16 The formation of the front included almost all Czechoslovak ground troops: 15 mobilized divisions arranged into 3 armies, the air force, an airborne brigade and the accompanying technical and rear equipment. The command was given to the general staff of the ČSLA; the chief-of-staff became the commander of this front.

17 "Analysis of joint exercises at the Ministry of National Defense in 1960," VUA, MNO, 1960, box 394, sig. 6/5, c.j. 17989-OS/1960, VUA, MNO, 1961, box 347, sig. 17/ 1–4, c.j. 1659/OS–1961; VUA, MNO, 1961, box, 347, sig. 17/ 2–24, c.j. 4135; VUA, MNO, 1961, box 348, sig. 17/2–31,c.j.

4922/21.

18 "Exercise Wind (Voter)," VHA VUA, MNO, 1962, box 304, sig. 17 2/13, c.j. 12650/1962. VHA VUA, MNO, 1962, box 305, sig. 2-15, c.j. 12130.

19 See Matthew Evangelista, 'Why Keep Such an Army?' Khrushchev's Troop Reductions, CWIHP Working Paper 19 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1997). On Khrushchev see also Vladislav Zubok and Hope Harrison, The Nuclear Education of Nikita Khrushchev," in John Lewis Gaddis, Philip H. Gordon, Ernest R. May and Jonathan Rosenberg, eds., Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999), pp. 141-168.

20 See Evangelista, 'Why Keep Such an Army;' Vladislav M. Zubok, "Khrushchev's 1960 Troop Cut: New Russian Evidence," CWIHP Bulletin 8/9 (Winter 199/1997), pp. 416-420.

21 "Lecture On the Character of Present-day War," VUA, MNO, 1961, sig. 4 1–6, c.j. 16196–NGS.

22 Based on experiences with the Sputnik exercises, one of the main tasks for the exercise season of 1965/66 was set to be the training of operations without the use of weapons of mass destruction. See "Guidelines for the preparation of generals, officers and warrant-officers of the Ministry of National Defense in 1965," VUA, MNO, 1964, box 269, sig. 17/1-5, c.j. 1400/19. 23 "Exercise Sputnik," VUA, MNO, 1964, box 270, sig.

17/2-3, c.j. 11500/108-54/1964.

24 "Conclusions from the Exercise October Storm on 1622 October 1965," VUA, MNO, 1965, box 242, sig. 4/4, c.j. 17841.

25 In the 1960s, Václav Vitanovský was considered a guru of Czechoslovak military thinking. In 1964 he published a textbook on the theory of strategy and doctrine. He was deposed already in 1967 for coming into conflict with the Soviet generals, who pressed the Czechoslovak military headquarters to raise military expenditures and number of troops.

26 Interview with General Major Václav Vitanovský of 20 November 1990, Institute of Modern History, Prague, Collection of the "ČSFR's Government Commission for the Analysis of the Years 1967-70," R-105. Unfortunately, half of the interview has been lost. Colonel Karel Štepánek, Chief of the Operations Room at the General Staff at the time and another participant in the preparation of the 1964 plan, also confirmed this procedure in an interview with the author.

28 The mapping of Western Europe during the 1970s and 1980s also seems to confirm that the 1964 plan was valid until the second half of the 1980s. It is apparent from the plan of map renewal in the 70s and 80s for individual Warsaw Pact countries, that the ČSLA was still responsible for the same area as during the 1960s. The same goes for the scale of 1:100,000. See plan "Utocnenija sovmestnych rabot geograficeskich sluzb armij gosudarstv-uscastnikov Varsavskogo dogovora po obnovlenii topograficeskich kart na 1972-1975 gody," VHA VUA, fond Varsavska smlouva (VS), Topo, c.j. 004/75-12; also see plan "Utocnenija ucastnikov Varsavskogo dogovora po obnovlenii topograficeskich kart na 1976-1980 gody," VUA, VS, Topo, c.j. 5643/4

By Matthias Uhl and Vladimir I. Ivkin

On 26 March 1955, Nikita S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and Nikolai A. Bulganin, Chairman of the Soviet Union's Council of Ministers, signed government decree no. 589-365. Their signatures set in motion one of the most secret military actions of the Cold War-the stationing of strategic nuclear missiles on the territory of the German Democratic Republic (GDR).'

as

in

Recently declassified documents and internal materials from the Russian Federation's Strategic Missile Command now reveal that the first stationing of Soviet strategic missiles outside the borders of the USSR did not occur previously assumed by most historians and observers Cuba in 1962, but in the GDR nearly three years earlier. While the stationing of the missiles in Cuba provoked a global crisis, the Western governments, in their official statements in 1959, acted as if unaware of the developments in East Germany. Documents from the West German foreign intelligence service (BundesnachrichtendienstBND), now available in the German Federal Archives in Koblenz, show that at least the intelligence agencies of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the United States, Great Britain, and France knew about the missile stationing. Both blocs apparently succeeded in addressing the tense military situation outside the public eye through a combination of secret diplomacy and calibrated pressure.

This essay provides an overview of the most important events and presents aspects of this military episode that have received little attention to date. Many of the relevant documents are still classified in Russian, German and US archives, or are considered to be lost, so the following is only a tentative assessment. It is difficult to put these events in the context of larger political developments because the internal deliberations about the operation are not yet known.

By 1955, more than 300 of the German missile specialists who had been brought to the USSR in the early postwar years had left the Soviet Union. They had been included in the missile building program that had existed since 1946 as a vital part of the Soviet Union's effort to develop and produce long-range ballistic missiles using German technology. The German scientists' legacy was the production of a Soviet version of the German V-2, which the Soviets called R-1.2 The entire Soviet missile program was subsequently built on the success of the R-1 series. The next step in its development, the R-2, already had a range of 600 kilometers. The first missile of genuinely Soviet production was the R-5, which was successfully

tested in March 1953. It had a range of 1,200 kilometers and carried a warhead weighing 1.42 tons.3

It was necessary to equip the missile with an atomic warhead in order to make it a new strategic weapon. On 10 April 1954, the Soviet government gave its militaryindustrial complex the assignment of developing just such a weapons system. Given that the atomic bombs available at the time were too heavy to be delivered by a missile, the first step was to reduce the weight of the warhead. A special department of the Nuclear Weapons Development Center "Arzamas-16" headed by Samuel G. Kocarjanc took the lead on this aspect of the project. The nuclear warhead was to be delivered by a modified version of the R-5. The draft construction plan of the new R-5 was drawn up by the "Special Construction Office No. 1" (OKB-1) of the Scientific Research Institute No. 88 (NII-88), which, at that time, was the only Soviet research institution that developed long-range ballistic missiles. The well-known missile builder Sergei P. Korolev headed the scientific aspects of the project, and D. I. Kozlov was charged to head the construction of what was officially called "Production 8K51." The project progressed rapidly, and in January 1955, the first flight tests took place at the Soviet Ministry of Defense's central testing site in Kapustin Yar.4 The tests revealed several technical adjustments still necessary to make the R-5M a reliable carrier of nuclear weapons.

The second phase of the testing began in January 1956. By that time, Soviet technicians had succeeded in delivering atomic warheads on missiles. The operation had been code-named "Baikal." Initially, the troops responsible for testing the new weapon launched four missiles equipped with complete warheads, except for the components necessary to start a nuclear chain reaction. On 2 February 1956, the Soviets successfully completed the world's first launching of a battle-ready nuclear missile. After a flight of 1,200 kilometers, the missile reached its planned target area in the Aral region's Karakum Desert [Priaral'skie karakumy]. The detonation device for starting the chain reaction functioned properly, causing the first explosion of a missile equipped with a nuclear warhead. The strength of the detonation was measured at the equivalent of 0.4 kilotons (KT) of TNT. Soon thereafter, the engineers and technicians increased this strength to 300 KT, more than twenty times the power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. At that point, the missile and the warhead comprised a new weapons system that allowed the destruction of strategic objectives. The Soviet Ministry of Defense added the R-5M to its missile arsenal as early as

21 June 1956.5

The new weapon, officially called a first-generation mid-range strategic missile, had a length of 20.8 meters, a diameter of 1.65 meters, and a weight of 28 tons. The missile was driven by a liquid propulsion system that used liquid oxygen and alcohol, which created a thrust of 44 tons and was therefore able to carry the 1,400 kilogram warhead up to a maximum distance of 1,200 kilometers. The missile would hit its target after a maximum flying time of 637 seconds. The navigational system of the missile functioned on the basis of inertial navigation and was guided by radio transmission to correct deviations from the missile's proper flight path. The average margin of error of 1.5 kilometers was considered to be sufficiently accurate. It allowed the destruction of important political and economic centers as well as larger "soft" military targets."

Even before the successful conclusion of the tests, the Soviets began working on designs for a deployment of the weapon. The planners in the Soviet Ministry of Defense responsible for the project were aware that the R-5, with a range limited to 1,200 kilometers, still had to be stationed. outside the territory of the Soviet Union if the most important political, military, and economic centers of Western Europe were to be in reach. Between 1953 and 1955, special groups from the Soviet Ministry of Defense gathered information on potential deployment locations for R-1, R-2 and R-5 missiles during reconnaissance trips to

Romania, Bulgaria and the GDR. Due to the limited effectiveness of these weapon prototypes in a conflict situation, the military leaders decided against implementing these plans. The plans were, however, the starting point for the planned stationing of the R-5M missile outside the Soviet Union."

In March 1955, the Soviet Ministry of Defense presented draft decree no. 589-365 for the USSR Council of Ministers' decision. The draft called for stationing battleready missile brigades of the Supreme High Command Reserve (RVGK) in the Trans-Caucasian Military Zone, the Far Eastern Military Zone, in the GDR and in Bulgaria. While the Soviet Foreign Ministry was instructed to obtain the agreement of the Bulgarian government for stationing missiles on its territory, this procedure was not followed in the GDR. There the missile brigade was apparently to be integrated into the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, which were considered to have extraterritorial status. The Soviet Union therefore saw no reason to consult with its ally about the intended stationing. In fact, as far as can be documented, the Soviet military apparently kept the stationing of the R-5M in the GDR a secret from their East German ally.?

8

Although Khrushchev and Bulganin signed the decree on 26 March 1955, its implementation was delayed repeatedly. The most important causes for this delay were repeated problems in producing the R-5M in sufficient

numbers, which made it impossible to equip the troops as planned. It was not until 1957 that the first strategic nuclear missile was actually introduced to the Soviet armed forces.10 By that time, plans for stationing the R-5M in the GDR had solidified. In addition to the Operations Division of the General Staff of the Soviet Army, the Staff of the Missile Troops also took part in preparing the operation. In early 1957, Maj.-Gen. P. P. Puzik, acting head of the Operations Division of the Missile Troops, received the order from the head of the Main Operations Administration of the General Staff, Lt.-Gen. A. O. Pavlovski, to choose proper stationing locations for the R-5M in the GDR. A few days later, Puzik traveled to the staff of the Group of the Soviet Forces in Germany, near Wünsdorf. From there he began his search for the best locations. These locations would ideally be in thinly populated areas, be easy to guard, and, if possible, have a good railway connection for unloading the equipment necessary for the operation. In the end, he chose the towns of Fürstenberg on the Havel and Vogelsang. Planning proceeded under the utmost secrecy. Puzik, for example, was not allowed to make any drawings during his inspection tour. The exact map of the planned sites was only developed after his return to the Operations Division of the Soviet General Staff."

The troops chosen for the stationing the 72nd RVGK Engineer Brigade of the Soviet Army-were considered to be elite troops with experience in Germany. The 72nd RVGK Engineer Brigade had been formed in 1946 in Thuringia. On Stalin's orders, the core of the future Soviet missile troops practiced launching V-2s at Berka, near Sonderhausen. The goal of the exercises was the practical testing of six V-2 rockets in Peenemünde in October 1946.12 Because Stalin feared diplomatic problems due to this obvious violation of the 1945 Potsdam Accords, the first launch of the rocket took place in Kapustin Yar in 1947.

In the ensuing years, the unit tested not only a steady stream of new models of missiles but also practiced the first tactical variations of the use of missile weapons. The unit alternated between simulating the destruction of industrial areas and political centers. The brigade was still primarily a testing unit since the inaccuracy and low levels of explosive power of conventional warheads made their effective use in battle unlikely. The experience gathered from the tests was used primarily to analyze the most applicable methods for missile attacks and to develop the necessary command and troop structures.13

Once the 72nd Engineer Brigade had been designated for stationing in the GDR, the military preparation for the operation began immediately. From March 1957 on, the first of the brigade's three artillery units was equipped with the R-5M weapons system. Just one month later, the special unit responsible for the construction and use of atomic warheads, the 23rd Field Construction Brigade, was formed within this division. The other two artillery units continued to deploy the outdated R-1 and R-2 missiles. The entire brigade took part in an exercise in the summer of 1957, in the course of which the troops were ordered to show

actions of an engineer brigade during the attack of an army group. During the exercises, the brigade's 650th Missile Unit launched two R-5M missiles.

During the following year, the 72nd Engineer Brigade underwent a number of restructuring measures. At that point, the 635th and 638th Artillery Units, designated for stationing in the GDR, received new nuclear missiles. At the same time, the construction brigade necessary for the use of the warheads, soon renamed the Mobile Missile Technical Base, was established. In addition, the brigade developed a strenuous training schedule in order to master the awe-inspiring weapons system. By the end of 1958, the 72nd Engineer Brigade had launched a total of eight R-5M missiles in preparing for the stationing. At this point, the missiles were equipped with nuclear warheads that could carry the equivalent of 300 kilotons of TNT to any type of strategic target in an attack. 14

14

In early summer 1958, the USSR to build storage and housing areas for the warheads, missile technology, and the soldiers, while preparing the troops for their transfer. These preparations were carried out in extreme secrecy. Only Soviet soldiers worked on the construction sitesGerman construction companies did not participate in the project. Rumors were spread that the new facilities were being constructed to train East German army troops with the Soviet troops stationed in Germany. 15 In spite of the caution exercised, the Soviets made a fatal mistake in the beginning phase of the project. The trucks used to transport construction materials bore the marking "ATOM" prominently displayed on the rear. By the time that the Soviet troops noticed the mistake, it was already too late. The West German intelligence service (BND) learned of the unusual events taking place in the Fürstenberg/Vogelsang area from its agents, mostly civilians working in the Soviet garrisons as well as agricultural workers and foresters who had access to the restricted area.

16

In fact, the secrecy employed by the Soviets came back to haunt them. The local population, including those that were working for BND, became suspicious about the exclusive use of Red Army construction crews and the unusual practice of strictly separating the Soviet garrisons. In September 1958, an agent code-named "V-16800" reported that the large-scale transport of construction material "is connected with the construction of a rocket launching base in the region around Vogelsang, Templin, and Groß Dölln."17 The BND's evaluation of this report rated it a C-3, meaning "dependable source/probably true information." Although this report shows signs of having been processed, no further clues are available as to the impact of this information, because the relevant documents are still classified in Bonn and Pullach. 18 Nevertheless, the report provided Western intelligence services with information about the Soviet deployment plans before the first missiles had even reached the GDR.

The Soviet military continued its preparations, however, since it still assumed the operation to be a secret. By the end of 1958, the construction work necessary for

stationing the missiles and their crews was nearing completion, and in November-December 1958, the 72nd Engineer Brigade prepared for its transfer to the GDR. Since only enough space existed thus far for two divisions, the third division was transferred to Gvardeysk in the Königsberg region. The remaining staff of the brigade, the 635th and 638th Missile Units as well as the 349th and 432nd Mobile Missile Technical Bases, began their secret transport of soldiers and equipment to the GDR.19

Efforts to maintain secrecy, such as firing all German workers in the Vogelsang and Fürstenberg garrisons, were increased.20 Nonetheless, at the end of January 1959, agent V-9771 reported to his contact in the BND the arrival of parts of the 635th Missile Unit. He reported that a transport of the Soviet Army had arrived at the train route between Lychen and Fürstenberg. At the center of the transport, soldiers had moved "very large bombs" with the help of caterpillar tractors. It seems clear that this was the movement of R-5M components. Avoiding the main roads, the equipment, now covered in tarpaulin, was then taken to the back side of the Kastaven Lake military base near Fürstenberg.2

21

R-5M Missile

Picture Courtesy of Matthias Uhl

The staff of the brigade as well as the 349th Mobile Missile Technical Base were stationed with the 635th Division in Fürstenberg, in the immediate vicinity of the command center of the Second Soviet Tank Guard Army. The 638th Division and its accompanying 432nd Mobile Missile Technical Base were stationed twenty kilometers away, in the neighboring village of Vogelsang.22 Each of the two missile divisions controlled two artillery battalions, outfitted with a launching ramp for firing the R-5M, including the necessary ground equipment. Each launching ramp was equipped for three missiles at that time; in total four launching units and 12 missiles were ready for deployment in the GDR. In addition to the aforementioned equipment, each division had a transport battalion, a unit to fuel the missiles, and a guidance battalion. This last group had the task of increasing the accuracy of the missile through the use of radio control. To this end, the guidance battalion employed a guidance device designed to reduce the missile's tendency to veer to one side or the other.23

The missiles, however, were not fully ready for battle. They still lacked the necessary nuclear warheads, which arrived in the GDR only in mid-April 1959. The warheads, officially labeled "generators" for the trip, were brought by train under heavy guard to the military airport at Templin. In the nights thereafter, they divided the Mobile Missile Technical Bases among the bunkers designed for them in the area around Vogelsang and Fürstenberg. On 29 April, an incident occurred that is not described in any detail in the material available at the time this article was written. But it is clear that during the transport of the nuclear weapons, the head of the 432nd Mobile Missile Technical Base, Lt.Maj. S. I. Nesterov was demoted and relieved of command on the spot by Lt.-Gen. M. K. Nikolski, the head engineer for the 12th Central Division, responsible for the warheads.24

Once the nuclear warheads had arrived, the 72nd RVGK Reserve Brigade was finally ready for battle. At the beginning of May 1959, the Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, M. V. Zakharov, personally told Khrushchev that the missiles were ready for use.25 At that point, the brigade, which reported directly to Khrushchev and the General Staff, was in position to report that it was ready to "assume the planned launching position and fulfill the designated tasks."26

Since the relevant documents are not accessible, one can only speculate as to the possible targets assigned to the missile brigade. It seems likely, however, that four missiles were aimed at the UK. The US-British "Thor" missiles stationed in Yorkshire and Suffolk were to be destroyed by the Soviet nuclear missiles in the case of a crisis. For the first time, moreover, the most important US air bases in Western Europe were also within range of the Soviets' weapons. The bombers stationed in Western Europe carrying US nuclear weapons, the most important element in the strategy of massive retaliation, were thus in