society through the quick development of a market economy during the demonopolization of our economy, and by a significant increase in the responsibility of the state institutions for the regulation of economic processes, e.g., in the areas of healthcare and social welfare, science, education, culture and care of the environment. A key problem is the reevaluation of proprietary relations in the society.

We are pressing for our country to once again take its honorable place in Europe and in the world. We are not asking for change in Czechoslovakia's current

membership status in the COMECON and Warsaw Pact. We are assuming that the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries which participated in the military invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 will condemn this intervention, by which the indispensable reform process of socialist countries was pushed back for decades.

[Source: USD AV ČR, KC OF Archive, file OF Documents-copy of the computer print A4, 2 p. Translated by Caroline Kovtun.]

DOCUMENT No. 6

The Position of the Civic Forum and Public Against Violence Toward the Negotiations with Czechoslovak Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec, Prague, 28 November 1989, 4 p.m.

The CF believes that the negotiations with the prime minister of the federal government, Mr. Ladislav Adamec, and his associates authorizes it to provide the public with this information and these proposals:

1. The Prime Minister promised the delegation of the CF and PAV [Public Against Violence] that he would form a new government by 3 December 1989.

2.

The Prime Minister announced to the delegation of the CF and PAV that tomorrow the CSSR government will present the Federal Assembly with a proposal for a constitutional law by which the articles legally establishing the leading role of the CPCz and MarxismLeninism as the state ideology will be expunged.

3. The Prime Minister promised the CF and PAV delegation that he would immediately discuss with the Prague National Committee the issue of allotting the CF rooms, and discuss with other institutions the issue of giving the CF and PAV access to the media, including creating conditions for the publication of their own journals.

4. The Prime Minister informed the CF and PAV delegation that he had already submitted to the President

of the republic a proposal for amnesty for political prisoners, [and] a list that the CF submitted to the Prime Minister during the previous meeting. The CF will challenge the president of the republic to accomodate this proposal at the latest by 10 December 1989, which is Human Right's Day. The Civic Forum is receiving information that this list was not complete and therefore the CF and PAV are reserving the right to complete it.

5. The CF gratefully received the news from Dr. Kučera, the deputy chairman of the Federal Assembly [FA], that tomorrow at the meeting of the FA he will propose the creation of a special committee for the investigation of the brutal intervention against the peaceful demonstration of Prague students on 17 November 1989. CF representatives, especially students, will be invited to work on this committee.

6. The CF and PAV delegation requested that the new government publish the directives of its program declaration as soon as possible, in which it should be obvious that the government is prepared to create legal guarantees for securing free elections, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of speech and press, for the elimination of the state control over the church, for the amendment of the National Defense Act and others. It is further necessary to ensure the liquidation of the People's Militia and consider the question of the future existence of political party organizations in all workplaces. The CF and PAV delegation also requested that the government turn its declaration into visible deeds as soon as possible. The delegation let the federal prime minister know that, should the public not be satisfied with the programatic declaration of the government and with its implementation, then at the end of the year the CF and PAV will demand that the prime minister resign and that the president of the Republic nominate a new prime minister suggested by the CF and PAV, if the President should deem it necessary.

7. On 29 November 1989, CF and PAV will demand in writing that the President of the Republic, Dr. Gustav Husák, step down by 10 December 1989.

8. The CF and PAV delegation suggested to the Prime Minister that the government of the CSSR submit to the Federal Assembly a proposal for a constitutional law by which the representatives of the Federal Assembly, the Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council and the national committees of all degrees who have broken their oath as representatives and ignored the will and interest of the people, will be recalled from their functions. The CF and PAV will propose a system of supplementary elections in the nearest future.

9. The CF challenges the government and the Federal Assembly to immediately condemn the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact troops, and the Federal Assembly to request the Highest Soviet of the USSR and the representative organs of the Bulgarian People's Republic and the German Democratic Republic to declare the intervention by the armies of five Warsaw

Pact countries in Czechoslovakia a violation of the norms of international law and the Warsaw Pact itself, because the intervention occurred without the knowledge or agreement of the highest state organs of Czechoslovakia.

10. The CF believes that this outcome justifies it in challenging every citizen to continue working in peace while in a state of readiness to strike. Strike committees can transform themselves into civic forums, but can also work along side of them. Students and theater workers will decide themselves whether they will end their strike today or tomorrow, or whether to continue it. When they decide, however, the CF will support their position. The CF and PAV challenge the public to assess itself the results of these negotiations and to make their opinion known to the CF and PAV by all accessible means.

The Civic Forum and Public Against Violence 28 November 1989 at 4 p.m.

[Source: ÚSD AV ČR, KC OF Archive, file OF Documents-typescript copy A4, 1 p. Translated by Caroline Kovtun.]

***

DOCUMENT No. 7

Internal Organization of the Civic Forum, 28 November 1989

What We Are

The Civic Forum is a medium for the renewal of genuine civic positions and life, forgotten more than forty years ago. The following text therefore does not contain any statutes, it only wants to be a concise guideline for creating local civic forums.

The internal organization of Civic Forums:

1. The Civic Forum (further only CF) is a spontaneously created citizen movement, which is united by the effort to find positive outcomes from the current crisis in our society. No one is excluded from this movement who agrees with the program directives of the CF, published on 26 November 1989 and who especially refuses the further continuation of a political system consisting of one ruling party. We consider the basic goal of the CF to be the complete opening of an environment for the creation of political pluralism and for the organization of free elections in our country.

2. It is possible to create a local CF anywhere based on regions, professions or interests by citizens, and not institutions. We recommend that membership in the CF be established by signing the charter of the local CF organizations; we further recommend that an informal coordinating group be established to which the citizens

could turn, and that its representatives be elected. 3. Relations between the Coordinating Center and the local CFs:

a) The CF Coordinating Center and the local CF
constitute a unit joined solely by the active civic
attitude of its members. The Civic Forum does not
have a complicated hierarchy, only a horizontal net
with every local Civic Forum, connected to one
coordinating center;

b) The Coordinating Center is just an informational
and organizational center, and it is in no way an
administrative center; its task is to collect information
from local CFs, exchange it and inform [all local CFs]
about past and future activities. All local Civic
Forums operate completely independently on the local
level;

c) The Coordinating Center represents the Civic Forum in negotiations with central state and international institutions, mostly on the basis of suggestions and recommendations from the local CF. 4. The function of the informational center of the CF:

a) In order to secure informational links, it is
necessary to submit in writing to the Coordination
Center these basic details about the local CF:
business, region or interest group where the CF was
created, precise address, telephone number, names of
the representatives, number of members (rough
estimate at least). These data will be entered on file
centrally;

b) Contact with the Coordinating Center-for a period
of three weeks starting on 28 November 1989, the
record-keeping, collection of information and
consulting services of the CF will be located at:
Špálova galery, Národní Třída 30, 110 00 Praha 1, tel.
268366, 265132, 267529. The new address and
telephone line of the Coordinating Center will be
released promptly. The post office box of the CF: 632,
pošta 111 21, Praha 1, Politických véz 4,
Communications Professional Training Center
entrance. CF account 2346-021, SB S branch Praha 2,
110 01 Praha 1, Václavské náměstí 42;

c) Transfer and exchange of information between individual local CFs and the Coordinating Center will be ensured in the form of an informational bulletin, which will be sent out by the Coordinating Center by means of mass communications or exceptionally by telephone.

5. The orientation of the activity of the local CF: The point of the activity of the local CF is the activation of civic behavior of its own free will and discussion in political and everyday life. Therefore the Coordinating Center can not and does not want to hand down any orders and restrictions, it solely provides suggestions and recommendations.

6. We believe that the local CFS should concern themselves very soon with these areas of activity:

a) Local CFs should specify and define the opinions of citizens in the broad democratic discussion. The discussion should lead to political differentiation, which is an indispensable prerequisite for a pluralistic democratic political system;

b) Local Civic Forums can pursue solutions to local problems, which are not satisfactorily dealt with by the current social structures. Local CFs can thus contribute to the creation of civic home rule or to the transformation of the institutional bureaucratic apparatus into a democratic one;

c) Local CFs can prepare strikes, demonstrations and other activities supporting their demands, even the demands of the whole Civic Forum if it should be necessary. In this sense, the local CFs are a continuation of the strike committees until all the demands of the CF have been met.

d) Local CFs should support all citizens in all areas where relations with the current undemocratic structures results in violations of civic rights in the broadest sense of the word. Local CFs are therefore the means for civic self-defense.

Supplement solely for consultative workers

Legally the local CF is a free coalition of citizens, it is not a legal subject and in this way does not have any rights or responsibilities. The Civic Forum as a free coalition of citizens has the same rights as an individual citizen. If the local CFS should deal with money, it is useful to keep it in a safe and enter the contributions and withdrawals into the account book and elect a treasurer and auditor. It is useful to provide monetary gifts over 3,000 Kcs in the form of a deposit book.

democrats and therefore we can not prohibit our fellow citizens, without regard to their party affiliation, from joining and participating in the new structures of the civic movement. It is necessary, however, for all who work in them to be honest followers of our movement, the basic goal of which is, as introduced in the declaration on the internal organization of the CF from 28 November, "the complete opening of an environment for the creation of political pluralism and for the organization of free elections in our country." A person whose actions are in blatant contradiction with efforts to create a democratic [society] while fully respecting human rights does not belong here, and it is necessary to expel him from the Civic Forum. This without regard to his party affiliation. Such an expulsion is especially urgent in those instances where there is a larger group of opponents of democracy [than honest members] in the forum. If there is a majority of them anywhere, it is necessary for the followers of the civic movement to leave the forum, found a new forum, and release a statement about their action. The opponents of democracy are in the minority, let us not let them rule and frighten us! In order to avoid such conflicts, we must be careful when accepting new Civic Forum members and in particular members of its committees, commissions et. al., especially in those cases when CPCz members are applying for work. It is unacceptable for any kind of group within the CF (for example, CPCz members, but also others) to assert their so-called party discipline, according to which all the members of this group are bound to a common plan of action, including those who would otherwise disagree with the plan.

The existence of various political and social groups, including communist ones, their activity and their influence over public opinion is, on the contrary, very demanding outside of the framework of the forums and certainly should not develop into discrimination against any group during speeches at public gatherings, in workers' and local presses etc.

We can only build democracy by democratic means! In some establishments and places, civic activities are coming up against refusals to negotiate with Forum representatives by the organs of state power, national committees, business managements etc. It usually occurs where the forums have not yet gained greater support from fellow citizens or co-workers. Only one thing will help in this situation: turn to the citizens and factory workers, inform them of your activity and challenge them to take part in it. If you will be many, no chairman of a national committee or factory director will refuse to negotiate with you.

[Source: ÚSD AV ČR, KC OF Archive, file OF Documents-typescript copy A4, 1 p. Translated by Caroline Kovtun.]

By Mircea Munteanu

T

lo those interested in the history of contemporary Eastern Europe, the past ten years offered a great opportunity to analyze the rise, establishment and fall of communist governments. The ability to study documents from both Western and the former Communist-world archives has allowed for the formation of better theories and a more complete understanding of the history and inner-workings of the dictatorships controlling so many lives for more than half a century.

The following document, excerpted from Şerban Săndulescu's book December '89: The Coup D'Etat Confiscated the Romanian Revolution,' contains the Romanian minutes of the conversation between Nicolae Ceauşescu and Mikhail Gorbachev on 4 December 1989, only 12 days before the start of the Romanian Revolution and 20 days before the Romanian dictator's execution. The document not only gives historians a glimpse into the last days of what has been called the last Romanian "absolutist monarchy," but also provides a window into the Kremlin's attitude towards the situation in Romania on the eve of the December 1989 events.

The break in the relationship between Ceauşescu and the Kremlin leadership, created purposely by Ceauşescu over the years, by the late 1980s had effectively isolated Romania from the reforms instituted in the Soviet Union by Gorbachev. By December 1989following the transition from power of the Communist Parties in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the toppling of Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov-the bankruptcy of the communist ideology in Eastern Europe should have been clear to anyone, including Ceauşescu. The minutes of the conversation between Gorbachev and the Romanian leader, however, make clear is that Ceauşescu was so far removed from reality that he believed it possible to overturn the "velvet revolutions" that had taken place in the previous months. Advocating military intervention across the East Bloc, Ceauşescu, the "defender" of Czechoslovak independence in 1968,2 had came full circle by 1989.

But intervention was out of the question. Fortified in his confidence in US President George Bush following the 2-3 December 1989 Malta summit, Gorbachev rejected the idea of military intervention. Later, the Soviet government would outright reject the possibility that Soviet troops be used on the behalf of the Romanian dictator, or the revolutionary forces.3 Following the Romanian coup d'etat, Washington made clear that it no longer viewed Soviet actions in Eastern Europe as necessarily a cause of instability. The US-Soviet talks, along with Gorbachev's unwillingness to use force to maintain communist regimes, proved that the Brezhnev Doctrine was dead."

Illustrative of the new international situation, Gorbachev, throughout the conversation with Ceauşescu, never alludes to the meeting with Bush and to any decisions that were taken in Malta regarding the future of Communism in Europe.

It is also interesting to note that throughout the discussions between Gorbachev and Ceauşescu, the later never suggested that he needed either help from Soviet troops or Soviet support for himself. He seemed more concerned about remaining the only communist dictator in power in the region, seemingly unconcerned as to how the wave of revolutions might effect his country. Hence, the revolution in Timişoara, Cluj, Bucharest, and all other major Romanian cities in December 1989 surprised both Ceauşescu and, it seems, the communist reformers that took over power on 22 December without much resistance from the old regime. Events unfolded so fast that even today it is still unclear what exactly happened between 22 and 25 December, from Ceauşescu's flight to his execution.

Romanian archival sources, especially concerning the dictator's last years, days and hours are scarce and documents are only selectively declassified. Despite availability of documents on Romania's involvement in certain Cold War crises, such as the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the 1968 Prague Spring, and on the early years of the Securitate secret police, the bulk of the records of the Romanian Communist Party and Ceauşescu's regime files remain classified. A full opening of the Romanian Archives would allow for a more complete history of the communist regime and a more complete history of the region."

DOCUMENT

Minutes of the Meeting between
Nicolae Ceauşescu,

and Mikhail S. Gorbachev,
Moscow, 4 December 1989

At the meeting were also present comrades Constantin Dăscălescu, Prime Minister of the of the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and Nikolai I. Ryzhkov, President of the Council of Ministers of USSR.

M.S. Gorbachev:

Comrade Ceauşescu, first and foremost I would like to congratulate you on behalf of the entire leadership of Soviet Union for the successful finalization of your