THE TITO-KHRUSHCHEV

CORRESPONDENCE, 19541

Introduced by Svetozar Rajak

The Tito-Khrushchev letters printed below represented a first contact between leaderships of two countries since the spectacular break-up of their relations in 1948 that created the first rift in the post-World War II Communist bloc. The communication occurred in utmost secrecy. The letters demonstrated deep mistrust that existed between the two countries, especially on the Yugoslav side. The timing. was crucial to Khrushchev's initiative. It is highly possible that the motive behind it was to prevent a closer military alliance of Yugoslavia and the West, ahead of the planned signing of the Balkan Pact in July 1954.

The Tito-Khrushchev correspondence had farreaching implications. It established a Yugoslav-Soviet dialogue that would lead to normalization of relations and at historic visit by Khrushchev to Belgrade in May 1955. It also defused a conflict, which existed since 1948 and threatened the fragile balance of power between the two blocs in one of the strategically most important regions of the Cold War-Southeast Europe. The exchange of letters of the two leaders and the ensuing normalization was also to have important implications on the process of liberalization in Eastern Europe and on the developments that led to the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement.

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The three letters and one cable by Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev and the one letter by Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito exchanged between 22 June and 27 September 1954 represented a first contact between leaderships of the two countries since the break-up of their relations in 1948. Initiated by Khrushchev with his first letter of 22 June, the correspondence occurred in highest possible secrecy. Members of the Central Committee (CC) of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia were first informed of its existence in November. The importance of this correspondence can only be understood within the context of relations that existed between the two countries at the time. The 1948 Yugoslav-Soviet split was total, and the

ideological, political, and military hostility in the subsequent years comprehensive. Between 1948 and the time of the arrival of Khrushchev's first letter, Yugoslavia was under a real threat of a military invasion from the Soviets and their satellite states. Border incidents and armed clashes were an everyday occurrence. On 29 April 1953 Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov had received the Yugoslav chargé d'affaires in Moscow, Dragoje Djuric for the first time since 1948. The meeting lasted merely ten minutes, and only very formal diplomatic niceties were exchanged. Two months later, again at Molotov's initiative, diplomatic relations between the two countries were restored to the ambassadorial level. Although unprecedented and positive steps, these initiatives of the new Soviet leadership remained isolated. Official Soviet and satellite propaganda still branded Yugoslavia as a "traitor and enemy of Marxism-Leninism" and its leadership around Tito as a "fascist clique." Under these circumstances, normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet diplomatic relations was understood by Yugoslavs merely as a return to common diplomatic decency and part of the new image that the post-Stalin leadership was eager to promote. It was impossible to envision direct communication between the Yugoslav and Soviet leaderships. The arrival of Khrushchev's first letter shocked Tito and the very few top Yugoslav leaders who were privy to its existence. Not surprisingly, Tito at first considered it to be another Soviet propaganda ploy against Yugoslavia.

The Tito-Khrushchev letters offer a unique insight into the extent to which an ideological rift had existed between the two countries since 1948 and the high stakes involved in their reconciliation. Both leaders were well aware of the implications that the nature of their relations had and could have for their countries' respective strategic positions, for the cohesion of the global Communist movement, and for developments in Eastern Europe. Thus both sides exercised extreme caution, evident throughout the correspondence. The new Soviet leaders emerging out of Stalin's shadow were victims of their own propaganda against Yugoslavia. As a result, their knowledge about Tito and the situation in Yugoslavia was surprisingly limited and distorted. They were unsure of the Yugoslav response to their initiative. There was a huge risk of humiliation

should the Yugoslavs chose not to respond but instead make public Khrushchev's offer of reconciliation. Furthermore, the fact that Khrushchev alone signed letters of such significance provides a glimpse into the existing balance of power within the Kremlin. It reflected both Khrushchev's ascendancy and the fragility of his position. Part of the Soviet leadership that initiated the new approach towards Yugoslavia, notably Khrushchev, Nikolai Bulganin and Anastas Mikoyan, were under close scrutiny from the more conservative members of the Politburo. Relations with Yugoslavia were of highest ideological significance, and any miscalculation could provide competitors in the ongoing leadership struggle, most notably Molotov and Georgy Malenkov, with valuable ammunition.

The Yugoslavs were, if anything, even more guarded and distrustful of the Soviets. In the first few weeks after receiving the letter, Tito seriously considered the possibility that Khrushchev's initiative was a Soviet maneuver aimed at undermining Yugoslavia's position. By making an enthusiastic Yugoslav response public, Khrushchev could either humiliate Tito in the Communist world or undermine Yugoslavia's strategic position vis-à-vis the West. Certainly the timing of Khrushchev's letter was most inopportune for Tito. The crisis over Trieste required Yugoslavia's close cooperation with the West in order to counter Italy's actions. For this reason, Tito chose not to respond with a letter. To keep his options open, however, he needed to acknowledge the initiative, should it prove to be genuine, and yet, in case of it being a Soviet ploy, to maintain the ability of plausible denial by keeping himself at distance. Tito thus chose Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Edvard Kardelj, his closest associate, to inform Khrushchev in midJuly via the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade that Yugoslavia had received the initiative favorably, but was in no position to respond for the time being. As an excuse, Kardelj cited considerations arising from the Trieste Crisis and the effect a possible breach of secrecy of Yugoslav-Soviet dialogue might have on its outcome. Tito's tactics proved to be correct, judging from Khrushchev's reaction in his second communication of 24 July. Indeed, Tito's full response came almost three months later, in his first letter to Khrushchev on 11 August.

Critical to an understanding of Khrushchev's initiative was its timing. Since May 1954, Yugoslavia had been engaged in final negotiations with Greece and Turkey regarding the creation of a "Balkan Pact." The formal signing of the pact was scheduled for 17 July, in Bled, Yugoslavia. One can reasonably assume that the Soviet leadership viewed the signing of the Balkan Pact as Yugoslavia's final slide into a closer alliance with NATO. (Both Greece and Turkey were full members of NATO.) Yugoslav-Soviet reconciliation, in the Soviet assessment, could potentially pull Belgrade away from the Western alliance. Moreover, the impending signing of the Balkan Pact was probably the necessary catalyst that ensured support for new tactics towards Yugoslavia even from staunchest conservatives and "anti-Yugoslavs" within the

CPSU Politburo. It provided those favoring of a fresh approach to the "Yugoslav problem," notably Khrushchev, with the necessary strategic motive in pursuit of the initiative, while shielding them, at least for the time being, from possible attack by Molotov and other conservatives. In Moscow's calculations, finally, normalization of relations with Yugoslavia could also give a huge boost to the image of a peaceful Soviet foreign policy, vigorously pursued at the time by the new Soviet leadership.

The letters also suggest that both Tito and Khrushchev were eager, even at this early stage of their communication, to promote and force upon each other their own approach to the resolution of the conflict and normalization of their relations. In an attempt to evade responsibility for the 1948 break, the Soviets adhered to Stalin's formula of placing blame on an expelled, preferably dead, member of the leadership. The Beria affair provided an ideal opportunity. In the Yugoslav camp, longtime Tito associate Milovan Djilas, expelled from the Yugoslav Politburo in January 1954, seemed to the Soviets to be the obvious choice. Conveniently, both men had also been among the closest associates of their respective leaders in 1948. All past wrongdoings could thus be blamed on these two scapegoats, and the image of infallibility of the Communist Party and its leaders could be preserved. From the Soviet perspective, the existence of "culprits" in both countries would also allow responsibility for the conflict to be distributed evenly between Yugoslavia and the USSR.

The Soviets also insisted from the outset that normalization meant the reestablishment of inter-party relations. Hence, the Soviet letters were written on behalf of the CPSU Central Committee. This served at least three purposes. First, given Western sensitivity to closer party relations between the two countries, their normalization would fulfill the goal of estranging, if not isolating Yugoslavia from the West. Second, Tito's agreement to reconciliation between the parties would confirm that the 1948 break was nothing but a family quarrel, and that Yugoslavia was returning to the fold. Third, prompt normalization of party relations would reinforce the leading role of the Soviet Party and diminish Yugoslavia's corrosive ideological influence on the satellites.

Clearly aware of these dangerous implications, Tito resolutely resisted the path to normalization suggested by Moscow. Compared to 1948, Yugoslavia's strategic position had changed irrevocably and to the country's advantage. In addition, current foreign policy considerations, the pursuit of the Balkan Pact and accommodation with Italy over Trieste, demanded extreme caution. Stung by the experience of 1948, Tito was reluctant to relinquish the hard-won distance from the “Russian bear." In his first letter to Khrushchev, Tito hence insisted on the necessity of small positive steps that would confirm Soviet sincerity, and a gradual pace of the normalization. He was also adamant that the scope of normalization should, for the time being, be limited to government-to-government relations only. Party relations, according to Tito, could be

normalized only after the confidence between the two countries had been fully restored. Nevertheless, Tito quickly seized the opportunity provided by the Soviet approach. He recognized the potential for an ideological victory in a conflict that cost him dearly since 1948 and had banished him and his regime from the Communist community. In his letter, he therefore dismissed the relevance of Djilas to the Yugoslav decision-making in 1948. In a masterfully ambiguous sentence, he then added, 'As with regard to the extent of Beria's guilt, you know best his role in the whole affair and we have no reason to repudiate your assertions.' Tito clearly suggested that the current Soviet leadership had sat together with Beria in the politburo and thus shared responsibility for the break. It also implicated the one person who was never mentioned in the letters but had unquestionably been in charge in 1948-Joseph Stalin. Consequently, the conflict could only be blamed on the Soviet Union.

The correspondence is remarkable for the extreme care in the choice of ideologically "correct" formulations. This can be attributed to the highly ideological character that the conflict between the two countries had acquired immediately after the rift in 1948. Both the Yugoslav and the Soviet leaders descended from a Stalinist heritage that commanded strict adherence to pamphlet-like formulations. Any divergence from truths declared in “correct” and rigid linguistic frameworks was looked upon as a betrayal of the "cause." Neither Tito nor Khrushchev could afford to neglect this aspect. At stake were the prestige of both parties within the Communist movement and the responsibility for the great schism. The fear that the other side might make letters public, certainly contributed to the abundant use of ideologically "correct" proclamations. Khrushchev's fourth letter in particular underlined the importance of the ideological context. The sole purpose of this letter was to inform Tito of disciplinary actions taken against editors who "allowed" accusations against Yugoslavia, a staple of official Soviet policy ever since 1948, to be reprinted in the latest edition of the publication "The Historical Materialism." This gesture was an offer of truce in the ideological confrontation, an ultimate sacrifice in the existing Communist paradigm. As such, it was expected to serve as the final proof of Soviet sincerity.

The letters are also striking for the complexity of the language used by the two leaders. An abundant use of indirect speech and complicated syntax served to conceal the true meanings, as demonstrated by the above-quoted statement on Beria in Tito's letter. Very often, however, a multi-faceted syntax helped to brush over essential disagreements. Undoubtedly, both Tito and Khrushchev were well aware of the huge gulf that still existed between them. In an effort to reach some basic common understanding, necessary for the reestablishment of communication between them, both leaders had to be careful to avoid confrontational language as much as possible. Take for example the statement in Tito's letter on the character of normalization between the two countries: "With regard to

contacts between the CC of the Communist Party of Soviet Union and the CC of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, in principle, we are not against them. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia never discards cooperation with all those organizations and movements that wish to fight for peace in the world and cooperation between nations, in particular not with socialist movements and parties. However, before some progress in normalization of government relations is achieved, the meeting you are suggesting would not prove efficient in eliminating everything that instigates material and political damage to both countries.” In a response, Khrushchev's formulation was equally multi-faceted: "Expressing our agreement with your proposal that normalization of our relations should start with the government relations, at the same time we believe that fundamental interests of our countries, interests of the international workers' movement, and the great cause of peace and socialism obligate our parties to invest all efforts so that established friendly relations are not limited to government relations only."

More importantly, however, the complex language resulted from efforts by both sides to avoid admission of the initiative for the normalization. In the eyes of the Communist fraternity, such an admission would mean acknowledging responsibility for the conflict. In Khrushchev's first letter-which, after all, initiated the correspondence— statements of a position were often preceded by formulations such as, “... there exist some conditions for the improvement of relations..." or "... unfriendly relations developed between our countries create certain damage ... to the interests of the peoples of our countries..." Most illuminating, perhaps, is a phrase meant to be above suspicion: "In light of new facts that have emerged..." Expressions, such as "... proceeding from your statement..." were used extensively. Both Tito and Khrushchev thus articulated their positions as responding to other side's initiative or statement. In his first letter, Khrushchev cleverly preceded his proposal with this sentence: "President of Yugoslavia Tito and other leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Government of FNRJ have in their speeches on numerous occasions expressed their desire for improved relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union." That was followed by the phrase, "With the existence of these shared ambitions..." Linguistic complexities as found in these letters are therefore critically important for understanding the atmosphere, motivations, and the true meaning of the exchanges between Khrushchev and Tito. In an effort to present these complexities in full, the translation of the letters (below) veers conscientiously, from time to time, away from the correct English language syntax.

The Tito-Khrushchev letters had important implications: First, the letters established a dialogue between the Soviet and Yugoslav leaderships for the first time since the break-up of their relations in 1948. Second, this initial