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tional network of individual and institutional partners. Over the past two years alone, CWIHP has supported or linked up with new Cold War research organizations, established often under difficult financial or political conditions, in Baku, Bucharest, Helsinki/Tampere, Hong Kong, Reykjavik, Tirana, Saratov, Shanghai, Sofia, London, Rome/Florence, Tomsk, Belgrade and Zurich. They complement longtime partnerships with US and Canadian institutions as well as Cold War research groups in Beijing, Berlin/Potsdam, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, Warsaw. Much of this inspiring cooperation would not be possible without the financial support by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the Korea Foundation and other donors.

This Bulletin issue, as others before it, is one result of this remarkable international collaboration. As the editor, I am particularly grateful for advice as well as editorial and other support to Jordan Baev, Thomas Blanton, Ashley Bullock, Bill Burr, Malcolm Byrne, Sarah Campbell, Chen Jian, Anatoly Chernyaev, Jan Chowaniec, Dan Cook, Gregory Domber, Fred Ferrer, Gary Goldberg, Christopher Goscha, Sven Gronlie, Hope Harrison, Jamil Hasanli, Jim Hershberg, Hans-Hermann Hertle, Alexander Kingsbury, Anne Kjelling, Caroline Kovtun, Mark Kramer, Robert Litwak, Geir Lundestad, Vojtech Mastny, Stephen Matzie, Christina Mayer, Nancy Meyers, Mircea Munteanu, Catherine Nielsen, Olav Njolstad, Andrzej Paczkowski, Zachary Pease, Erich Pryor, Anzhela Reno, Priscilla Roberts, Janine Rowe, Svetlana Savranskaya, Radek Špikar, Valentyna Tereshchenko, Richard Thomas, Mike Thurman, Stein Tønnesson, Kathryn Weathersby, Odd Arne Westad, Paul Wingrove, David Wolff, Vladislav Zubok and this issue's patient contributors.

Christian F. Ostermann

I The full document is published in this Bulletin issue. 2 The conference series included the following meetings: "Poland, 1986-1989: The End of the System,' Miedzeszyn-Warsaw, 21-23 October 1999, organized with the Institute for Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences (Warsaw) and the National Security Archive; “The Democratic Revolution in Czechoslovakia: Its Preconditions, Course, and Immediate Repercussions, 1987-89," Prague, 14-16 October 1999, co-organized with The Czechoslovak Documentation Centre (Prague), The Institute of Contemporary History, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (Prague) and the National Security Archive; "Political Transition in Hungary: 1989-1990," Budapest, 10-12 June 1999, co-sponsored with the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution (Budapest), the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Budapest), and the National Security Archive; and "The End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989: 'New Thinking' and New Evidence," Musgrove, St. Simon's Island, Georgia, 1 May 1999, sponsored by the National Security Archive. 3 Earlier conferences on Cold War flashpoints included:

"Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions,” Jachranka-Warsaw, 8-10 November 1997, co-organized with the Institute for Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences (Warsaw) and the National Security Archive; "The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe," Potsdam, 10-12 November 1996, co-organized with the Center for Contemporary History Research (Potsdam) and the National Security Archive; “Hungary and the World, 1956: The New Archival Evidence," Budapest, 26-29 September 1996, co-sponsored with the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution (Budapest) and the National Security Archive; and "Czechoslovakia and the World, 1968: The New Archival Evidence," Prague, 18-20 April 1994, co-sponsored with The Prague Spring 1968 Foundation (Prague) and the National Security Archive. For information on these conferences, see past issues of CWIHP Bulletin, in particular nos. 8/9, 10 and 11.

4 The project has also collected hundreds of documents on the 1980s. These will be published in future issues of the Bulletin. 'See especially Bulletin 6/7, “The Cold War in Asia" (Winter 1995/1996).

"The conference "China, Southeast Asia and the Vietnam War," co-sponsored with the University of Hong Kong, took place on 10-12 January 2000. See the conference report by Priscilla Roberts in this Bulletin.

? For further information on this initiative, see the editor's introduction to the document collection in this Bulletin.

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Organized by the Fondazione Istituto Gramsci. Organized by the Center for Cold War International History Studies (East China Normal University, Shanghai) and the Modern Historical Documents Studies Center (Beijing University).

17 Organized by the Universidad de La Habana, Centro de Estudios sobre Estados Unidos, Instituto de Historia de Cuba, Centro de Investigaciones Historicas de la Seguridad del Estado; Centro de Estudios sobre America, and co-sponsored by The National Security Archive.

18 CWIHP plans to publish many of these documents. See the report in this Bulletin.

19 For information on the Consortium see http:// www.pfpconsortium.marshallcenter.org.

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New Evidence on Cold War Military History

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New Evidence on the End of the Cold War

New Evidence on the "Soviet Factor"

By Vladislav M. Zubok

in the Peaceful Revolutions of 1989

In 1999 Eastern European countries celebrated the tenth anniversary of their peaceful liberation from

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communism. In the commemorative discussions, at conferences, workshops and in the press one would have expected a detailed, informed and dispassionate reconstruction of the events of the "annus mirabilis" when the Soviet empire in Central and Eastern Europe ceased to exist. Surprisingly, however, this was not so. First, the events of ten years ago remain the subject of heated and partisan debate in the Central and East European countries; even what seemed to be certain ten years before (e.g. the role of "reformist" wings of the ruling communist establishments, the positions of various factions of anti-communist movements, etc.) are now no longer certain and, in fact, are vigorously questioned. Second, the international aspects of the collapse of communist Europe, the role of "the Gorbachev factor," and of the devolution of the bipolar Cold War are not evaluated and recognized in a balanced way. Sometimes they are even passed over in silence.1

Other equally strong passions and biases are present in the discussions and literature produced in the United States and in the former Soviet Union. For many American authors, the collapse of the Soviet Union's external empire was the beginning of the West's victory in the Cold War. This created a strong temptation to regard the events through "triumphalist" lenses. Former CIA director Robert Gates contends in his memoirs that the years 1989-1991 were a triumph of the strategy of containment, as formulated in 1946 by George F. Kennan-a vindication of "the belief that, denied new conquests, the inherent weaknesses of Soviet communism ultimately would bring it down." Other former officials, particularly President George Bush, his National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, and Robert Hutchings, then a member of the National Security Council staff dealing with Central and Eastern Europe, recognize the importance of Soviet noninvolvement. At the same time, they, as well as Gates and other "triumphalist" authors, argue for the importance of "the American factor," "strategic prudence" and the "vision" of the policy-makers in Washington. Specifically, they point to the United States' quiet mediation in Poland and other Eastern European countries between "reformist" communists and anti-communist forces, and consistent successful efforts to allay the fears of the Soviet leadership regarding the rapid pace of change.3 Still, the main focus of the "triumphalist" literature in the United States is elsewhere, on the secret policies and initiatives of the Reagan Administration between 1981 and 1987-on the

military, economic, political and psychological factorsthat, in this view, broke the back of the Soviet empire and set the stage for the "victory" of the West."

On the Russian side, Mikhail Gorbachev, his assistants and ministers Anatoly Chernyaev, Georgi Shakhnazarov, Vadim Medvedev, Alexander Yakovlev, and Eduard Shevardnadze, emphasize in their writings and speeches that Soviet domination in Central and Eastern Europe had already been doomed by the mid-1980s. They claim that communist leaders of those countries were incapable of change, and did not follow advice from Moscow to alter their traditionalist policies. They emphatically claim that there was no alternative to the Soviet policy of noninvolvement during the peaceful revolutions of 1989 which they say stemmed logically from the reformist strategy of overcoming the legacies of the Cold War and integrating the Soviet Union into Europe.

A large group, primarily former party apparatchiks, military and former KGB officials of the last Soviet administration, denounce Gorbachev's "new thinking" and point to the writings of American “triumphalists” as a proof of Gorbachev's ineptitude, at best, and high treason, at worst. Some contend, specifically, that the "peaceful revolutions" in Central and Eastern Europe were not totally spontaneous, that one could discern the "hidden hand" of the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies. Some intimate that 1989 was the beginning of the "betrayal," when the Soviet Union lost its geostrategic advantages and valuable "allies." The evidence for these claims, however, is largely absent, and those Gorbachev critics closely involved in security affairs and foreign policy (e.g., former KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov, Marshal Dmitry Yazov), conspicuously avoid blaming Gorbachev for the "loss" of Central and Eastern Europe. It is easy to notice that the fallout of the Soviet Union's collapse continues to be the main obstacle to serious and sober discussion of 1989 and many other issues of recent history. In addition, growing apprehension about US goals, specifically deep mistrust of the American world role, tend to color the fluctuating assessments of the year when Moscow "lost" its geopolitical security belt in Central and Eastern Europe.8

Still, serious and balanced research has appeared on the international context and Soviet aspects of 1989. The well-documented book by two veterans of the Bush Administration NSC staff, Philip Zelikow and Condolezza Rice, reveals that the real priority for Washington was NATO's unity and particularly a peaceful reunification of

Germany within the Western alliance. A heated discussion took place from 1992 to 1995 between the proponents of "realism" and its critics, with the critics claiming that under Gorbachev foreign policy "became increasingly inconsistent with power transition and other realist theories," and that the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe was even more inconsistent.' Canadian political scientist Jacques Lévesque focused on "the enigma of 1989" and concluded that "new thinking" and Gorbachev's personality played an outstanding, unique role in transforming the realities of power and ending the Cold War in Central and Eastern Europe. Gorbachev, says Lévesque, replaced the faded Stalinist imperial consensus with a new neo-Leninist utopia, based not on force and party monopoly, but on consensus and pluralism. This, more than anything else, led to the quick disappearance of the Soviet European empire in 1989. “Rarely in history," he writes, "have we witnessed the policy of a great power continue, throughout so many difficulties and reversals, to be guided by a such an idealistic view of the world, based on universal reconciliation, and in which the image of the enemy was constantly blurring, to the point of making it practically disappear as the enemy."

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The most difficult task for researchers is finding links between Soviet policies (or non-policies) and the developments in the East-Central European countries during the year of great change. What was the degree of "spontaneity," and was the element of a "hidden hand" present there? The main problem remaining is that posed by Lévesque the spectacular non-use of force-in total violation of the "realist" prescriptions of behavior for a great power. Was there at any point a danger of Soviet intervention? What options were discussed in the Kremlin as it witnessed the meltdown of the Soviet empire? How did domestic constraints (e.g., economic and financial crises) and "new thinking" affect the Soviet view of "Eastern Europe"? There are still many gaps in the historical narrative and documentary evidence about 1989. Overcoming the passions of the day and narrow national agendas is a prime purpose of a project developed by the National Security Archive at George Washington University and the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, in collaboration with other universities and research centers in the United States, Russia and East-Central Europe. The new evidence obtained through these efforts" enhances our understanding of the "peaceful revolutions" of 1989 as an integral part of the intellectual, cultural and political ferment that took place inside the Soviet bloc.

An important part of the story of 1989 is the final demise of Stalin's imperial, xenophobic legacy in the Kremlin after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. Within just a few years, from 1985 until the end of 1988, the idea of "Eastern Europe" as a geopolitical glacis [predpolie] of the Soviet Union came to be replaced by the idea of a "Common European House." The hostile blocs of NATO

and the Warsaw Pact were to be replaced by the integrationist international structures.

This striking change of mindset stemmed from many factors, the most important of which was the death of communist ideology. At a critical oral history conference in May 1998, Anatoly Chernyaev, veteran of the CPSU CC International Department, recalled the common feeling he had with Italian "Eurocommunists" whom he had met in the 1960s-that "the ideology had stopped working long

ago. "12 Another long-term factor was, ironically, the position of the USSR as a superpower and the persistent strivings of the Soviet leadership to gain international recognition as a "normal" state. They sought it not only through military build-up, but also through détente, trade, and economic cooperation with Western Europe. At certain points, for instance in the early 1970s, Soviet political ties to France and West Germany became more important and perhaps warmer on a personal level than relations with some members of the Warsaw Pact. Soviet diplomats as a professional corps, and various Moscowbased academic "think-tanks," became to a considerable extent a "pro-détente lobby." They even attempted, whenever possible, to encourage the leadership to reform relationships inside the Warsaw Pact, holding NATO as an example.13

The combination of these two developments eroded the "imperial-revolutionary" foundation of the Soviet imperial mentality. Soviet expansion was never geopolitical; it was "geo-ideological," a blend of realism. and ideological messianism.14 At the same time as that blend faded, neither of its components could serve as justification for preserving the Soviet presence in Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, even though MarxistLeninist prescripts had served since Stalin's time as a window-dressing for Soviet security interests, those interests were not systematically spelled out and developed and, consequently, no consistent Soviet "realist" school emerged beneath the ideological façade. This inherent weakness of "realist" thinking in the Soviet political establishment played an important role during 1989.

There was also a lack of conceptual understanding of how to end the Cold War and what would, in this case, be the fate of the East-Central European "empire." The same could be said about the West (where dominant "realist" thinking precluded any conceptualization of the world beyond containment of communism and bipolarity). But the Soviet case was a unique one: in the minds of an important segment of Soviet apparatchiks and academics the end of the Cold War came to be linked to the issue of profound domestic reforms and, ultimately, with the idea of integration of the USSR into the same world capitalist system that had emerged in opposition to Soviet communism. They secretly believed that through détente and rapprochement with Western countries they could help the country resume the process of modernization, as Stalinist autarky and a mobilizational regime had clearly

outlived its usefulness.15 This prepared the stage for a remarkable willingness on the part of many in the Soviet establishment to accept "Western influences." For a long time, between 1956 and 1981, the intellectual and cultural ferment in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, served as a substitute for the "real West." Consequently in the minds of putative Soviet reformers, Eastern Europe occupied an important place as a source of "third way" ideas.

This all came to an end in the 1980s. Ironically, the defeat of Solidarity in Poland put an end to the intellectual preeminence of Eastern Europe in the intellectual life of the reformist-minded part of the Soviet establishment. "Eurocommunism" and "communism with human face" had already been in crisis by the end of the 1970s. The complete ideological vacuum on the Left pushed Soviet intellectuals and their friends in the apparat to look for ideas elsewhere, beyond the Left, and beyond Eastern Europe, in the "real West," including the United States. This process accelerated by leaps and bounds after 1985 when Gorbachev granted the upper caste of the Soviet "official" intellectual class (intelligentsia) the long

forgotten privilege of meeting foreigners without first asking permission from the highest authorities.16 The Soviet leader himself developed a new reference circle among foreign politicians and statesmen, including not only "Eurocommunists," but increasingly Western European Social Democrats, leaders of the "non-aligned movement," and even leaders of the conservative Right (former US President Richard Nixon, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and later US President Ronald Reagan).17

All the evidence indicates that Gorbachev and his advisers had no new policy for Eastern Europe as they moved, step by step, from confrontation to reconciliation with NATO powers; on this point his modern-day critics are right. In his defense, Gorbachev suggests that immediately after he assumed power he let Eastern European communist leaders understand that they were now on their own and that the so-called "Brezhnev doctrine" was dead. 18 Chernyaev, who observed Gorbachev for six years when he was in power, confidently claims: "If you presented Gorbachev with the question: would you sacrifice the freedom that you had given to the

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President Ronald Reagan and Vice President George Bush with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev on

Governor's Island, New York (December 1988).

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