anatoly Chernyaev, Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, f. 2, op. 2. Translated by Vladislav Zubok (The National Security Archive).]

p. 10.

34 On this issue, see Theo Pirker, M. Rainer Lepsius, Rainer Weinert and Hans-Hermann Hertle, Der Plan als Befehl und Fiktion: Wirtschaftsführung in der DDR (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1995).

35 See Sigrid Meuschel, Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft in der DDR (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1992).

36 Heinz Klopfer, Persönliche Notizen über die Beratung beim Generalsekretär des ZK der SED und Vorsitzenden des Staatsrates der DDR, Erich Honecker, Berlin, 16 May 1989, p. 42.

37 The Valutamark (VM) was the currency the GDR used for foreign trade with the West. One VM corresponded to one (West German) DM.

38 "Darlegungen Gerhard Schürers zur Zahlungsbilanz mit dem nichtsozialistischen Wirtschaftsgebiet, " 16 May 1989, BA, Berlin Branch, E-1

56321.

39 "Communiqué of the Meeting of the Political Advisory Committee of the Member States of the Warsaw Pact", 7-8 July 1989 in Bucharest, Europa-Archiv 20 (1989), p. 599; see also Thomas Blanton, “When did the Cold War end?" CWIHP Bulletin 10 (March 1998), pp. 184-7.

40 Stephen Szabo, The Diplomacy of German Unification (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992); Helmut Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit (Berlin: Propyläen 1996), p. 74.

41 See Hannes Adomeit, "Gorbachev and German Unification," Problems of Communism, no. 4 (1990), p. 6. 42 Tobias Hollitzer, "Heute entscheidet es sich: Entweder die oder wir." Zum 9. Oktober in Leipzig, in Horch und Guck 2 (1998), p. 23-37; Elizabeth Pond, Beyond the Wall: Germany's Road to Unification (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993), p. 111-129; Ekkehard Kuhn, Der Tag der Entscheidung: Leipzig, 9 October 1989 (Berlin-Frankfurt/Main: Ullstein, 1992).

43 Gerhard Schürer, Gerhard Beil, Alexander Schalck, Ernst Höfner and Arno Donda Vorlage für das Politbüro des Zentralkomitees der SED, Betreff: Analyse der ökonomischen Lage der DDR mit Schlußfolgerungen, 27 October 1989, SAPMO-BA, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/3252.

44 'Gerhard Schürer's comments: "We had the idea of bringing the continued existence of the Wall into the discussion. That is the first official document from the former GDR that, to my knowledge, dared bring up the Wall for discussion. Up to this time, Honecker's saying, 'The Wall will stand another hundred years!' was still the official line."

It was clear to me that the GDR's sovereignty could only be maintained in a restricted manner, since it was clear to me that if the FRG was going to give us 8-10 billion, the money would come with political demands attached. As economists, we could no longer have such an illusion because we knew that there was no other possible way out. The only way out was for us to gain access to capital for investments in new technology. If we were not able to do

this, annexation was the only possible result." (Author's conversation with Gerhard Schürer, 21 February 1992.)

45 Compare the final version of the Politbüro draft, SAPMO-BA, ZPA-SED, DY 30/J IV 2/2/2356, with the original draft in SAPMO-BA, ZPA-SED, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/ 3252.

46 Gerhard Schürer, Explanatory section of the draft "Analyse der ökonomischen Lage der DDR mit Schlußfolgerungen" (speech text), Berlin, 31 October 1989,

p. 9.

47 If not stated otherwise, sources and notes for the following section can be found in Hans-Hermann Hertle, Der Fall der Mauer, pp. 143-44.

48 Memorandum of Conversation between Comrade Egon Krenz, General Secretary of the SED Central Committee and Chairman of the GDR Council of State, with Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 1 November 1989 in Moscow, Berlin, 1 November 1989, SAPMO-BA, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/329 (Document No. 1).

[blocks in formation]

56 Tenth meeting of the Central Committee of the SED, 9 November 1989 (transcription of a recording), documented in Hans-Hermann Hertle and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan, eds., Das Ende der SED, p. 305 (Document No. 7). 57 See Document No. 8.

58 Tom Brokaw: "I would like to tell you that I knew that the Wall would come down. That was not the case. I did think that there would be a very interesting and important political story. So I went to Berlin simply to be in the midst of that story." (Author's interview with Tom Brokaw, 4 November 1998.)

59 Michael E. Geisler, "Mehrfach gebrochene Mauerschau: 1989-1990 in den US-Medien," in Rainer Bohn, Knut Hickethier and Eggo Müller, eds., Mauer-Show: Das Ende der DDR, die deutsche Einheit und die Medien (Berlin: Sigma, 1992), pp. 260-61.

60 Author's interview with Michelle Neubert (NBC), 11

July 1995.

61 See the portrayal by Marc Kusnetz in Robert Goldberg and Gerald Jay Goldberg, Anchors: Brokaw, Jennings, Rather and the Evening News (Secaucus, NJ: Carol Publishing Group, 1990), p. 262, as well as Peter Ross Range, When Walls Come Tumbling Down: Covering The

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