East German Revolution, (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center, 1991), p. 7.

62NBC Nightly News, Thursday, 9 November 1989, Title: "Berlin Wall is opened for unrestricted travel for the first time since its construction 28 years ago." Hit time: 7:01:47 (NBC News Archives, New York).

63 Ibid.

64 A camera crew from the German television station SFB captured this scene with Tom Brokaw. The interview with Schabowski was aired on the NBC evening news shortly after 7:00 p.m. EST on 9 November 1989 (10 November, 1:00a.m. in Berlin).

65 George Bush: "I felt emotional about it. But I did not want to overplay the hand of the United States of America. I did not want at that critical moment for us to gloat, to stick my fingers in Mr. Gorbachev's eyes, which would have been the worst thing you could possibly do. So, restraint was called for." (Author's interview with George Bush, 2 July 1998.) See “Remarks and a Question-andAnswer Session with Reporters on the Relaxation of East German Border Controls," 9 November 1989, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George Bush, 1989, Book II: July 1 to December 31, 1989 (GPO: Washington, 1990), pp. 1488-1490. See also George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998), pp. 148-151.

66 Margaret Thatcher, on BBC Radio 4, 10 November 1989, 2:00 p.m. For the British Prime Minister's approach, also see Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), pp. 792-794, and Percy Cradock, In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major, (London: John Murray, 1997), pp. 102-104.

67 Francois Mitterrand, France 1, 10 November 1989, 6:00p.m.

68 See Jacques Attali, Verbatim, vol. III, (Paris: Fayard 1995, p. 337.

69 Author's interview with Helmut Kohl, 25 November 1998.

70 Author's interview with Mikhail Gorbachev, 8 December 1998.

71 Author's interview with Eduard Shevardnadze, 18 December 1998.

72 Ibid.

73 Author's interview with Mikhail Gorbachev, 8 December 1998.

74 "Schön, ich gab die DDR weg." Interview with Mikhail Gorbachev, Der Spiegel (2 October 1995), p. 72. 75 Nikolai Portugalov, in: Ekkehard Kuhn, Gorbatschow und die deutsche Einheit (Bonn: Bouvier, 1993), pp. 65, 70.

76 Ibid., p. 70.

77 ADN, 10 November 1989, 6:45 p.m.

78 See Yuli A. Kvizinski, Vor dem Sturm: Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten (Berlin: Siedler, 1993), p. 15.

79 Verbal message from Mikhail Gorbachev to Helmut Kohl, 10 November 1989, in SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/

2.039/319, sheets 15/16 (Document No. 9).

80 Verbal message from Mikhail Gorbachev to President François Mitterrand, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and President George Bush, 10 November 1989, in SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/319, sheets 20/21 (Document No. 10).

81 Helmut Kohl: "I took Gorbachev's message very seriously. I also believe that this request was fateful for the following days. We now know that GDR State Security and parts of the SED leadership were sending their Soviet friends very threatening scenarios. They told them that order had broken down completely and that Soviet facilities and possibly the troops could be caught up in the chaos, and that their security—that was Gorbachev's concerncould no longer be guaranteed. The KGB had passed on such information from the Stasi to Gorbachev.

I now know from my later conversations with Gorbachev just how decisive this moment was, that he rather believed us than the KGB. Developments certainly would have taken a different path if Gorbachev had, to put it sharply, turned the military loose on 10 November 1989, as the Soviet leadership had in June 1953. That would have had terrible consequences.

We informed Gorbachev that his fears were groundless, that there was no upheaval, but that the people simply wanted to come together, that the mood remained upbeat and things were taking place peacefully. In this decisive hour, Mikhail Gorbachev believed me." (Author's interview with Helmut Kohl, 25 November 1998); Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung (Berlin: Siedler, 1991), p. 20.

82 Ibid., p. 23.

83 Ibid.

84 "We wanted to welcome the change diplomatically, almost clinically-and try as best we could not to be overly emotional, so that Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, and other Soviets who saw our reaction would not feel, as the President put it, 'that we were sticking our thumb in their eye'." James A. Baker, with Thomas A. Defrank, The Politics of Diplomacy. Revolution, War and Peace (New York: Putnam, 1995), p. 164.

85 The chancellory's notes on the phone conversation are documented in Hans Jürgen Küsters and Daniel Hofmann, eds., Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik: Deutsche Einheit 1989/90 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1998), pp. 505-507.

86 Information about the contents of the phone conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl on 11 November 1989, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/ 319, sheets 17-19 (Document No. 11). Also see Teltschik, 329 Tage, p. 27.

87 Ibid., p. 28.

88 See Robert K. Merton, "The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action," American Sociological Review 1 (1936), pp. 894-904.

89 Robert K. Merton, "Die Self-Fulfilling-Prophecy," Soziologische Theorie und soziale Struktur (Berlin: de

Gruyter, 1995), pp. 399-413.

90 Ibid., p. 399.

91 See M. Rainer Lepsius, "Die Bundesrepublik - ein neuer Nationalstaat?," Berliner Journal für Soziologie 1 (1994), p. 10.

92 See the statement of the "Neues Forum" of 12 November 1989, "Die Mauer ist gefallen", Die ersten Texte des Neuen Forum edited for the state press agency for New Forum, (East Berlin: Tribüne Druckerei, 1990), pp. 2021, as well as the proclamation "Für unser Land," dated 26 November but published on 28 November 1989 (see Neues Deutschland, 29 November 1989).

93 See the detailed account in Rafael Biermann, Zwischen Kreml und Kanzleramt: Wie Moskau mit der deutschen Einheit rang (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1997). 94 Also see Dieter Grosser, Das Wagnis der Wirtschafts-, Währungs und Sozialunion: Politische Zwänge im Konflikt mit ökonomischen Regeln (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1998).

95 See Lepsius, "Die Bundesrepublik--ein neuer Nationalstaat?," p. 10.

96 From 25 September to 2 October 1989, Krenz participated in the ceremonies on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the People's Republic of China.

97 On Ulbricht's 1971 ouster, see Mary E. Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Détente and Ostpolitik, 1963-1973 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

98 On the Nina Andreeva affair, see Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 168, 172-74.

99 Reference to a German card game. The "black Peter" is a card you want to avoid holding at the end of the game. 100 Reference to Honecker's hardline 13 October 1980 speech in Gera, in which the East German leader had demanded, among other things, the Western recognition of GDR citizenship.

101 Krenz's handwritten note on the address: "Kr. 7 November, 1989."

102 The note bears a handwritten comment from Krenz on the first page: "Comrade Schalck. 1) Thank you! 2) Please send me relevant material for talks with Seiters. 12 November/Kr"

103 Krenz signed off on this letter with his initials "Kr." 104 The document does not bear a registration stamp and is signed with Stoph's handwritten abbreviation "St." 105 Head of the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers since 7 November 1989.

106 Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst, the official GDR press agency.

107 Günther Jahn, the First Secretary of the SED District leadership of Potsdam, was next on the list of speakers.

108 Hans-Joachim Hoffmann, born 1929, from 1973 to 1989 the GDR Minister of Culture and from 1976 to 1989/90, he was a member of the SED Central Committee and a Representative in the GDR Parliament. Hoffmann died in

1994.

109 Friedrich Dickel, Army General, successor to Karl Maron as Minister of the Interior and the head of the People's Police, member of the SED Central Committee and delegate in the GDR Parliament, member of the National Defense Council.

110 Professor Dr. Manfred Banaschak, editor-in-chief of the SED theoretical journal "Einheit" [Unity].

111 Author's transcript from the television recording. Schabowski was accompanied to the press conference by three other members of the Central Committee: Professor Manfred Banaschak, Helga Labs, Chair of the Teachers' and Instructors' Union, and Foreign Trade Minister Gerhard Beil.

112 Schabowski at this point at first skipped the words: "and (West) Berlin, respectively," but this point brought a second question. See below.

113 The Soviet ambassador in Bonn, Yuli Kvizinski, presented the verbal message from Gorbachev to Kohl's advisor Horst Teltschik during the program in front of the Schöneberg Town Hall in Berlin. See Yuli Kvizinski, Vor dem Sturm (Berlin: Siedler, 1993), p. 15; see also Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage. The SED leadership received the written version of this message from the Soviet embassy in East Berlin with the date of 13 November 1989.

114 The document is, like documents 10 and 11, information sent from the Soviet embassy in East Berlin to the SED General Secretary. According to Horst Teltschik, the phone conversation took place around 12:00 p.m. See Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage, pp. 27-28.

By Jordan Baev

T

hough induced by similar social and economic conditions, the political changes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 had different historical, psychological and functional characteristics in each country. Against the background, or rather the foreground, of the succession of reforms in Poland and Hungary, the dramatic changes in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and the bloodstained epilogue of the Romanian dictatorship, the events taking place in Sofia that November passed by, barely noticed by the international community.'

The process of the Bulgarian transition to pluralist democracy is still largely unknown in the West. There were three main internal political factors which brought about the change in the Bulgarian political system: first, behindthe-scene political ambitions and infighting within the ruling elite; second, the ethnic conflict in the eastern part of the country; and, finally, the increasingly open social discontent, expressed predominantly within intellectual circles. All three factors have foreign analogues but they differ in their peculiar Bulgarian origins. Just as in some other Eastern European countries, the first challenge to authority in Bulgaria came not from traditional opposition organizations, but from newly-formed ecological and human rights groups, inspired to some extend by the example of the "green" movements in the West. The independent trade union "Podkrepa" [Support] was created as a Bulgarian analogue of the Polish "Solidarity." In Romania, an important cause of the internal conflict was the oppression of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. Similarly, in Bulgaria the treatment of the Bulgarian Turks by the authorities after 1984 had turned into a peculiar "detonator." In combination with the worsened economic situation, this issue played an important part in the heightening of social tensions. Moreover, the Soviet embassy in Sofia, following Mikhail Gorbachev's unambiguous instructions, played an important role in changing who ruled in the Bulgarian capital.

The overthrow of Todor Zhivkov,2 the longest ruling communist leader in Eastern Europe, was the result of joint behind-the-scene efforts by communist party reformers and senior Soviet diplomats in Bulgaria. No authentic documents on the events preceding Zhivkov's "resignation" on 10 November 1989 are thus far available. Various memoirs offer contradictory information and prejudiced attempts to mythologize or demonize key persons and events. During the last decade, I have had the opportunity to interview many of the participants crucial to Zhivkov's ouster. Generally, they lacked clear and definite answers to the key issues. Among those interviewed were former Foreign Minister Petar Mladenov,3 Todor Zhivkov's successor as political leader and head of state in November

1989; the late ex-prime ministers Stanko Todorov and Andrey Lukanov;' Dimiter Stanishev, former Secretary of the Central Committee [CC] of the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] in charge of international relations during the period 1977-1990; Gen. Dobri Dzhurov and Gen. Atanas Semerjiev,' the defense minister and chief of staff, respectively, each with the longest service of any in a Warsaw Pact country. Analysis of the decision-making process requires careful reading "between the lines" of the available information and a critical comparison of the existing fragmentary articles. The following documentary publication is a first selection of Bulgarian "political elite" documents from 1989.

A specific characteristic of Cold War Bulgaria was the lack of strong anti-communist opposition, not to mention the lack of influence on the part of traditional bourgeois parties in the political life of the country before November 1989. Individual acts by some intellectuals (many of whom either had a communist background, or were connected in some way with the ruling elite) as well as feeble efforts to create dissident groups (inspired mainly by the Czechoslovak and Polish examples), did not draw much public response until the mid-eighties. The strongest challenges Todor Zhivkov had ever faced had come many years earlier from reformist or Stalinist circles within his own party. Hence, one of Zhivkov's favored measures since 1956 had been to reshuffle the hierarchy periodically, thus rendering potential rivals harmless and keeping the remaining members of the leadership in check.

8

In 1987-88 several "informal" ecological, human rights and reformist groups came into existence in Bulgariagroups in which communist intellectuals took an active part as well. In most cases, however, these groups did not call for a change of the political system, but for its reform. The secret services were shocked when they discovered that among the leaders of these groups were BCP CC members. Following Zhivkov's personal instructions, the authorities retaliated with repressive measures which, however, proved counterproductive. At the same time, Zhivkov conducted his regular reshuffling of his favorites and opponents. The appointment of Zhivkov's son to one of the leading positions in the arena of Bulgarian culture aroused particularly strong resentment among many Bulgarians. It triggered protests even within the circle of Zhivkov's closest associates, including Defense Minister Dzhurov.

Among those expelled from the Communist Party for participation in an "informal" group was Sonya Bakish, the wife of Stanko Todorov, the former prime minister and then chairman of the Bulgarian parliament. As a result Todorov submitted his letter of resignation from his position in July 1988. Although his resignation was not accepted, the episode for many was one of the first indications that the

anti-Zhivkov opposition had reached into the top echelon of power. The second half of 1988 was most likely the time when certain Politburo members began to consider seriously their chances of changing the status quo in the long run and toppling Todor Zhivkov. That became a reality a year later when the regime became internationally isolated (owing to the persecution of the Bulgarian Turks), when the country sank further into economic recession, and the growing controversies within the Eastern European system aggravated the situation in Bulgaria.

The key factor in the events of 10 November 1989 in Bulgaria, however, was the Kremlin's position. Gorbachev's increasingly cool attitude toward Zhivkov outward expressions of "fraternal friendship" notwithstanding— was something of a public secret. Recently, a number of new facts regarding the energetic activities by the Soviet embassy in Sofia (mainly on the part of Ambassador Victor Sharapov and of Counselor Valentin Terechov) have become well known.io Sharapov and Terechov's purpose was to unite the efforts of some members of the party and state leadership to oust Zhivkov. Rather significant is the fact that even the KGB representative in Bulgaria, Gen. Vladilen Fyodorov, was kept in the dark about these efforts until the very last moment for fear of a "leak." The evidence seems to suggest that the embassy's efforts in Sofia were known only to Gorbachev's closest associates, among whom numbered Alexander Yakovlev, a key figure in the policy arena. As far as the evidence indicates, the main role in the events was assigned to Moscow-born Andrey Lukanov whose grandfather had been held in Stalin's prisons as a "rightist opportunist" and whose father had been Bulgarian foreign minister in late 1950s. While closely linked to influential circles in Moscow, Lukanov maintained at the same time good contacts with Western politicians and financial magnates, such as Robert Maxwell. Two things served as catalysts for the action against ZhivkovPetar Mladenov's 24 October 1989 letter to the BCP CC Politburo," and the replacement of Communist Party leader Erich Honecker in East Germany.

Participants in the events between 24 October and 9 November 1989 give conflicting accounts of their sequence. All of them, however, agree that the action to depose Zhivkov was carried out under central direction and conspiratorially to be able to succeed even under an enormously repressive system and to secure Moscow's discreet logistic support. All of this made possible Todor Zhivkov's acceptance of his ouster without any visible resistance at a Politburo session on the evening of 9 November. The acceptance of the resignation of the BCP CC Secretary General at the plenary session of the Central Committee on the following day was a mere formality. Zhivkov's overthrow was engineered so smoothly that neither the US ambassador in Sofia, Sol Polansky, nor top Washington officials responsible for Eastern Europe, such as Robert Hutchings and Condoleezza Rice, knew anything in advance.2 Not until a month later did US Secretary of State James Baker inform his deputy Lawrence S.

Eagleburger that he had received reliable information on the role that Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze had played in Zhivkov's ouster. Shevardnadze himself still keeps silent on the matter.

The actions of the new party-government team in Bulgaria after 10 November 1989 intended to preserve the political system through reforms and by changes in its outward appearance. Much of the blame was laid on Todor Zhivkov personally plus a few of his closest associates. In order to secure the survival of the authors of the "coup" as leading political figures in the future political system, some of them used their political influence and contacts to move into decisive economic positions. That was the main reason for the "duel" between Andrey Lukanov and Ognyan Doynov,13 the other party leader, specialized in foreign trade, also known for his connections with financial and business circles in the West. In the course of the following months another "recipe," recommended earlier by the authors of the Soviet Perestroika, was used-the sharing of the responsibilities of power with the newly established political opposition. Initially, during the spring of 1990, the Polish-Hungarian "round table" model was applied. Several months later the outbreak of a political crisis was overcome through the formula "your Presidentour Government." A year later, a "coalition government" was also tried. The anticommunist opposition responded to the requests with the reply "all power forever" and with demands for the prohibition of the former Communist Party (renamed in the spring 1990 as the Socialist Party). The bipolar model of fierce confrontation was typical during the first few years of political transition to a multiparty system

following 1989.

The Bulgarian documents presented below have never been published before. The first document has been obtained from the Diplomatic Archive, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the last two from the Archive of the Bulgarian Parliament. The rest of the documents are from the as yet unprocessed collections in the former BCP records.14

DOCUMENT No. 1

Memorandum from

Foreign Minister Petar Mladenov to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 12 July 1989

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

No. 01-05-20/12 July 1989

TO THE POLITBURO OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (THE CC OF THE BCP)

INFORMATION

by Petar Mladenov, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Comrades,

The routine session of the Political Consultative Committee of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact was held on 7 and 8 July in Bucharest [...]

The most pressing problems of socialism and the present day were analyzed in a business-like, constructive, and on some issues, critical and self-critical spirit; the paths were mapped out for accelerating the positive processes leading to a more stable and democratic world. Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev's speech set the tone for this atmosphere.

It was emphasized during the exchange of experience and information about the course of the renewal processes in the allied countries that, despite the diversity in national conditions, practically all socialist countries were struggling to resolve a series of similar problems. [These problems] had sprung from the necessity to overcome the negative tendencies in [these countries'] internal development and to stimulate and fully utilize the potentials of socialism.

The allied countries have lagged behind, especially in the field of new technology [and] in growth rates; the currency debts are perceived by the West as the "sunset of socialism." With regards to [these facts], the necessity to prove the advantages of the new order through both strong arguments and real actions was emphasized. The further influence of the socialist countries on positive

changes in the world will depend to a crucial degree on the ability of socialism to renew itself [...]

In the future, the socialist countries' political philosophy in the field of international relations should be a combination of active struggle for transition toward a new international order and a reliable defense of our countries.

In the process of exchanging opinions on the cardinal problems of disarmament, the leaders of the allied countries stressed the importance of signing a Soviet-American agreement on a 50% reduction in both countries' strategic offensive weapons, providing a strict adherence to the 1972 Agreement on Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense [i.e., the ABM Treaty]. The universal and complete ban on chemical arms and the liquidation of [chemical arms] stockpiles continue to be issues on the agenda of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact.

The meeting paid special attention to the process of building a “pan-European home." It analyzed the results of the recently held forums in the framework of the Helsinki process. Emphasis was placed on the interests and values common for the European peoples, on the need for equal dialogue and an enhancement of contacts in various areas. The unity of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals is possible and necessary in the conditions of preserving each country's identity and its social, economic and cultural diversity, which should be viewed as a treasure of European civilization. The meeting confirmed that every attempt to destabilize the situation in any socialist country will have an impact on the balance in Europe, and on the confidence building process between the two halves of the continent. Such an attempt will destroy what has been already achieved.

The Soviet leader informed the meeting about new developments in the relations and policies of the USSR towards the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] and France. [...]

Cde. Mikhail Gorbachev confirmed the readiness of the USSR to coordinate the size of the Soviet contingents and the order of their withdrawal from Eastern Europe with the leaderships of the allied countries. The combination of political, military and geographical factors should be taken into consideration during the discussion of [the abovementioned] possibility because it would influence the European situation after the realization of such a withdrawal. It was emphasized that the US proposal for equal ceilings on Soviet and American military contingents in Eastern Europe and Western Europe respectively, should be considered in a broader context. An optimal position should be prepared for counting the military contingents of the other NATO countries in the FRG as well.

The process of conventional military disarmament should be started in the shortest possible time. The Soviet leadership considers that real steps in this respect should be made around 1992-1993. At that time the question about NATO modernization is going to be worked out, a United Europe will be created, and new elections for the American