Much could be said about his [Atanasov's] economic incompetence and primitivism in working in the economic field.

I also want to address A. Lukanov and to ask him whether he feels himself the main culprit for the tremendous increase in the foreign debt. Who managed the currency commission? The privileged and [Todor Zhivkov's] retinue lined up to run this commission: Todor Zhivkov, Grisha Philipov,43 Georgy Atanasov. Invariably, Andrei Lukanov was either its chairman or its operative manager. [...].

I propose that G. Atanasov, A. Lukanov, and P. Pachov immediately hand in their resignation from all posts and duties currently occupied in order to avoid being disgracefully expelled later. [...]

I have spoken seriously and made serious accusations. I am prepared to answer to them. Those who accused me of being one of Todor Zhivkov's retinue should not hide behind anonymity, behind the flag of the Party and the country.

I do not call for revenge, but for justice. Hatred is a destructive force. We need love and optimism now in order to go forward.

In the past, there was a ready scenario for a speech such as mine. The voters were advised to request a recall of their people's representative. This was followed by prison and, as a result of the imprisonment, a lack of access to any documents with which a person could defend himself or herself.

Let us now see how this matter will be dealt with in democratic conditions.

Now, if we want the new-born democracy to survive, I propose that a parliamentary commission with the wide participation of public organizations and the mass media hears out everyone who is being accused or has something to say. In this way the members of Todor Zhivkov's retinue could be revealed as well as the real culprits responsible for the present situation.

Justice could be served only by uncorrupt people who will not take advantage of their power in order to hide their own shame and disgrace.

All of us who worked in the days of Todor Zhivkov, both good and bad, ought to leave and give way to new and young people, morally and mentally unburdened by the horrid deformations which we lived through.

13 December 1989 Ognyan Doynov

[Source: Archive of the Bulgarian Parliament, Sofia. Document obtained by Jordan Baev.]

DOCUMENT No. 5

Letter by People's Representative and Candidate BCP CC Politburo Member Andrey Lukanov to Stanko Todorov, Chairman of the People's Assembly, 18 December 1989

TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY, CDE. STANKO TODOROV

Comrade Chairman,

I would like to share several comments in connection with the accusations which the People's Representative Ognyan Doynov directed at me in his speech during the last session of the People's Assembly.

Before I dwell on these accusations, I would like to emphasize that I reject the principal thesis which Ognyan Doynov developed at the end of his speech concerning the equal guilt and culpability of all who worked under Todor Zhivkov-"both good and bad." This thesis could benefit only people with guilty consciences who would want to hide their own concrete guilt and concrete deeds behind collective responsibility.

I am also dismayed at Ognyan Doynov's statement that he has never been in Todor Zhivkov's retinue.

Lately, many of those who Todor Zhivkov promoted and set against the honest people in the leadership of the party, and later removed according to his own reasons, present themselves as his victims and even as fighters against his personal dictatorship. Such is the case with the people's representative Ognyan Doynov.

And now, about Ognyan Doynov's accusations. The first concerns my culpability for the increase of our foreign debt. Obviously, all of us who were in the government carry such responsibility to some extent. I do not believe Ognyan Doynov has forgotten that at the time when I was entrusted with the duties of Secretary of the Politburo's currency commission, together with all the respective rights and authority, Bulgaria's foreign debt was reduced from $4 billion in 1978 to $2.923 billion in 1984.

Of course, no one should take personal credit for this because the sharp decrease in debt was the result of a truly nationwide mobilization.

Grisha Philipov announced in 1984 on instructions from Todor Zhivkov that I was not to deal with capitalist countries and currency problems any longer so that I could concentrate my attention on relations with the membercountries of the COMECON.

Regardless of this, during the past few years as a member of the government, I have opposed many times, with varying success, requests for an increase in the country's currency expenses and a respective increase in

the interest on debt. Such requests were made very often in connection with propositions for additional currency expenses by Ognyan Doynov or other individuals whom he managed. My colleagues in the government during these years can confirm this.

If we truly desire to be objective, we should also take into account that the reasons for the increase in the foreign debt during the last few years are connected not only to the deformations in economic policy, but also due to outside factors and domestic and international conditions. [.....]

Analyzing Ognyan Doynov's accusations and his whole speech, I ask myself what motivated him to utter so many untruths at once. Knowing him well, I am convinced that this is not accidental and is not due to a lack of knowledge about the true state of affairs. I come to the conclusion that in this case he is trying to place himself ahead of truthful revelation in order to present himself as a victim once again—this time a victim of the present party and state leadership. I am confident that this tactic will not hinder the clarification of actual facts, provided the requirements for objectivity and impartiality are fully adhered to.

As for me, I understand very well that I am one rather "inconvenient" witness to Ognyan Doynov because I am very well familiar with many of his risky projects and concrete actions due to the authority of the duties I performed.

He expressed doubts about my impartiality by voting against my appointment as chairman of the parliamentary commission for investigations and for resolving urgent issues related to deformation and violation of the law. Taking this into account, I have already asked the commission to relieve me of the obligation to deal with the cases concerning Ognyan Doynov. This will be performed by other members of the commission against whom he has not expressed reservations.

I will be grateful, esteemed Comrade Chairman, if you bring this letter of mine to the attention of the people's representatives.

18 December 1989

With respect, [signature]

Andrey Lukanov,

People's Representative from the 248th Electoral Region of Sliven

[Source: Archive of the Bulgarian Parliament, Sofia. Document obtained by Jordan Baev.]

Dr. Jordan Baev, a senior fellow at the Institute of Military History and Associate Professor at the University of National and World Economy (Sofia), is Vice President of the Bulgarian Association of Military History.

'On the events in Bulgaria, see Raymond Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 399, 603.

2 First Secretary (1954-1981); Secretary General (19811989) of the CC BCP, Prime Minister (1962-1971); Chairman of the State Council (i.e. President or Head of State) of Bulgaria (1971-1989). Under home arrest (1990-1996).

3 Member of Politburo (1974-1989); Secretary General of Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party; Minister of Foreign Affairs (1971-1989); President of Bulgaria (Nov 1989 - June 1990).

4 Member of Politburo CC BCP (1962-1988); Deputy Prime Minister (1962-1971); Prime Minister (1971-1981); Chairman of the Bulgarian Parliament (1981-1989).

5 Associate Member of Politburo (1979-1989), Deputy Chairman of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (1990-1991), Deputy Prime Minister (1976-1989), Prime Minister (Jan.Dec. 1990). Both Stanko Todorov and Andrey Lukanov are no longer alive. Lukanov was shot in front of his home in Sofia a week before a scheduled visit to the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., to join an International East-West Project in October 1996. In May 1999 there were arrested three Russian professional killers wre arrested, suspected for Lukanov's and several other murders in Eastern Europe from Hungary to Macedonia.

❝ Minister of Defense and Member of Politburo CC BCP (1962-1990).

7 Chief of General Staff, Bulgarian Armed Forces (19621989); Minister of the Interior (Jan.-Jul. 1990); VicePresident of Bulgaria (Aug. 1990-Jan. 1992).

8 See e.g., Open Society Archives [OSA], Budapest, Fonds 300, Subfonds 20, RFE Background report 156, 10 July 1978-Dissidence in Bulgaria by J. L. Kerr.

9

See e.g., National Archives & Record Administration, Washington, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964-1966, Box 1952, 1953.

10 Terechov's posthumous memoirs appeared recently in some Bulgarian newspapers "The Coup d'etat," 24 Hours, Sofia, 6-9 February 1999.

11 The letter was cited for the first time in the West by Stephen Ashley, but with a wrong date- OSA, 300/20/1/ 123, RFE Situation Report 11, 15 December 1989.-Some evidence indicates that Lukanov took Mladenov's letter to the Kremlin while he was in Moscow in late October as Bulgarian representative to a Council for Mutual Economic Assistance [COMECON] meeting.

12 Robert Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider's Account of US Policy in Europe, 1989-1992. (Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow

Wilson Center Press, 1997), p. 81. In a 9 November 1989 cable in the afternoon Polansky informed the State Department: "That people wanted changes was clear; what was equally clear was that no one is prepared to mount any direct challenge to Zhivkov... We tend to agree... that there probably will not be major personnel changes." The National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.

13 Secretary of CC BCP (1976-1986); Member of Politburo (1977-1988); Deputy Prime Minister (1974-1976; 1986-1988).

14 All documents are slightly abridged.
15 Not printed.

16 Head of Todor Zhivkov's office at CC BCP (19561986), member of Politburo (1982-1989).

17 Member of Politburo (1981-1989) and Secretary of CC BCP (1988-1989), Minister of Interior (1974-1988).

18 Minister (1987-1989); Deputy Prime Minister (JulyNov. 1989).

19 Minister of Economy (1987-1989).

20 Minister of Foreign Trade.

21 Son of Todor Zhivkov; head of Department in CC BCP (1988-1989)

22 Head of Education Department CC BCP (1973-1986); Head of Todor Zhivkov's Office (1986-1989)

23 Relative of Todor Zhivkov; Deputy Head of International Department CC BCP; Ambassador in Spain.

24 Secretary CC BCP (1978-1988); removed from CC BCP 1988.

25 Head of Union of Bulgarian Painters (1973-1985); Deputy Minister of Culture (1982-1984); removed from CC BCP 1988.

26 Secretary of CC BCP (1962-1966); Chairman of Party Control Commission (1986-1989); Minister of Education (1959-1962); ambassador to Japan (1967-1971); Chairman of State Committee for Science & Technical Progress (19721984).

27 Director of Party Newspaper "Rabotnichesko Delo" (1977-1981); Secretary of CC BCP and Member Politburo (1981-1990).

28 Head of International Department CC BCP (1976

1989), Secretary of CC BCP (1977-1990)

29 Deputy Chairman, State Council of Bulgaria (19811989).

30 Associate Professor of Sociology in Sofia University; First Secretary of Communist Youth Organization (1986-1989).

31

Secretary CC BCP (1986-1988).

32 Secretary CC BCP for Agriculture in 1980s.

33 Secretary of CC BCP (1962-1966); Chairman of Party Control Commission (1986-1989); Minister of Education (1959-1962); Ambassador to Japan (1967-1971); Chairman of State Committee for Science & Technical Progress (19721984).

34Member of Politburo (1966-1989); Deputy Prime Minister (1962-1974); President of the Fatherland Front organization (1974-1989).

35 First Secretary of Burgas District of BCP and member CC BCP in the 1980s.

Repressed as Yugoslav and British spy 1950-1951; Deputy Minister of Defense (1962-1981); Chairman of the Committee of Solidarity with Asia, Africa and Latin America (1982-1989); Member CC BCP until 1991.

37 Adviser of Todor Zhivkov (1950-1988); Member of Board International Sociological Association (1972-1986); President of Bulgarian Sociological Association (19821988).

38 Former head of Politburo Guard B Security & Guard Department at the Ministry of the Interior (1986-1989). 39 Former General Prosecutor of Bulgaria; Member of Parliament (1990-1991).

40 Minister of Agriculture (1957-1962); Secretary of CC BCP (1962-1978).

41 Member of Politburo (1966-1989); Deputy Prime Minister (1962-1974); President of the Fatherland Front organization (1974-1989).

42 Member of Politburo (1981-1990); Prime Minister (1986 to Jan 1990).

43 Secretary of CC BCP (1972-1981, 1986-1989); member of Politburo (1974-1989); Prime Minister (1981-1986); member of the State Council (1986-1989).

By Oldřich Tůma

I

is difficult to select only a few documents from among the hundreds that vividly illustrate the collapse of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia. As the uniqueness of the Czechoslovak case consisted in the considerable dynamism of the process, one possible solution to the dilemma is to illustrate the unexpected acceleration of the Czechoslovak crisis using several documents from the regime and opposition issued immediately after the "Velvet Revolution" of 17 November 1989.

The collapse of the regime actually occurred in the ten to fourteen days after the evening of 17 November, when disciplinary police brutally broke up a demonstration of many thousands in downtown Prague. The nucleus of protesters was formed by university students. The following day, students from Prague University and the Technical University decided to react decisively. The students proclaimed a strike and also called for a general strike on 27 November. Theaters, first in Prague and then around the country, immediately went on strike. Instead of performances, spontaneous political debates took place in numerous theater buildings every day.

On 19 November, the Civic Forum (CF) was successfully set up as a coordinating organ of the opposition, that became, stage by stage and in cooperation with the students' strike committee, a major political force in the country. Demonstrations in Prague went on for days: on 20 November, for the first time, the number of participants exceeded a hundred thousand; on 25 November perhaps three quarter of a million men and women took part in an opposition demonstration in Prague. From 20 November on, many thousands of men and women demonstrated daily in numerous Czech and Slovak towns across the country.

That same day, first some of the print and then the electronic media freed themselves from the regime's control. On 24 November, the leadership of the CPCz (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia) abdicated. The new leadership also failed to regain the initiative. On 26 November the first official meeting and negotiation between the government and Civic Forum (CF) took place. The next day a two-hour general strike gripped the country. On 29 November, due to public pressure, the Communist Party rescinded the constitutional article on the leading role of the Communist Party.

In the ensuing days and weeks a new government was established with the participation of the CF and its Slovak

partner, Public Against Violence (PAV). Parliament, which was to be chaired by former communist party leader Alexander Dubček, ousted after the Prague Spring in 1968, was reconstituted, and former dissident Václav Havel was elected president. All of the important power shifts were finally completed with the first free elections in June 1990. The powerful clash of people and principles lasted from about 17-29 November 1989. Documents 1-5, in which the leaders of the CPCz struggle hard to notify and furnish party members with instructions, show quite clearly their growing irresolution, helplessness and lack of control over the events. They also illustrate that when the CPCz could no longer make up its mind and wavered over the use of force (17 November was the last time that violence against the public was used), the leadership was powerless in the face of the growing opposition. Attempts at political mobilization proved ineffective and futile. Teleprinters (telexes) and information from the center increasingly became statements of its own concessions and impotence, as well as of the opposition's éclats and their achievements. In the document of 29 November, the opposition is already accepted as a political partner, even though only a few days earlier the regime had refused to establish any contacts with those forces. Similarly, despite the CPCz's insistence on the continuation of Gustáv Husák's presidency, on the continued existence of the People's Militia, the party organizations in the workplace, and party control over and ownership of vast amounts of property, the regime was unable to defend these positions. As early as 10 December, Husák abdicated the presidency, and before the end of the year the People's Militia had been disarmed and broken up, party organizations at the work place had been forbidden, and soon after the elections, even the CPCz's property was confiscated.

Two important documents from the opposition, documents nos. 6 and 7, also give proof of the speed of the events: the CF Proclamation of 19 November and the CF Program Principles of 26 November. What We Want states that the problems of the country would not be solved by replacing people in positions of power or by the withdrawal of several politicians from public life. Yet, it was exactly that solution which the proclamation of CF had demanded a week earlier-and which had seemed at that time, extremely radical. The proclamation What We Want already brings a rather vague but consistent and rounded-off program of essential changes in all areas of public lifesimply said, it calls for the end of the Communist system.

DOCUMENT No. 1

Teleprint from CC CPCz to First Secretary CC CPCz and Secretaries of Regional and District Committees,

19 November 1989

19 November 1989, Prague-Teleprint from the CC CPCz to the First Secretary of the CC CPS [Communist Party of Slovakia] and the Head Secretaries of the Regional and District Committees of the CPCz on the situation and roles of the Communist Party.

As you are already informed, at the end of the commemorative procession on the participants 50th anniversary of the 17 November in Prague there occurred an antigovernment demonstration by several participators. In view of the character of the event, necessary measures were undertaken by the disciplinary forces. As a result of the dissemination of incorrect information about the death of one of the participants-the student Martin Šmíd-a hostile psychosis arose, especially among the students and actors from the theaters in Prague and in some counties which announced a week-long strike and want to misuse the theater buildings in order to sway the residents with their opinions, which are in conflict with the interests of the majority of the citizens and the state.1

Their aim is to launch a general strike on 27 November in the CSSR. It is necessary to assume that they will try to influence the cultural workplace and schools in the entire republic. They even want infiltrate the factories and the JZD2 [Standard Farming Cooperative] in order to gain support for their destabilizing plans from all strata of society.

Anti-socialist groups headed by the Charter [-77] are evidently behind this activity. The plan of action is coordinated by the Western media.

The Presidium of the CC CPCz dealt with these questions today, 19 November, in the evening hours and adopted the necessary measures allowing [it] to confront these plans.

The Presidium calls on the regional and provincial committees to do everything necessary to reject the enemy's efforts in the counties, districts, in the factories, in the cooperatives, in the schools and in other workplaces, and to ensure that uninterupted work, peace and order be secured.

It is desireable that the collectives publicly express their resolute position against efforts to bring about a political coup in our country.

Within the framework of the adopted measures it is necessary to secure the readiness of the People's Militia to protect the workplaces from the efforts of the enemy forces to penetrate into the workers' collectives.

The Presidium has called on responsible workers to step up the offensive in their ideological work in this connection, especially in the media, with the aim of

politically isolating the forces seeking an overthrow. Adopt the same measures in the counties and districts.

With comradely regards,

General Secretary,

[Jakeš's signature]

[Source: SÚA, ÚV, KSČ - teleprints and letters, ÚV-134/89. Obtained by Oldřich Tůma.]

***

DOCUMENT No. 2

Teleprint from the Presidium of the CC CPS to the Secretaries of Regional Committees of the CPCz [and] CPS and the Party Municipal Committees in Prague and Bratislava 21 November 1989

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia

Prague, 21.11.1989 #ÚV-0135/89

Dear Comrades,

In the last few days a disturbance of the peace and public order occurred in Prague and a list of other places in our republic. The organizers of these acts abused a segment of the public, especially the student youth. They are dramatizing the situation, influencing the feelings and opinions of young people, heightening emotions. They are misusing the cultural front for this. Strikes are being organized in a series of theaters.

Revolutions and demands with ultimatums calling for cadre changes in the leading organs, for the resignation of the government, for the destruction and liquidation of the CPCz, for the discrediting of the SNB3 (police). This is a direct attempt to overthrow the socialist order.

The forces of the opposition are trying to widen their influence beyond the scope of the capital. They are sending their organizers out to universities and various gatherings which are taking place in many areas at their initiative.

The current situation demands deliberate yet principled and offensive action on the part of all party organs and organizations and individual communists, in order not to let the situation slip out of our hands.

It is urgently necessary to mobilize party organizations, communists and all citizens who care about socialism, to support the position of the CSSR government, the