neutral India and the PRC. This war revealed a real discrepancy between Soviet foreign policy and Chinese interests. The official Soviet record provides necessary correction to Khrushchev's memoirs:31 what the Soviet leader remembered was "rude" and "awkward" manners of Chen Yi. The record shows that these epithets fitted Khrushchev more than anyone else in the talks, especially providing possible refinement of his expressions by Russian interpreters who wrote the transcripts. Volkogonov, commenting on the October summit of 1959, wrote: "Khrushchev in Beijing did not show flexibility, tact, wisdom, and his 'revolutionary diplomacy' collided with its counterpart."32

Indeed, the Russian transcripts show Khrushchev as much more confident of himself in comparison with the 1958 summit, and prepared to attack the Chinese as Mao had assaulted the Soviets more than a year earlier. Wearing the mantle of a world statesman, Khrushchev preferred this time to disapprove of Mao's brinkmanship as illogical, unnecessary and contradicting Soviet policy of "détente." From Mao's angle, Khrushchev practiced a double standard, since he himself was doing approximately the same thing with different means with regard to West Berlin. Even during the first conversation in July 1958, Khrushchev's patience had begun to wear thin under the barrage of Mao's pricking, unnerving comments. In October 1959 he was considerably more short-tempered. Contrary to his claims in the memoirs, he had learned nothing about the Chinese motivations, and was not even prepared to listen. At one point Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi hinted to him openly that the Chinese belligerence towards India was dictated by the desire to take revenge for the century of humiliation at the hands of European great powers. He tactfully omitted Russia. But this useful hint was ignored by Khrushchev. He was incensed by Chen Yi's repeated use of the word "time-servers" in connection with the Soviet leaders. There might have been a problem of language and translation involved: for Khrushchev this word was synonymous with "opportunist," a deadly ideological label for a good communist. It is not clear what the word exactly meant in Chinese context.

Khrushchev rushed to give a rebuff: "What a pretty situation we have: on one hand, you use the formula [the communist camp] 'led by the Soviet Union,' on the other hand, you do not let me say a word. What kind of equality can we talk about?" Later Khrushchev and Suslov repeated this argument in Moscow, expecting to get support from his colleagues.

The October 1959 summit presents a different Mao in comparison with 1958; the Chinese leader was less forceful and somewhat mellow. Perhaps the disastrous consequences of his Great Leap Forward forced Mao to take a lower profile, and provided more room for his politburo colleagues at the meeting. At the same time he was clearly in command and must have enjoyed when his colleagues, one after another, attacked the Soviet leader. At some point, when the altercation between Khrushchev and Chen Yi degenerated into a brawl, Mao must have realized that

things had gone too far. He intervened with reassuring calm tone to bring the stormy meeting to a civilized conclusion.

Consequences of the Summits: The Soviet Side

Whether Mao expected an open Sino-Soviet split soon or not, he obviously did not want to be blamed for it. After Khrushchev's departure, in a conversation with Soviet chargé S.F. Antonov, the Chinese leader struck a very conciliatory tone. He pointed out that the Sino-Soviet differences constituted only "half a finger" out of ten. He even approved Khrushchev's plan of general and complete disarmament (it was not even mentioned at the summit in Beijing), and remarked that Khrushchev "spoke very firmly and correctly on the issue of Taiwan" during his talks with Eisenhower. He promised to refrain from war over Taiwan and "to wait for 10-20, and even 30 and 40 years" for China's control over the island. One could imagine, Mao continued, that the Taiwan crisis was "a tricky and mysterious affair." In reality, it was just "one link in the chain of difficulties that we created for the Americans. Another chain was the issue of Berlin put forth by the Soviet Union." All these issues "assisted in achieving some goals that you set in Europe." As to the Sino-Indian conflict, Mao said: "We would never go beyond the Himalayas. This is a dispute over insignificant patches of territory."33 This was not the last time the Chinese leader turned to sweet talk in his conversations with Soviet representatives. But he was hardly sincere.

Khrushchev did not do so well protecting his flanks after the disastrous communist summit. Offense was the best defense for him. Even on his way to Moscow he began to complain that Mao was "an old galosh;" later he indiscreetly used this expression publicly. Khrushchev also authorized Mikhail Suslov, who accompanied him to Beijing, to prepare a report that for the first time contained an open criticism of the CCP leadership, and Mao Zedong in particular. The report cited "mistakes and shortcomings in the field of domestic and foreign policy of the Communist Party of China" and explained them largely "by the atmosphere of the cult of personality of cde. Mao Zedong." The report blamed Mao for coming "to believe in his own infallibility. This is reminiscent of the atmosphere that existed in our country during the last years of life of I.V. Stalin."34 This, incidentally, reveals that the Soviet leader continued to rationalize Chinese challenge against the backdrop of his political experience. From that moment on, Mao became "another Stalin" to Khrushchev-the enemy of his course of de-Stalinization, the advocate of obsolete and disastrous policies.

Khrushchev's incautious steps caused negative reaction among Soviet officials and general public. The flywheel of Soviet euphoria regarding China could not be stopped so abruptly. As some recalled the spirit of the time, "it seemed that the friendship sanctified by the same

ideological choice would be unbreakable. It seemed much more solid than the ties that emerge between countries on the ground of sober pragmatic interests."35 The truth that Mao had decided to shake off the fraternal embrace was completely irrational and unthinkable for the Soviet people, even the most intelligent of them. Therefore, after Khrushchev's trip to Beijing, public opinion was concerned that the Soviet leader, already well known for his capacity to be rude and unpredictable, might have damaged the Sino-Soviet friendship. Troyanovsky recalls that "back in Moscow, one could not help feeling in some circles of the society a new concern with the aggravation of the relations with China. I recall that about that time I received several calls from the people whose opinion I valued very much. They asked me to do whatever is possible to prevent a split with [China]."'36

Other radical initiatives by the Soviet leader, who was still euphoric about the prospects for improving SovietAmerican relations, did even more to antagonize him to a growing segment of Soviet officials and broader public. Even the rapid reduction of Soviet armed forces which was designed to turn swords into plowshares and to liberate resources for improvement of civilians' living standards, created for Khrushchev hosts of new enemies. Former Soviet diplomat Oleg Grinevsky believes that by the spring of 1960 a "new opposition" to Khrushchev emerged in the leadership and among the officials. Its mood was that it would be better to do everything to mend the alliance with the communist China, rather than to risk everything by aiming at an elusive friendship with Americans.37

The first casualty of the acrimonious summit in Beijing was another summit in May 1960 in Paris. It is said sometimes that Khrushchev just used the U-2 episode to wriggle out of the summit when he realized that the West was not ready for negotiations on the German Question. The available record reveals Khrushchev as, above all, willing to project image of toughness to the party elites. On 4 May, he told the CC Plenum that he planned an antiAmerican speech at the forthcoming session of the Supreme Soviet about the US spy plane. He warned that "perhaps we would not have a meeting on 16 May, this outcome is also possible." He explained that he and other members of the CC Presidium believed that the collapse of the summit "not only would not be a failure for us, but it would work to our advantage, since the situation is such that [hopes] for resolution of any questions at the meeting are weak." He added: "It would be difficult for Eisenhower to come [to Paris] after this." 38

The October 1959 meeting in Beijing contributed to Khrushchev's mood in this case. Troyanovsky claims in his memoirs that Khrushchev was forced to confront Eisenhower after the U.S. President admitted the guilt for sending the spy plane into the USSR. "There is no doubt," he writes, "that had he not reacted with enough toughness, the hawks in Moscow and Beijing would have used this incident and not without justice as a testimony that

the person who stands at the helm of the Soviet Union is ready to bear any insult from Washington."39 Back in Beijing, Khrushchev had said: "We shot [down] several American planes and always said that they crashed by themselves. This you cannot brand as time-serving." Now Khrushchev decided to prove to the Chinese and anybody concerned that he was not a coward and opportunist.

Another casualty of the 1958-59 summits were the chances for a peace settlement in Laos, and perhaps in the Indochina in general. At the end of the October 1959 meeting Mao suggested to discuss the Laotian situation, but an angry Khrushchev was not interested. During the 1950s the PRC and the USSR had jointly kept the more belligerent among Vietnamese communists from expanding "revolutionary struggle" in the region. As the transcript reveals, they continued to understand that Stalin's mistake in Korea in 1950, that brought American military might there, should not be repeated in Indochina. For historians of the Vietnam War it may be of interest that both Khrushchev and Mao were pessimistic as to the ability of the communist forces in Vietnam to withstand US intervention. The Sino-Soviet duel, however, precluded any effective cooperation on this issue, and ultimately the Vietnamese were able to have their way.

40

Suslov's report on the 1959 summit failed to arouse much discussion. As long as Khrushchev remained in power, the rest of the Soviet leadership did not have the nerve to discuss openly the reasons for the Sino-Soviet dispute that quickly turned into the split. But Khrushchev's colleagues had their opinion on what happened, and they expressed it in October 1964, when they sent Nikita Sergeevich into forced retirement. At that time, of course, the relations between the communist powers were already poisoned by years of mutual ideological and political hostility. CC Secretary Alexander Shelepin, speaking at the Presidium, said Khrushchev's policy vis-à-vis China was correct, but he had to be "more flexible in pursuing the line." "There is much that you have to be blamed for,” he rebuked Khrushchev.41 A more detailed opinion was in the undelivered Presidium report (prepared by Dmitry Polyanski, the Presidium member, in case Khrushchev would not surrender and prefer to fight at the CC Plenum). The report stated that “the main reason of the danger of the split is the subversive activity of the Chinese leadership that slid back to the position of great power nationalism and neo-Trotskyism. But there are some points for which Khrushchev has to be blamed. He is crude, haughty, and does not contain himself in conversations with the leaders of fraternal parties. He uses offensive expressions. He called Mao Zedong publicly 'an old galosh,' [the Chinese leader] learned about it and, of course, became enraged.”42

These phrases, however, might not have been completely sincere either. Shelepin and Polyansky, among others (including Alexei Kosygin), still misunderstood the Chinese reasons and dynamics; they tended to believe that, without the factor of Khrushchev and after correction

of Soviet foreign policy, the Sino-Soviet rift could be mended. In January 1965, this group severely criticized Yuri Andropov, then the head of the CC International Department (for socialist countries) and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko for defending the course of "détente" and disregarding measures to improve relations and strengthen unity with our "natural" allies and our "class brothers" (meaning the Chinese).43 These sentiments finally died off only by the end of the 1960's. There are still no archival documents available illustrating the painful reconsideration on the Soviet side. One may suggest that ultimately the Chinese challenge became, in the Kremlin's eyes, primarily a geopolitical challenge. The most perceptive among Soviet leaders began to see what Khrushchev had failed to see in 1958-59: how naïve and romantic the Soviets were in trying to hold in its fraternal embrace a giant country with unique history and culture. As Gromyko told to an assistant in 1978, when the question of German unity was discussed: "A united socialist China is enough for us."44 According to this new Soviet convictions the Sino-Soviet alliance was doomed because of the geopolitical weight of China and political ambitions of Beijing. Khrushchev's impulsiveness, abysmal lack of culture and other personal qualities only played a secondary role.

The documents published below reveal that it is impossible to extricate great acts of history from their actors. In the situation, when personal sympathies and antipathies were as important and real as state interests, the two summits in Beijing became the important and necessary preludes to the split and fragmentation of the Sino-Soviet alliance and to the end of the world communist movement as it existed since 1917.

DOCUMENT No. 1

First Conversation of

N.S.Khrushchev with Mao Zedong
Hall of Huaizhentan [Beijing],
31 July 1958

Present at the meeting: Cdes. B.N. Ponomarev, Deng
Xiaoping.

N.S. Khrushchev passes on greetings and best wishes from the members of the Presidium of the C[entral] C[ommittee of the] CPSU.

Mao Zedong thanks him. He says that cooperation between the leaders of the two parties facilitates decisionmaking on world problems.

N.S. Khrushchev agrees.

Mao Zedong: Without making forecasts for a longer time, one can say that our cooperation is assured for 10,000 years.

N.S. Khrushchev: In such a case we could meet again

in 9,999 years in order to agree on cooperation for the next 10,000 years.

Mao Zedong: We have, however, certain differences of opinion. Such differences on specific questions were, are, and will be the case. If we compare this with 10 fingers, then our cooperation will [account for] 9 fingers, and the differences for one.

N.S. Khrushchev: Yes, we can have a difference in understanding.

Mao Zedong: These issues can be easily solved, and cooperation between us will last forever; therefore we can sign an agreement for 10,000 years. He suggests to move to the discussion on the question of interest.

N.S. Khrushchev: We received information from Yudin45 on his conversations with you.46 Judging by it, there was a lot there that was exaggerated [nakrucheno]. Therefore, I would like to talk to you, so that everything would become clear.

Mao Zedong: Good.

N.S. Khrushchev: I will not dwell on the issues where, according to the messages on the conversation with your ambassador, we have common views. These are issues relating to the international situation, the assessment of the events in the Middle East [na Blizhnem I Srednem Vostoke], the Yugoslav question. We also support your declaration where you say that we cannot have issues that might generate different viewpoints. We take great joy in the successes of your Party and the PRC. I believe you take joy in ours.

Mao Zedong: Yes.

N.S. Khrushchev: I would like to touch on the issue that hit us squarely on the head [ogoroshil]. It is on the building of the Navy [voenno-morskogo flota]. You said that you spent a night without sleep. I also had a sleepless night when I received this information.

Mao Zedong: I was shocked, therefore I could not sleep.

N.S. Khrushchev: Never, did any of us, and above all as far as I am concerned, for it was primarily I who talked to Yudin, and only then he received the instructions from the CC Presidium, have had such an understanding of this issue that you and your comrades developed. We had not even an inkling of the idea about a joint fleet. You know my point of view. When Stalin was alive, I was against joint companies. I was against his senile foolishness [starcheskoi gluposti] regarding the concession on the factory for canned pineapples. I am emphasizing this-it was his senile stupidity, since Stalin was not so stupid as to not understand this. But it was the beginning of his sclerosis.

Mao Zedong: I also cited these examples and kept saying that Khrushchev liquidated this heritage.

N.S. Khrushchev: I was one of the members of the Politburo who said it straight to Stalin that we should not send such a telegram on the concession to Mao Zedong, because it would be wrong as a matter of principle. There were also other members of the Politburo, with whom I

have parted ways now, who did not support this proposal by Stalin either. After Stalin's death we immediately raised the issue of liquidating the joint companies [smeshannie obschestva], and today we do not have them anywhere. Mao Zedong: There were also two half-coloniesXinjiang [Sinkiang] and Manchuria.

N.S. Khrushchev: The abnormal situation there has been liquidated.

Mao Zedong: According to the agreement, there was even a ban on the residence of citizens of third countries there. You also eliminated these half-colonies.

4

N.S. Khrushchev: Yes, since it contradicted basic

communist principles.

Mao Zedong: I am in absolute agreement.

N.S. Khrushchev: Even in Finland, a capitalist country, we liquidated our military base.

Mao Zedong: And it was you personally who liquidated the base in Port Arthur.

N.S. Khrushchev: It could not be otherwise. This was even more correct with regard to a socialist country. Even in capitalist countries this causes nothing but harm. We liquidated joint ownership in Austria; we sold it to the Austrian government. This bore its fruits. Otherwise there would have been a constnat source of conflict with the Austrian government. We had good, warm meetings when we received a delegation from Austria. Earlier we would not have been able to hold such meetings. The fact that we have good relations with a neutral capitalist country is advantageous for all socialist countries.

Our course is crystal-clear. We render assistance to former colonies; there is not a single clause in our treaties that would cloud our relations or contain encroachments on the independence of the country which we assist. In this lies the strength of the socialist camp. When we render assistance to former colonies and do not impose political conditions, we win over the hearts of the peoples of these countries. Such assistance is provided to Syria, Egypt, India, Afghanistan, and other countries. Recently we agreed to sign a treaty with Argentina. This will strongly affect the minds of people in Latin America and particularly in Argentina. We agreed to provide equipment for the oil industry in the amount of $100 million. This is directed against the United States, so that South Americans would not feel completely dependent on the US and would realize that there is a way out.

Mao Zedong: This is right.

N.S. Khrushchev: How could you think that we would treat you in such a way as was described in the conversations with cde. Yudin? (Joking.) Now I am launching an attack.

Mao Zedong: What is a joint fleet? Please, clarify. N.S. Khrushchev: It displeases me to speak about it, since the ambassador is absent.47 I sent him the instruction, talked with him separately and then at the Presidium. When I talked with him, I feared that he might misunderstand me. I asked: "The issue is clear for you." He said: "Clear." But as I can see, he did not tell you the essential thing from what I

said to him.

Mao Zedong: Is that so? [Vot kak?]

N.S. Khrushchev: As I can see, these issues are as far from him as the moon is from the earth. This is a special issue, in which he is not involved.

The issue about the construction of the fleet is so complicated that we have not passed a final judgment on it. We have been dealing with it since Stalin's death. We sent Admiral [Nikolai] Kuznetsov into retirement, freed him from military service, because, in case we had accepted his 10-year program of naval construction, then we would have ended up with neither a Navy nor money. That is why, when we received the letter from com. Zhou Enlai with the request of consultation and assistance in the construction of a navy, it was difficult for us to give an answer.

Mao Zedong inquires about the cost of this program.
N.S. Khrushchev gives an answer.

We were asked to build cruisers, aircraft carriers, and other big-size vessels. One cruiser is very expensive, but [there is the] construction of ports and the places of anchorage for the fleet. It's many times more expensive. We discussed this program and rejected it. But, most importantly, we subjected to criticism the very doctrine of the Navy in the light of the changed situation with regard to military technology.

In 1956 we convened a conference of seamen at Sevastopol, where [Klementi] Voroshilov, [Anastas] Mikoyan, [Georgy] Malenkov, [Gen. Georgy] Zhukov and I were present. The seamen reported on how they planned to use the Navy in war. After such a report they should have been driven out with a broom, not only from the Navy, but also from the [Soviet] Armed Forces.

You may remember, when we were returning from you in [October] 1954, we took a detour via Port Arthur to Vladivostok, and then to Komsomolsk [on Amur]. Then we made a brief trip on a cruiser, during which we held a small exercise. Admiral Kuznetsov was with us. During the exercise our submarines and torpedo boats attacked the cruiser. Not a single torpedo from the boats hit the cruiser. From the submarines only one hit the target. We felt that if the Navy was in such combat readiness, then our country could not rely on its naval forces. This was the beginning of our critical attitude. After that we instructed Kuznetsov to make a report and prepare proposals. At the CC Presidium his proposals were not accepted. He grew indignant and became insolent, declaring: "When would the CC take a correct position with regard to the Navy[?]" Then we built a correct relationship-sacked Kuznetsov from the Navy.

Under Stalin we built many cruisers. During my stay in London I even offered [British Prime Minister Anthony] Eden to buy a cruiser. Today people scratch their heads. how to use the Navy in war. Can you recall any large-scale sea battles during the Second World War? None. The Navy was either inactive or perished. The US and Japan were the strongest naval powers. Japan inflicted a serious defeat on the American Navy by its air force. The Americans then

also routed the Japanese Navy with the help of the air force.

The question is where one should invest money. When we received your letter, we began to think-to send the military [to China], but they have no unanimous viewpoint on naval construction. We already discussed this question three times and one last time decided to give them a month deadline for presenting their proposals. What kind of navy does one need under modern conditions? We stopped the construction of cruisers, [and] tossed the artillery turrets that were already finished into the smelting furnaces. And they had the value of gold. We have several cruisers under construction in docks [na stapeliakh]. Within our General Staff, people are divided into two camps: some say-toss them away, others say we should finish them and then should stop building. Upon my return I will have to decide on this. The military advisers split into two groups. I did not have a firm opinion on this: to end the construction-investments are lost, to finish-more expenses are needed. One does not need them for war. Before I left for vacation, [Defense Minister Marshal Rodion] Malinovsky asked me to look into this question. At the Military Council for Defense I spoke against finishing the cruisers, but did not do so decisively. Malinovsky cajoled me, I decided to support him. We held a session of the CC Presidium, and many distinguished marshals and generals spoke there categorically against [terminating construction]. We then decided to postpone the question until Malinovsky returned from vacation and to discuss it once again. I think that at this time we will decide to throw them in the furnace [vagranka].

What kind of consultation under such circumstances could our military have given you? Therefore we said to ourselves that we must get together with the responsible Chinese comrades to discuss and resolve this issue. We could not rely on the military alone since they lack themselves any precise point of view. We wanted to discuss jointly with you which direction we should take in the construction of the Navy. For instance, I cannot say today which point of view on this question the head of the Naval Headquarters has [shtaba voenno-morskikh sil]. If we send him [to the PRC], one cannot say which opinion he would express-his own or ours. Therefore we wanted to discuss this with comrades Zhou Enlai and Peng Dehuai, with military and civilian officials. We did not want to impose our point of view and we are not going to; you might have disagreed with us on which kind of navy we should build. We are still in the exploratory phase.

Who today needs cruisers with their limited firepower, when rocketry exists[?] I told Eden in London that their cruisers are just floating steel coffins.

The question of naval construction is very complicated. Military officers ask, why then do the Americans keep building their Navy[?] I believe that the Americans, from their point of view, are doing the correct thing because the United States are located in America, and they are going to wage war in Europe or Asia. They need the

Navy for transportation and support [prikritiia]. Otherwise they should renounce their policy and declare the Monroe Doctrine.

Mao Zedong turns to Deng Xiaoping and asks him for the records of conversations with Yudin. Deng Xiaoping passes to Mao Zedong the records of conversation.

N.S. Khrushchev: Such is now the situation with regard to this business. Therefore I talked with Yudin in such a way, instructed him to tell you about this situation. I asked him if everything was clear. He responded affirmatively. But he never dealt with the Navy, therefore he could only render the crux of the matter imprecisely. The CC CPSU never intended and does not intend to build a joint Navy.

Mao Zedong (irritated): I could not hear you. You were in Moscow. Only one Russian spoke with me-Yudin. Therefore I am asking you: on what grounds you can speak of "launching an attack" against me?

N.S. Khrushchev: I did not claim it. [Ia ne v pretenzii.] Mao Zedong (with irritation): So who should be attacked-Mao Zedong or Yudin?

N.S. Khrushchev: Am I bothering you with my long explanation?

Mao Zedong: Not at all. You have said the main thing. N.S. Khrushchev: For reasons that I mentioned we wanted your comrades to come for joint discussions of the issue of what kind of navy is needed, about its technical and combat use. Indeed, I spoke to Yudin in such a way— that cde. Mao Zedong had welcomed coordination of our efforts in case of war. You spoke about it in 1954 during our visit and during your stay in Moscow in 1957. Until now, unfortunately, we have not acted on this. Therefore I told Yudin to clarify the situation. It is obvious for us that one should build a submarine fleet and torpedo boats armed not with sea-to-sea missiles, but instead with sea-to-air [vozdhushnimi] missiles, because the main task of the submarine fleet would be not the struggle against the surface fleet of the enemy, but instead the destruction of its ports and industrial centers. So I talked with Yudin along these lines. It would be good to discard the fleet located in the Black and Baltic Seas. We do not need it there, and if something should be built in those areas, then it should be mid-size submarines. In this case, where can we build them? In the area of Murmansk, but reaching America from there is not easy. In England and Iceland they take measures to intercept us. Vladivostok is better, but there as well we are squeezed by Sakhalin and the Kurile Islandsthey defend us, but also allow the enemy's submarines to monitor the exit of our submarines. I told [Yudin] that China has a vast coastline and access to open seas, from where it would be easy to conduct the submarine war with America. Therefore it would be good to discuss with China how to use these possibilities. More specifically-perhaps, on one of the rivers (Yellow River or another) we need to have a plant producing submarines in rather big numbers. We believed it would be necessary to talk about this, but we