I completely agree with what you said about the importance of our meeting in Malta. I prepared quite similar points in my notes. Therefore I won't repeat myself.

About our attitude to perestroika. I would like to express with all certainty that I completely agree with what you said in New York [during Gorbachev's visit to the UN]: that the world would be better off for perestroika's success. Until recently, there were still some doubters on that score in the US. Then in New York you said that there are certain circles which did not want perestroika to succeed. I cannot say that there are no such elements in the US. But I can say with all certainty that seriously thinking people in the US do not hold such views.

But the changes in Eastern Europe and the entire process of perestroika influence these changes in the American mindset. Of course, there are differing points of view among analysts and experts. But you can be confident that you are dealing with a US administration and also with a Congress that wants your reforms to be successful.

I would now like to describe a number of positive steps which, in our opinion, could define in general terms the direction of our joint work to prepare for an official summit meeting in the US. [...]

Some comments about economic questions. I want to inform you that my administration intends to take steps directed at preventing the Jackson-Vanik amendment2, which prohibits granting the Soviet Union most-favored nation status, from going into force ...

I would also like to report that the administration has adopted a policy of repealing the Stevenson and Byrd amendments3 which restrict the possibility of granting credits to the Soviet side. [...]

These measures, which the administration is proposing right now in the area of Soviet-American relations, are restrained [vyderzhany] in the appropriate spirit: they are not at all directed at demonstrating American superiority. And in this sense, as we understand it, they correspond with your attitude. We in the US, of course, are deeply confident of the advantages of our way of economic management. But that is not the issue right now. We have been striving to draw up our proposals so as not to create the impression that America "is saving" the Soviet Union. We are not talking about an aid program, but a cooperative program.

After the Jackson-Vanik amendment is repealed, favorable conditions will arise to remove the restrictions on granting credits. The American administration is not

thinking about granting aid but about creating conditions for the development of effective cooperation on economic issues. We have in mind sending the Soviet side our proposals on this matter in the form of a document. It concerns a number of serious projects in the areas of finance, statistics, market operations, etc. [...]

I would like to say a few words to explain our position regarding the Soviet side's desire to gain observer status at GATT. Previously we had a difference of opinions on the subject, the US was opposed to the USSR joining this organization. This position has now been reexamined. We are [now] in favor of the Soviet side being granted observer status at GATT. In doing so, we are proceeding from the belief that Soviet participation in GATT would help it familiarize itself with the conditions, the functioning, and the development of the world market. [...]

There is one more area to use new approaches in a plan to develop economic cooperation. I have in mind the establishment of ties with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. This would provide a good framework for cooperation on economic questions through East-West channels. The administration is in favor of moving actively in this direction. [...]

G. Bush next switches to regional problems, describing the US position regarding the situation in Central America. Then he suggested moving on to disarmament issues.

M. S. Gorbachev: Agreed.

G. Bush: You know that my administration is in favor of ridding mankind of chemical weapons. Today I would like to describe our new proposal which will contain a certain shift [podvizhka]. If the Soviet side consents in principle to our proposal about chemical weapons which was described in my speech to the UN General Assembly in September, then, in the framework of this approach, the US could undertake to renounce our program of modernization that is, the further production of binary weapons, after a comprehensive convention prohibiting chemical weapons goes into force.

On the practical level this means that even in the near future both sides could reach agreement about a considerable reduction of chemical weapon stockpiles, bringing this amount to 20% of the amount of CW [Chemical Warfare] agents the US presently has in its arsenal, and, 8 years after the convention goes into force, to 2%. We propose to pursue work in such a manner that, by the time of the summit in the US in the middle of next year, a draft bilateral agreement will have been prepared which would then be signed.

About conventional weapons. Although serious efforts will be needed for this, including those associated with the need to overcome certain obstacles not only on our side but in other countries, let's say in France, one could count on reaching agreement as early as next year. It appears in this regard that we could put forward such a goal: to orient ourselves toward signing agreements about radical reductions of conventional forces in Europe in 1990, signing such an agreement during a summit of representatives of the countries which participate in the talks in Vienna."

Concerning the issue of a future agreement about reducing strategic offensive weapons. The American side is trying to provide the proper impetus to the talks on this subject. We are in favor of resolving all remaining key questions through joint efforts before the upcoming summit meeting in the US. We also do not exclude the possibility that a draft treaty on reducing strategic offensive weapons, and the documents associated with it, will be completely worked out. The treaty could be signed during the summit in this case.

We proceed from the position that at the upcoming Soviet-American talks at the foreign-minister level, solutions could be found in the near future to such problems as the procedure for counting long-range airlaunched cruise missiles, enciphered telemetry, limitations on undeployed missiles, etc. The American side plans to form its own position on these issues just before the foreign ministers' meeting, which could take place at the end of January, and will set them forth at the talks.

We are also planning to send instructions to our delegation at the Geneva talks that the previous American proposal to prohibit mobile ICBMs [Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles] be permanently withdrawn.

I would like to call upon the Soviet side to again return to the question of limitations on the SS-18 ICBMs. We are in favor of prohibiting the modernization of these missiles and of the Soviet side considering the possibility of deeper unilateral reductions in their numbers.

The resolution of the issue of preventing the proliferation of missiles and missile technology is gaining ever greater significance at the present time. In this regard the United States welcomes the accession of the Soviet Union to the regime of limitations which seven Western countries having been observing.

M. S. Gorbachev: This question is already at the discussion stage.

G. Bush: We would like to raise the question about the possibility of the Soviet Union publishing information about their military budget in approximately the same

detail as is done in the United States. It appears that our publications give a quite complete picture of what activity is being carried out in the military field in our country. I am confident that your intelligence agencies can authoritatively testify to this.

M. S. Gorbachev: On the contrary, they report to me that you do not publish everything.

G. Bush: I am confident that the publication of more detailed information about military budgets on a mutual basis would facilitate the growth of [mutual] trust in this entire area.

I would like to touch on several questions which are important for the future...

The issue of protecting the environment is acquiring special urgency at the present time. Now we have to take into account even the economic consequences of the changes in the global climate. In several Western countries, feelings are emerging in favor of preventing such changes to phase out even necessary economic activity as much as possible.

We are trying to approach these issues rationally and avoid extremes. At the present time the USSR and US are actively working in a committee to prepare an international conference on the climate under the aegis of the UN. This is cause for satisfaction. In the future we plan to take two more important steps in this direction. First, after work in the committee is completed by autumn of next year, we plan to host a conference in the US to work out a framework agreement on climate change issues.

Protection of the environment requires the attention of eminent representatives of science. I have instructed White House Science Adviser Dr. [Alan] Bromley [Translator's note: incorrectly rendered as "Romli" in Russian] to convene a conference on ecology in the spring of next year in which the best scientific energies [sily] as well as the leaders of the appropriate agencies from many countries of the world could participate. I hope that Soviet representatives will also come to this forum.

The development of cooperation between nations depends in large part on the participation of youth in this process. Student exchanges are called upon to play a great role here. We propose that it be arranged, so that such an exchange in the 1990-1991 school year be increased by 1,000 students from each side. This would mean carrying out such an expansion from young people under age 25. At the same time special, attention would be devoted to an exchange of students who are studying humanities and sociology [sic]. Such a practice would be quite rewarding with respect to all kinds of programs in the field of agriculture.

M. S. Gorbachev: Thank you for your interesting ideas. It's possible that this is the best evidence that the administration of President Bush has shaped its policy in the Soviet-American direction. I intend to touch on several specific issues later.

But right now I would like to make a number of comments of a philosophical nature. It seems to me that it is very important for us to talk with you about what conclusions can be drawn from past experience, from the "Cold War." What has happened remains in history. Such, if you will, is the privilege of the historical process. However, to try to analyze the course of previous events— this is our direct responsibility. Why is this necessary? Certainly we can say that we have all ended up at historical crossroads. Completely new problems have arisen before humanity which people had not previously anticipated. And what about it-will we decide them using old approaches? Simply nothing would come out of this.

By no means should everything that has happened be considered in a negative light. We have managed to avoid a large-scale war for 45 years. This single fact alone says that not everything was so bad in the past. Nevertheless, one conclusion is obvious-reliance on force, on military superiority, and the associated arms race have not been justified. Our two countries obviously understand this better than others.

And confrontation arising from ideological convictions has not justified itself either; as a result of this we ended up swearing at one another. We reached a dangerous brink and it is good that we managed to stop. It is good that now mutual trust between our countries has emerged.

Yes, and reliance on an unequal exchange between developed and underdeveloped countries has also been a failure. On what terms? The former colonial powers gained much from this exchange. But so many problems arose in the developing world which literally grabbed all of us by the throat. So everything is interconnected.

Cold War methods, methods of confrontation, have suffered defeat in strategic terms. We have recognized this. And ordinary people have possibly understood this even better. I do not want to preach here. People simply meddle in policymaking. Ecological problems, problems of preserving natural resources, and problems connected with the negative consequences of technological progress have arisen. All of this is completely understandable since we are essentially talking about the issue of survival. And this kind of public sentiment is strongly affecting us, the politicians.

Therefore we together the USSR and the US- -can do a lot at this stage to radically change our old ap

proaches. We had felt this even in our contacts with the Reagan administration. And this process continues right now. Look how we have confided in one another.

We lag behind the mood of the people at the political level. And this is understandable since various forces influence leaders. It is good that [Chief of the General Staff] Marshal Akhromeyev and your [National Security] Adviser, [General Brent] Scowcroft understand the problems which arise in the military field. But there are people in both countries—and there are many of them— who simply scare us. Many people working in the defense sector are used to their profession and for whom it is not easy to change their way of thinking. And all the same, this process has begun.

Why have I begun with this? The thesis is consistently advanced in American political circles that the Soviet Union "has begun its perestroika and is changing policy under the influence of the 'Cold War' policy." They say that everything is collapsing in Eastern Europe [that] and this also "confirms the correctness of those who relied on 'Cold War' methods." And if this is so, then nothing needs to be changed in this policy. We need to increase strongarm pressure and prepare more baskets in order to catch more fruit. Mr. President, this is a dangerous delusion.

I have noticed that you see all this. I know that you have to listen to representatives of different circles. However, your public statements, as well as specific proposals directed at the development of cooperation between the USSR and US which you spoke of today, mean that President Bush has formed a certain idea about the world, and it corresponds to the challenges of the time.

Of course, each side makes their own independent choice. But it is clear that when we talk about relations between the USSR and the US, mistakes and oversights in policy are impermissible. It is impossible to assume that our policy is built on misconceptions, both in relations with one another and in relations with other countries.

Initially, I was even thinking of expressing something of a reproach. To say that the President of the United States has not once expressed his support for perestroika, wished it success, and noted that the Soviet Union itself should deal with its own reforms. What we were expecting from the President of the United States was not only statements, but specific steps in accordance with these statements.

Now there are both statements and these steps. I am drawing this conclusion having heard what you have just said. Despite the fact that these are only plans for steps. But this is very important.

Second consideration. A great regrouping of forces is