By Vladislav M. Zubok

T

The last summits between the Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev and the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Mao Zedong played a significant role in political and psychological preparations of the Sino-Soviet split. This was already obvious from the secondary sources, including Khrushchev's memoirs. More recently documentation from the CCP archives, published selectively in Beijing, added significantly to the picture.' Further documents from Soviet archives shed new light on the period when the Sino-Soviet friendship capsized and began to sink. But transcripts of the summit talks were still not available. Russian historian Dmitri Volkogonov was the first to study these documents and cite from them in the mid-1990s. 3 It took the efforts of dedicated individuals and four years of time before these remarkable documents became part of the public domain as the Volkogonov Collection at the Library of Congress opened its microfilm reels of materials from the Russian Presidential Archive in January 2000.

This brief introduction cannot provide a comprehensive analysis of Sino-Soviet summits, but it attempts to place them into historical context. Several observations should be made in this regard for future, more substantial research. Disputed issues were at the center of the two Sino-Soviet summits. Also equally important was the broader context that Norwegian historian Odd Arne Westad called "history, memory, and the languages of alliance-making." The ideological nature, discourse and rituals of the Sino-Soviet alliance-making defined the nature, discourse and rituals of the alliance-breaking. Finally, the clash of personalities added to the drama. Mao Zedong's pride and revolutionary ambitions contributed as much to the trouble in Sino-Soviet relations as Khrushchev's impulsive anti-Stalinism and defiant earthy character.

Issues and personalities at the 1958 summit

The Sino-Soviet summit of July-August 1958 was an unforeseen and secret affair. Nikita Khrushchev came to Beijing as a trouble-shooter, on the instructions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU Central Committee) Presidium, in response to a sharp reaction by Mao Zedong to two Soviet proposals. First, to build a short-wave radar station in China in order to help Soviet submarine and surface fleets operate against the US Navy in the Pacific. Second, to create a joint Sino-Soviet submarine flotilla, operating under the Soviet command. According to Chinese sources, the second proposal was in response to the Chinese request sent by Zhou Enlai to Moscow on 28 June, to provide technology and documen

tation for construction of Chinese nuclear submarines with SLBMs. On 21 July, Soviet ambassador Pavel Yudin laid out the Soviet "joint fleet" proposal to Mao. The next day Mao called him back and in the presence of the CCP leadership lashed out at the Soviets, accusing them of chauvinism and plans to dominate China. The record of conversations between Khrushchev and Mao informs us about the final act in this dispute. Several important documentary links are, however, still missing, among them the exchange between the Soviet and Chinese military. Two additional memoranda of conversations exist, presumably on 1 and 2 August 1958, which were not found in the Volkogonov collection.

The major issue at the summit was Mao Zedong's profound dissatisfaction with the old model of the alliance according to which the USSR posed as "senior brother" and the People's Republic of China (PRC) had to be satisfied with the role of the "junior brother." Economic costs of Soviet industrial aid to China are cited as a reason for dissatisfaction. Indeed, Soviet data show that in 19581960 the PRC had to pay back 2.3 billion rubles on Soviet loans." Nevertheless, in general economic terms, the SinoSoviet alliance by that time worked exceptionally well for China. After Stalin's death, Nikita Khrushchev made a strong emphasis on the ideological, romantic foundations of the Sino-Soviet alliance, and on "fraternal, selfless" forms of assistance. Genuine euphoria about "friendship deeper than the see and higher than the mountains" spread in the USSR from the top leadership down to common citizens: there were far-reaching expectations of integration between the two communist giants in all fields. Even the pragmatic Vyacheslav Molotov, ousted by his rival Khrushchev, at that time shared this euphoric mood and submitted to the Central Committee a plan for further SinoSoviet integration all the way into a giant "socialist confederation."

The Chinese leadership seemed to reciprocate these expectations. For instance, in February-March 1958 Zhu De urged Yudin to think about "tight coordination" of economic development of the Northeastern China and Soviet Far East, as well as about a common “ruble zone” and "an international bank of socialist countries." In 1957, the Kremlin, prodded by the Chinese leadership, decided to help China become a nuclear power, i.e. to transfer nuclear know-how, help constructing facilities of the nuclearindustrial complex and, ultimately, to get a prototype device of the 1951 Soviet atomic bomb. On 18 June 1958, shortly before the dispute and Khrushchev's secret trip, a group of Soviet nuclear experts came to China to tell their colleagues "how to make nuclear weapons." Against this context, the proposals on the construction of joint fleet and the

eagerness to pay for the joint radar station in China came indeed, as Khrushchev insisted at the 1958 summit, from the heart and had no strings attached. For the Soviets, from all indications, Mao's attack came as a bolt from the blue.

In retrospect, it is obvious that political and personal, not economic reasons, motivated Mao Zedong's behavior. In the view of a Soviet diplomat who worked in Beijing from 1951 until 1966 and was a keen observer of China, "the Chinese felt too tight in our embrace. They wanted to break out of our arms and go their own way." About that time, Mao was getting ready to mobilize hundreds of millions of people for the Great Leap Forward. By its meaning and tone, this grandiose campaign was designed to resume the revolutionary process in China and the world, to surpass Stalin's "collectivization" and "industrialization" of the 1930's. The Chinese continued to take advantage of the large-scale assistance from the USSR and other "socialist countries." At the same time, however, they sought to demonstrate that they were no longer "pupils," but actually the leaders of the communist movement, since, by contrast to the Soviet "friends" who "marked time and made no headway," they moved "straight from socialism to communism."10

Readers of the transcripts will immediately see why American scholar William Taubman concluded that "the Sino-Soviet dispute was personal as well as political."11 The huge contrast between the personalities of Mao and Khrushchev leaps into the eyes. In terms of experience and historical role, Mao was Chinese Lenin and a Chinese Stalin combined, both the leader of victorious revolution and a founding father of the post-revolutionary Chinese state. He was the driving engine behind the challenge to Soviet authority in the communist camp. It is well known that Stalin's calculating and mistrustful attitudes towards the PRC had upset and offended Mao. It is less understood that the amicable embrace by the Soviets under Khrushchev repelled Mao no less. As Mao explained, he had long wanted to challenge Soviet seniority, and only waited for an auspicious moment. From the record of the 1958 summit Mao comes out looking almost the same as in his stormy meeting with Yudin on 22 July: offended, irritable and peevish, as well as haughty and lecturing. As Khrushchev tried to explain the Soviet position, Mao constantly interrupted him with teasing and provocative remarks.

By contrast to Mao, Khrushchev led his country and its bureaucratic classes on the road towards "normalization," not revolution. Mao, like Stalin, had the right to say, "l'état est moi" [the state is myself], and sought to symbolize the dignity of power. Khrushchev, who sought to overcome the excesses of Stalinism, was the caricature of a communist potentate. He was an extrovert, big-bellied, nearly farcical figure. He never minced words. Mao, on the contrary, posed as a sphinx-like, philosophizing emperor. Khrushchev's thinking was earthy, Mao's was cosmic.12 Taubman pointed out several personal

characteristics of Khrushchev that explained his "allergic reaction" to Mao. Among them was his "shaky sense of self-esteem," "vaulting ambition and an extraordinary low level of culture," "impulsiveness and hyper-sensitivity to slight," and his racist sense of superiority over the "Oriental" Chinese. 13

The contrast of personalities continued on the lower level of participants: between the pedantic head of the CPSU International Department, Boris Ponomarev, and the pithy, politically gifted Deng Xiaoping. According to Chinese sources, Deng, the CCP general secretary, played a particularly active role at the meeting. He "flew at the Soviet leader like a terrier. He accused the Russians of 'Great Nation' and 'Great Party' chauvinism. """ 14 There is not a word by Deng in the Soviet transcripts. Perhaps, Chinese version of the talks would one day help clarify this discrepancy. In any case, Deng was a witness to Mao's harangue at Yudin, and at the summit presented what Yudin had said on 21 June, since Yudin himself fell sick and could not be present an awkward imbalance for Khrushchev. The Soviet leader would have gained a lot from the presence of Anastas Mikoyan, the most skillful Soviet trouble-shooter. Mao, however, singled him out for criticism as the one who "flaunted his seniority" at the 8th CCP Congress in September 1956. Perhaps Mao intentionally wanted to cut down Mikoyan who, after all, had worked side-by-side with Lenin and thus could upstage the new international revolutionary hierarchy which the Chinese revolutionaries planned to lead.

Mao's personal ambitions were closely related to his groping for ways to consolidate his fluid regime and revolutionary legitimacy into a solid form where communist ideology was combined with Chinese aspirations of national greatness. The documents highlight in particular Mao's pride that came to be inextricably linked to his determination to restore China's greatness. Soviet assistance reminded him daily of China's backwardness and dependence, and therefore nourished his elemental antiSovietism.15 At the 1958 summit with Khrushchev, a theme of wounded pride was a major underlying issue. While Mao was disgusted with Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin's crimes, he relished in the opportunity to evoke Stalin's ghost at every opportunity, in order to demonstrate that Soviet policy toward China had the original sin of "Great Russian chauvinism.”

This jarred Khrushchev's ears. The Soviet leader, who in the previous years had invested so much into building Sino-Soviet friendship, could not understand why, instead of gratitude and respect, he evoked Mao's condescension.16 In his memoirs, Khrushchev admits that the proposals to build the joint fleet and radar station were a mistake. The Soviets, he said, "got too excited at that moment [in 1958] and exaggerated the international interests of communist parties and socialist countries. We believed that both our Navy and the Chinese Navy, as well as all the military means of the socialist countries serve one goal: to be prepared for retaliation if imperialism imposes a

war on us." Khrushchev continues: “One again, we touched on sensitive chords of a state whose territory had long been dominated by foreign conquerors. After this [summit] I began to understand much better what motivated Mao in this conversation...I understand that a lot of tact is required in this kind of issues. Now I came to understand this consideration especially well. [Italics added - V.Z.]" 17

In reality, this understanding must have dawned upon Khrushchev much later. Had he been just a bit more literate in the history and mentality of the "Middle Kingdom," he would have armed himself with a better strategy to the extent the erratic Soviet leader was ever capable of strategizing. But the only source from which Khrushchev could cull explanations for Chinese motivations was his own Stalinist experience and his current context of fighting against "Stalinists" among his colleagues. And something told him that Mao was trying "to play Stalin" on him, which was absolutely intolerable, both for political and personal

reasons.

The first conversation appears to end in a full agreement between the two leaders. "Dark clouds have passed away," Mao commented. But the summit did not resolve the crisis of the alliance, and brought into the open the mistrust between the two communist leaders. In his memoirs, Khrushchev downplays this, recalling that "the conversations were in a rather calm, friendly tone."18 Yet, the transcript of the first conversation suggests the opposite. Particularly important was the exchange on Soviet advisers in China. It provides a new important insight into Khrushchev's decision in the summer of 1960 to recall all Soviet advisers from the PRC, and indicates that it was not so spontaneous as it looked. Other sources show that it marked the beginning of steep decline in Soviet efforts to assist China in creating its nuclear arsenal.19

From Khrushchev's memoirs we know that in the conversations that followed the leaders disagreed on the issues of war and peace in the nuclear age, and the meaning of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and missile technology for future joint policy of the Sino-Soviet alliance. The minutes of the concluding talks on 3 August, recently declassified and published below, hide the echoes of these disagreements behind the mutual assurances of unity.

The Road to the 1959 Summit

Khrushchev's mistrust of Mao grew during the Taiwan crisis, provoked by Beijing on 23 August 1958. As many Soviet sources indicate, Mao did probably not discuss his intentions regarding Taiwan and the off-shore islands of Quemoi and Matsu with Khrushchev during the 1958 summit. When the People's Liberation Army of China began shelling the islands, however, the Soviet leadership was convinced that the Chinese wanted to seize them to remove the threat to their coastline. Moscow was prepared

to help its ally in this endeavor. As the Eisenhower Administration, particularly Secretary of State John F. Dulles, made threatening declarations that implied the use of nuclear weapons, Khrushchev sent a letter to Eisenhower on 7 September declaring that the Soviet Union would abide by the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950 and would regard nuclear attack on its ally as an attack on itself2o.

These threats concealed the embarrassing lack of unity and coordination between the Chinese and Soviet leadership during the crisis. When it broke out, the Soviets tried desperately to learn about Chinese plans. On 6 September, Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko flew to Beijing, officially to coordinate Soviet and Chinese positions at the forthcoming UN General Assembly. But the reconnaissance attempts confused the Soviets rather than clarified the situation for them. On one hand, Zhou Enlai told Soviet envoys that there would be no war over the islands. On the other hand, the war hysteria in China was intensifing. At one point Zhou Enlai told Gromyko that the Soviet Union should stay out of the war in case the Americans used tactical nuclear weapons against the PLA. Khrushchev was uncertain about the real Chinese objective: to test his ally's loyalty or to drag him into a confrontation with the US without even informing him. After deliberating for almost twenty days, the Soviet leadership sent a special message to the CC CCP on 27 September, "thanking" the Chinese for their noble attitude, but affirming its intention to consider the war against China "a war with the entire Socialist camp."21

Once again, Khrushchev leadership failed to recognize the significance of the crisis in the light of Chinese domestic politics and Mao's urge to make China stand tall and fearless. As Soviet diplomat Fedor Mochulsky recalled, "it became clear to me, then just a young China specialist, that the [off-shore] islands were not the issue. The issue was domestic, not foreign policy." The war scare helped Mao Zedong and the Chinese communist authorities to mobilize the people for the "Big Leap Forward." The Chinese peasants toiled in the fields, while their rifles were stacked nearby. The war preparations also helped explain to people why they had to eat less and work harder. Unfortunately, Mochulsky's observations did not reach the Kremlin: the euphoric expectations among many Soviet officials fed the bureaucratic mood that impeded critical and objective observation.22

Mochulsky also recalled an episode in September 1958, when Soviet diplomats consulted with their American colleagues in search of a negotiated resolution on the disputed offshore islands. At one point they decided to inform the Chinese leadership that, if the PLA stopped shelling the islands, the US would attempt to persuade the Taiwanese regime to withdraw their troops from them. Mao Zedong'sa reaction came as a surprise: "We do not need any [of your mediating] mission with Americans! This is our business!"23 On the contrary, the Chinese leadership intended to maintain the tension over the islands indefinitely, using it as "a means of educating all the peoples of

the world, first of all the Chinese people."24

In the fall of 1958, Khrushchev was still sympathetic to Chinese brinkmanship, despite his ally's bizarre methods. He was also in a risk-taking mood with regard to West Berlin, and must have believed that only a "shock therapy" with threats of the use of force could bring the West to the negotiating table on the German question. He did not believe that the United States would start a nuclear war—either over the Chinese offshore islands or West Berlin. Mikoyan recalled in his memoirs that it was the second time (the first was in November 1956, over the Soviet invasion of Hungary), when he sharply disagreed with Khrushchev and thought about resigning the leadership.25 In November 1958, Khrushchev unleashed the "Berlin crisis" which to many in the world seemed to be synchronized with the Taiwan Crisis.

One year later the situation changed dramatically. By autumn 1959, Khrushchev seemed to be winning his risky game: first, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan traveled to the Soviet Union indicating his willingness to negotiate; second, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower invited the Soviet leader to visit the United States (the last such invitation had come to Stalin from Truman in March 1946). Khrushchev's trip to the United States in September vastly expanded his international recognition. From the UN podium, the Soviet leader presented a plan of general and complete disarmament. At the meeting a Camp David Eisenhower vaguely hinted to Khrushchev that the situation around West Berlin was "abnormal." This was enough for the Soviet leader, who celebrated the triumph of his personal diplomacy. His foreign policy adviser Oleg Troyanovsky recalls: "Khrushchev returned from the US in a good mood, confident that he [had] achieved substantial political results. As an emotional and impulsive person, he began to view his trip over the ocean as the beginning of a new era in US-Soviet relations. In particularly, he grew to believe that the Western powers would make concessions on the German problem."26

Khrushchev's optimism had another dimension to it: in the summer of 1959, the CPSU adopted the new party program of "construction of communism" to be achieved in twenty years. It was as risky a commitment as his promise "to catch up and surpass the United States." As some observers believed, it was Khrushchev's response to Mao's Big Leap in the race for the reputation of the most ambitious communist.27 Such was the mood and baggage of achievements (real or imaginary) that Khrushchev brought with him on his trip to China on 1-4 October. This time his summit with the Chinese leaders took place openly, during the national celebration of the 10th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. He came not only as a leader of the communist superpower who could talk on equal footing with the US president, but also as a successful architect of peace and détente with the West.

By contrast, the leaders of the CCP, particularly Mao Zedong, had grave problems on their hands. Despite

tremendous achievements and sacrifice, the Great Leap Forward fizzled out and led to the tremendous ecological disaster and, ultimately, to a three-year-long famine in the Chinese countryside. The number of famine casualties reached astronomical number-up to 20 and perhaps 30 million people. At the Wuhan conference of the CC CCP in December 1958, Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai criticized Mao's policies, and in August 1959 the CCP Plenum began to back off from the disastrous policies. In Tibet, the Great Leap Forward, in combination with the attempts to eradicate Lamaism, led to a rebellion in March 1959. Though the Chinese authorities suppressed it (with full Soviet support), the Dalai Lama fled to India, creating an international uproar and triggering a Sino-Indian propaganda war. As before, the Chinese leadership sought to use external tensions as a means to defuse the domestic crisis. On 25 August 1959, during initial skirmishes, the Chinese military killed several Indian border-guards who were positioned along the McMahon Line (established in 1914 between Great Britain and the Tibet authorities). Unlike India, China never recognized this line as the SinoIndian border. 28

The Sino-Indian conflict came at the worst possible time for Khrushchev who was about to leave for the United States on his "mission of peace" and with a message of disarmament. This time Khrushchev decided to distance himself from the PRC, and TASS released an official announcement calling on both sides to reach a negotiated settlement. On 13 September, the Chinese responded with an unpublished communiqué to the CC CPSU through party channels, criticizing its policy of "time-serving and concessions [politika prisposoblenchestva i ustupok] with regard to Nehru and the Indian government."29 Soon Khrushchev would get these reproaches thrown into his face in person.

The thaw in US-Soviet relations and its implications for the Sino-Soviet alliance were the first irritants at the two leaders' talks in early October. Khrushchev's itinerary-he came to Beijing almost straight from Washington via Moscow-added insult to injury. As a witness recalls, "Khrushchev enraged the Chinese, when he went to America first, instead of China; This produced strong antipathy on their part. And when Khrushchev arrived, they could not conceal it."30 Khrushchev noticed the cool reception, the absence of cheering crowds on his way, and probably decided to challenge the hosts for their lack of politeness and hospitality. As the transcripts of the talks reveal, this time the Soviet leader did not spare Chinese sensibility: he continuously referred to his recent talks with President Eisenhower at Camp David; suggested to release the remaining American prisoners in China, and criticized, in a quite undiplomatic manner, Chinese policies that had led to the Taiwan crisis.

The summit, however, survived the discussion of these issues and collapsed only over the sharp disagreements over the Sino-Indian war. Mao was enraged by Moscow's position of the middleman between the