number of those who came to medical institutions was from three to four thousand. About 500 in all were hospitalized, and at the present time about 1000 people are on the dispensary registry and undergoing treatment.

According to information of the Georgian MVD, in the course of the events 37 militia workers of Tbilisi City were injured; 22 of them were injured from the actions of servicemen. According to information of the USSR MVD, the number of servicemen who were injured was 69, but the report of the USSR MOD commission produced data that a total 152 servicemen were injured (132 Internal Troops, 22 Soviet Army), of which 26 were hospitalized (22 Internal Troops, 4 Soviet Army). According to a report of the USSR Procuracy, 189 servicemen were injured in these events.

The Commission established that of the 20 Soviet Army servicemen mentioned in the Ministry of Defense report in fact only three received injuries in the course of the events under examination.

The damage to the health of those who took part in the events of 9 April was expressed both in the form of injuries, poisoning by toxic substances, or a combination of both, and in various psychological and emotional disorders of the "mass catastrophe syndrome."

The demonstrators suffered 290 casualties: contusions 40%, closed head injuries-30%, wounds—20%, and various fractures-10%.

A selective analysis of the medical histories and a poll of a part of victims permits us to establish that the majority of injuries (including head injuries) were inflicted by rubber truncheons; in 21 cases the injuries were associated with the use of a small entrenching tool. It was often noted that people with serious injuries also had been poisoned by toxic substances (combined injuries).

An analysis of the course of the illnesses of people who turned for medical aid due to poisoning presents great difficulties.

The Commission especially notes that the concealment of the use of toxic substances on 9 April and then incomplete information about this issue (the use of CN-on 13 April, the use of CS-on 3 May), and the belated and insufficiently systematized testing for the presence of toxic substances at the site impeded the diagnosis and treatment of those affected and created an extremely unfavorable and tense social situation.

This circumstance, as well as the panic rumors, the concealment of the use of toxic substances, the uncertainty in the diagnosis, and also the published calls to go for medical help all this and several other circumstances promoted the undulating nature of the number of treat

ments for medical aid during the succeeding month.

Cases of the "secondary effects of poisoning" occupy a special place in a number of these phenomena, for example the outbreak of doctor's visits [obrashcheniya] on 28 April after flowers were moved from Government House to the church. The circumstances connected with this event have not been sufficiently identified up to now.

The Commission thinks that even in such cases, when based on complaints of a worsening of health, there were indications only from the victims themselves of contact with toxic substances, these cases could have been classed on a sufficient basis as a display of a "syndrome of a reaction to a mass catastrophe."

In all, about 300 victims of toxic substances were recorded (including 19 servicemen and 9 militia workers). The main mass of them involve people who had been poisoned on 9 April in the square in front of Government House and in several other places along Rustaveli Avenue. In the clinical severity of injury they (according to the evidence of the USSR Ministry of Health commission) were distributed in the following manner: serious-2%, medium severity 7%, slight-91%.

Data about the place, type of toxic substances used, and the nature of the injury suffered was contradictory. However, thanks to the results of detailed research testing of the air, soil, vegetation, clothing, and tissue of the corpses, and also a survey of the victims and eyewitnesses, the Commission was able to clear up these questions to a considerable degree. According to the testimony of victims on the special dispensary registry, [the following] were poisoned by chemical substances: immediately in front of Government House-49%; in the area of Rustaveli Avenue-Chitadze Street-15%; near the First Middle School-9%; at the "Rustaveli" movie theater-3%; and in the area of the Kashveti church-24%. A comparatively small part of the demonstrators were poisoned on Rustaveli Avenue adjacent to Republic Square and also on several neighboring streets.

From this information it ensues that the main places where toxic substances were employed were the square in front of Government House and in the area of the Kashveti church, which does not coincide with areas of toxic substance use referred to by the leaders of the operation.

As follows from the report of the USSR Ministry of Defense commission, three weeks after the events on Rustaveli Avenue in the sector from Pioneers House to the Communications Building the presence of CN and CS was observed in the soil and in two tests even in the atmosphere (in an underpass), which can indirectly confirm the use of a considerable quantity of toxic substances.

The use of chloroacetophenone (KhAF, CN) is indisputably admitted in the form of "Cheremukha" products and the substance CS in K-51 grenades (a toxic irritant substance).

In four tests of the soil taken in the area of Rustaveli Avenue around Government House and the Kashveti church, the research of the Tbilisi State University Chromato-Mass Spectrometry Center also found chloropicrin (a toxic asphyxiant). No explanation has yet been found for its appearance in these tests.

The experience of the use of so-called "police toxic substances" both in our country and abroad shows that the use of these substances within established rules does not lead to serious consequences. Cases of serious poisoning are extremely rare, and fatal outcomes are unique. The picture of the intoxication of the demonstrators in Tbilisi differs remarkably from the usual cases of the use of such types of toxic substances.

It is characterized by its massive nature, a considerable number of poisonings of medium and great severity, and with specific features of a clinical manifestation in the form of signs of "neurotropic" activity.

The Commission thinks that it could have appeared as a result of a combination of a number of circumstances and factors:

1. The circumstances of the weather situation-high humidity and calm wind, which impeded the dispersal of the gas cloud and created a high concentration.

2. The use of toxic substances in a dense mass of people deprived of the opportunity to leave the afflicted location.

3. The use, from the testimony of eyewitnesses and victims, of toxic substances in the form of an aerosol at a distance close enough to perhaps have created a critical concentration of toxic substances.

4. The combination of toxins with physical injuries and psychological stress, which aggravated the clinical finding of injury (a “neurotropic effect”).

5. The increase of the degree of toxic activity of toxic substances on an organism at nighttime in connection with the reduction of the organism's resistance.

It ought to be noted that the factual data and the ideas presented are not sufficient to completely exclude the probability that some of the victims were poisoned by some other unidentified toxic substance.

The question of identifying the direct causes of the

deaths of the 19 demonstrators occupied a special place in the Commission's work.

The materials and findings of various groups of experts received by the Commission gave an unambiguous explanation of the factors which led to the deaths of the victims.

In this regard the Commission brought in a group of scientists, and specialists in the field of pathological anatomy and forensic medicine who studied all the available material and came to the conclusion the direct cause of death of all those who died, with the exception of one case of serious skull and brain injury, was suffocation (asphyxia). In the opinion of specialists in the field of asphyxia two simultaneously operating factors played a role-both the compression of the body and the inhalation of chemical substances, which the corresponding macroscopic and microscopic data point to. The combination of the inhalation of chemical substances and the compression of the body mutually intensified their negative effect and served, in the opinion of the specialists, as the reason for the deaths of the victims. In two cases there were additional circumstances in the form of concomitant illnesses.

Nevertheless, it is not possible in each specific case to precisely determine from the available materials the predominance of one or the other factor in the development of asphyxia. The findings of the specialists have been sent to the USSR Procuracy.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

The tragedy which occurred on 9 April 1989 in Tbilisi, the deaths of innocent people, caused deep pain in the hearts and consciousness of the Soviet people.

The members of the Commission of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies share these feelings and express sincere condolences to the families, relatives, and friends of the victims and also to all who suffered on that bitter April morning.

The events of 9 April inflicted a significant blow to perestroika and shook our entire society. The show of force, the damage to the health, and the deprivation of people's sacred gift-life-are incompatible with common human moral principles and values.

The Commission turns to all citizens of the country with an appeal the most acute problems which life puts before us, conflicts, and misunderstandings can only be resolved by political methods, dialogue, and persuasion.

The Commission calls upon all Soviet people not to allow the sad events of 9 April in Tbilisi to be used to incite mistrust and hostile attitudes toward the Soviet Army.

The Commission calls upon the Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet to draw up and adopt laws strictly regulating the use of force within the country as a top priority.

On the basis of the available materials, the Commission of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies comes to the following conclusions:

1. The reasons for the tragic events of 9 April 1989 in Tbilisi were that under the conditions of democratization of the entire public and political life of our society, the leadership of the Republic did not manage to direct the acute and dynamically developing processes of perestroika in Georgia, properly evaluate the situation in the Republic, and make adequate political decisions.

The former Secretaries of the CC GCP, D.I. Patiashvili and B.V. Nikol'skiy, bear responsibility for the political and other consequences of the events of 9 April 1989 in Tbilisi.

2. The organizers of the unauthorized demonstration at Government House (I. Tsereteli, Z. Gamsakhurdia, G. Chanturiya, and other leaders of unofficial organizations) should bear criminal, political, moral, and other responsibility for their actions. In the course of their actions they committed various breaches of the peace, issued appeals to disobey legal demands of the authorities, and when a real threat of the use of armed force was created, did not take measures to stop it [the demonstration] and thus did not try to prevent the tragic outcome of the events.

3. The decision to sent sub-units of the Internal Troops, the Soviet Army, and special sub-units of the militia were formalized by a directive of the USSR Ministry of Defense General Staff (Cde. M.A. Moiseyev) and by an order of the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs (Cde. I.F. Shilov) after a meeting in the CC CPSU on 7 April 1989 (chaired by Cde. Ye. K. Ligachev). Inasmuch as the subject was not simply about troop redeployment but was actually about carrying out operations, introducing individual elements of a state of emergency in the city of Tbilisi, establishing control of entrances to and exits from the city, and taking the most important public and government buildings and other facilities under guard, it ought to be recognized that these decisions were made in gross violation of the law.

4. The instruction of the Georgian Council of Ministers (Cde. Z.A. Chkheidze) of 8 April 1989 to clear the square in front of Government House of demonstrators and to carry out other measures to preserve public order involving the participation of Internal Troops and subunits of the Soviet Army was illegal since

existing legislation does not provide the government of the Republic with such authority.

5. Serious violations were committed during the preparation and execution of the operation to clear the square, manifested in the fact that the operations plan was not corrected in accordance with the actual situation. It was insufficiently studied by the commanders of the sub-units, reconnoitering was not done, and the men and equipment of the Tbilisi city government Directorate of Internal Affairs were not brought into the operation in due measure. In spite of the USSR Minister of Defense's order, paratroop subunits were used not to guard facilities but to expel demonstrators. Gross violations of public order were committed by the use of special agents; in particular, non-standard special agents (product K-51) were used, and rubber truncheons and small entrenching tools were used illegally.

Generals K.A. Kochetov, I.N. Rodionov and Yu. T. Yefimov bear personal responsibility for these violations and oversights which led to the tragic consequences.

The Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia, Sh.V. Gorgodze, who removed himself from execution of his direct responsibilities, also bears responsibility in due

measure.

6. In the opinion of the Commission, the officials, who issued the order to use special agents and [heavy] equipment on the demonstrators on 9 April in Tbilisi, should be called to official and other forms of account. According to current regulations these "are used in exceptional situations to stop mass unrest accompanied by pogroms, brutality, destruction, arson, and to repel mass attacks on official and administrative buildings, the premises of public organizations and other important facilities, and also in cases when the violent actions of violators of public order threaten the lives and health of citizens, the members of Internal Forces units, and the civilian militia." The Commission has established that on 9 April 1989 in Tbilisi, no grounds to take such measures existed.

7. During the operation to halt the demonstration by clearing the square in front of Government House and Rustaveli Avenue, bodily injuries of varying degrees of severity (including injuries from the use of special agents-tear gases) were inflicted on the demonstrators, servicemen of the Internal Troops and the Soviet Army, and militia workers. Nineteen demonstrators died (mainly women). The Commission perceives the need for criminal liability of the specific individuals guilty of the deaths of people and the infliction of serious bodily injuries.

8. It is also necessary to resolve the issue of the senior officials who:

violated Point 59 of the Internal Troops Combat Duty Regulations, which prohibits the use of the "Cheremukha" special agent against women, adolescents, children, and in other specifically mentioned instances;

- violated current regulations according to which it is categorically prohibited to use a rubber truncheon against women, children, the aged, invalids with obvious signs of disability, and also to hit people in the face and head;

used articles with CS tear gas, which is not approved for use in the Internal Troops, at the concluding stage of the operation to expel the demonstrators.

9. The Commission raises the question of the responsibility of those people who permitted the violation of the guaranteed rights and legal interests of citizens when introducing and implementing the curfew in the city of Tbilisi.

10. Political, moral, and in necessary cases, legal responsibility should be borne by any official of both Party and government bodies who permits the concealment of the fact of use of special agents of the "Cheremukha" and article K-51 types containing CS

gas.

11. The Commission notes that in the periodical press many items have appeared based on rumors, conjecture, false reports, and a distorted picture of the real course of events. Thus, the Commission has not found evidence of the existence or operation in the square of specially formed groups of guerilla extremists, or the allegation that the first wounded and killed supposedly appeared even before the troops came in contact with the demonstrators.

The widely spread information about the multitudes of people who reportedly were missing after 9 April and the use by demonstrators of specially prepared silent [kholodnoye] weapons and firearms has also not been confirmed.

The Commission notes the lack of facts behind the statement by General I.N. Rodionov at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies that "a real threat of the seizure of vitally important facilities of the Republic had been created" by 9 April. Neither the reports of KGB organizations, nor the official reports of the Republic MVD, nor any other document contain any specific facts of this kind.

The Commission notes that a positive aspect in settling the conflicts between the civilians and military during the curfew in effect in Tbilisi was the organized actions of the veterans of the war in Afghanistan, which facilitated the normalization of the situation. The Commission also notes that, while performing their official duties in difficult extraordinary conditions, many militia workers not only helped medical personnel in the evacuation of the victims but they gave medical aid themselves to the injured civilians and hunger strikers.

In conclusion the Commission submits the following suggestions for the consideration of competent government bodies:

1. Party organizations which accordingly consented or made decisions at the federal or Republic level about sending troops and conducting this operation acted according to a long-held procedure and in the face of the decisions of the XIX Party Conference about the need to delimit the functions of Party and government institutions. In a state committed to the rule of law, the decisions of Party organizations at any level can have obligatory significance for institutions of state power and administration, including the Army, only after they are embodied in a legal act of a competent state institution, a law or a government decree.

In this regard an urgent need has occurred for an acceleration of the practical division of functions of Party and government institutions by making the necessary changes in existing legislation and corresponding Party documents.

2. The events of 9 April in Tbilisi pointed out obvious flaws in existing legislation and the practice of making the most important state decisions about introducing a special situation [osoboye polozheniye] or state of emergency using subunits of the Soviet Army to maintain and restore public order inside the country, in particular the possibility of using the armed forces to resolve internal conflicts directly on the basis of decisions adopted by Party, not government organizations.

A clear and exhaustive legislative regulation of the substance and the procedure for introducing martial law (in the case of the armed conflicts) a special situation (in the case of internal unrest) or a state of emergency (in the case of disasters) is required, excluding the situation which developed in Tbilisi when the introduction of a curfew assigned a subunit of the Soviet Army the mission of maintaining public order, which should only be handled by MVD personnel.

3. It seems advisable to review the question of

increasing the strength of the Internal Troops and manning them on a mainly professional basis. It is necessary to determine legislatively the procedure and mechanism for using federal and Republic subunits of the Internal Troops.

4. It is necessary to prohibit legislatively the use of the Soviet Army to put down mass unrest, stipulating the possibility of using Army subunits for these purposes only in exceptional cases directly stipulated by lawby a decision in each individual case by the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet with a subsequent report to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

5. The rights and responsibilities of militia and Internal Troops personnel need to be spelled out legislatively as to when they perform their responsibilities which are associated with halting illegal activities and mass disorder.

6. The Commission directs attention to the need to strengthen the investigatory group on this case by bringing in workers from the Georgian SSR Procuracy and taking additional measures for the quickest possible conclusion of the preliminary investigation of the case which was brought in connection with the events of 9 April 1989 in Tbilisi.

7. The powers of parliamentary commissions created by the Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet need to be spelled out legislatively, in particular the need to provide for the responsibility of officials for giving Commissions knowingly false testimony.

The Commission expresses gratitude to the governmental and public organizations and also to all citizens and officials who gave assistance in its work and helped establish the truth.

Chairman of the Commission A. Sobchak

Deputy Chairmen of the Commission Kh. Yu. Aasmyaeh, A. I. Golyakov, V. P. Tomkus

Executive Secretary of the Commission S. B. Stankevich

Members of the Commission:

S. A. Andronati, N. P. Bekhtereva, G. A. Borovik, B. L. Vasil'yev, O. G. Gazenko, V. L. Govorov, D. S. Likhachev, V. P. Lukin, V. A. Martirosyan, V. M. Miroshnik, N. A. Nazarbayev, K. V. Nechayev, R. K. Odzhiyev, R. Z. Sagdeyev, V. F. Tolpezhnikov, V. I. Fedotova, E. N. Shengelaya, P. V. Pet'ko, A. M. Yakovlev

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89. (Collection of documents, Xerox copy). Published in Istoricheskiy Arkhiv 3 (1993), pp. 102-120. Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

1 On Gorbachev's reaction, see Anatoly Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev. Translated and edited by Robert English and Elizabeth Tucker (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), pp. 218221.

2 D. I. Patiashvili, from July 1985 to April 1989 First Secretary of the CC GCP, member of the CC CPSU.

3 Iliya (Il'ya) II (I. G. Gugushauri-Shiolashvili), since 1977 Catholicos-Patriarch of all Georgia.

4 Translator's note: This term denotes weapons other than firearms, such as bayonets or clubs.

"Z. A. Chkheidze, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Georgia.

6 The appeal by M. S. Gorbachev to Communists and Workers of Georgia was published in the Republic press on 13 April and in the central press on 14 April 1989.

7A. S. Kapto, Chief of the CC CPSU Ideological Department; A. S. Pavlov, Chief of the CC CPSU State and Legal Department; Ye. Z. Razumov, First Deputy Chief of the CC CPSU Party Policy and Personnel Work Department. 8 On the first page of the document there are [the following] approvals: "Agreed. V. Medvedev. N. Slyun'kov, V. Nikonov, V. Chebrikov. A. Yakovlev". "Report agreement by enciphered communications. Laptev [Laptev, P. P. (born 1928)- First Deputy Chief of the CC CPSU General Department], 11.04.89.”

On the back of the document there are the following notes of workers of the CC CPSU General Department: "Cdes. Razumovskiy is on a business trip, Zaykov and Ligachev are on leave. Baklanov is on a business trip." "Agreement has been reported to Cdes. Kapto, Pavlov, and Razumov. 11.04.89." "It has been reported to Cdes. Fedyayev, Polyakova, and Smirnova. 11.04.89." [N. M. Fedyayev; V. I. Polyakov[a]; A.A. Smirnova, Chief of the Secretariats (Offices) of the CC CPSU State and Legal Department, the Party Policy and Personnel Work Department, and the Ideological Department.

[Translator's note: The name appears as Polyakova in the text, but as Polyakov in the footnote] "It has been reported to Cde. V.I. Boldin [Chief of the CC CPSU General Department] and permission has been given for distribution to the field [na mesta]. 11.04.89." "A copy of the telegram has been sent to the 4th Sector [of the CC CPSU General Department which handled enciphered communications] for the CP CC's, kray, and oblast' committees. 11.04.”V.I. Boldin.

9 G. S. Tarazevich, as of 1985 Chairman of the Presidium of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, as of 1986 simultaneously Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

10 G. V. Sergeyev, First Deputy USSR Minister of Health.