[On 22 March 1989, the parties and organizations of the emerging non-communist Hungarian opposition established a consultative forum, called the "Opposition Roundtable." Up to this point, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party had used the tactic of dealing separately with "alternative" organizations. Now the danger of having to negotiate with a unified opposition became increasingly likely. The Party's leadership also worried about an impending economic crisis possibly resulting in the destabilization of the political scene. These concerns were infused in Károly Grósz's presentation on the internal political situation. Gorbachev's "dialectic" approach to the issue of how to evaluate 1956 is remarkable: while stressing that this must be decided by the Hungarian leadership alone by examining the facts, he declared that a recent thorough investigation of the past by the Soviet leadership had undoubtedly proven that what had happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was a counterrevolution. Similarly ambiguous were the warnings of the Soviet leader concerning the tolerable scope of the political transition in Hungary. He emphasized that "the limit [...] is the safekeeping of socialism and assurance of stability," however, he also clearly declared that "today we have to preclude the possibility of repeated foreign intervention into the internal affairs of socialist countries." The timing of the conversation is also noteworthy from Gorbachev's perspective; it occurred on the eve of the legislative elections in the Soviet Union-the freest since the 1917 Revolution. The 26 March vote would elevate reformers (such as Yeltsin) and nationalists (especially in the Baltics) to a strong position to challenge the communist order, and Gorbachev may already have felt pressured by the impending balloting.] (EXCERPT) HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST WORKERS' PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE TOP SECRET Made in 2 copies Inf/1371/1989 REPORT Comrade Grósz informed the negotiators about the Hungarian situation. He said that the events in Hungary have accelerated lately. Their direction is according to our intentions, while their pace is somewhat disconcerting. Comrade Grósz emphasized that we wish to retain political power and find a solution to our problems by political means, avoiding armed conflict. We have a good chance for reaching our goals. People are afraid of a possible armed conflict.15 Workers, peasants and professionals want to work and live in peace and security, safeguarding their property. (...) Another major concern is the history of the last thirty years. We have to face our past, hard and painful as it is, as the acting participants are still alive. On the other hand, by drawing the necessary conclusions, we might dishearten certain layers of our policy's active supporters from the Party. Lack of self-confidence is palpable enough in the Party anyway. (...) Comrade Gorbachev agreed that the Western world does not want instability in Eastern Europe, including Hungary as well, because in the present situation it would be adverse to its interests. Nonetheless, it is quite apparent that they [the Western countries] intend to facilitate the realization and strengthening of a development that suits their own political ideas. Comrade Gorbachev emphasized: "The estimation of the 1956 events is entirely up to you." You have to stand on a firm ground; you have to examine what really happened then and there. The Soviet leadership has recently analyzed the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia, and they continue to maintain that what happened there was a counter-revolution, with all the idiosyncratic traits of such an event. There were different periods within the Czechoslovak events, but the Dubček regime was unable to prevent openly counter-revolutionary forces from gaining ground through them. (...) Comrade Gorbachev emphasized that we clearly have to draw boundaries, thinking about others and ourselves at the same time. Democracy is much needed, and interests have to be harmonized. The limit, however, is the safekeeping of socialism and assurance of stability. Comrade Grósz emphasized that when referring to 1956, we adhere to the original evaluation that the Party endorsed in December 1956. The process is described in three consecutive words: student protest, [people's] uprising, and counter-revolution. Comrade Gorbachev agreed with the above. He emphasized that today we have to preclude the possibility of repeated foreign intervention into the internal affairs of socialist countries. (...) [Source: MOL M-KS-288-11/4458 ö.e.. Translated by Csaba Farkas.] for members of the Political Committee [29 March 1989] (...) DOCUMENT No. 4 Agreement about the Commencement of Substantial Political Negotiations between the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, the Members of the Opposition Roundtable and the Organizations of the Third Side, 10 June 1989 [Between March and June the crucial question of the transition was whether the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party [HSWP] was willing to accept eventually the fact that it would have to negotiate with a unified opposition represented by the Opposition Roundtable [ORT]. Although the HSWP leadership tried to do everything it could to prevent this, by the beginning of June it gave up it's previous position. However, the opposition parties had to make a serious concession too, since it was a precondition of the HSWP in agreeing to start official negotiations on the political transition with the ORT that the talks should be tripartite. The "third side" included mass organizations and civil associations, all of which were supporters of the HSWP and/or represented left-wing political ideas. The agreement published below was signed at the first plenary meeting of the National Roundtable talks. The document, which put on record the legal framework and the conditions of the subsequent tripartite negotiations which lasted until 18 September. At the next meeting, on 21 June, two intermediate-level committees were established for political and for social-economic issues, each having six working subcommittees in which the bulk of the legal work leading to the establishment of parliamentary democracy in Hungary was carried out.] AGREEMENT About the Commencement of Substantial Political Negotiations between the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, the Members of the Opposition Roundtable and the Organizations of the Third Side, 10 June 1989 L The necessity to help the nation out of a serious political and economic crisis, and the democratic transformation of the conditions of power appropriate the dialogue between all the political circles that feel responsible for the future. Handling the crisis and creating a multiparty system is only possible with the agreement of the democratic forces. It presupposes that mutual objectives and aims are taken into account, that all participants are willing to make an agreement, and it necessitates trust and self-restraint. The fate of the nation can be improved by respecting the requirements of the constitution and firmly rejecting violence. It is in our mutual interest that social conflicts are solved according to the generally agreed norms of European political culture: with public consent. The transition from a single-party system to representational democracy and constitutional government can only be realized by free elections. Well-functioning representative bodies and a firm, consistent government that is trusted by the people are needed to stop the worsening social and economic crisis. The peaceful political transition and the relief of aggravated economic and social tension can only be realized by mutual agreement. An array of historical examples warn us that common problems can only be solved with consensus. All civil organizations and movements have to take part side by side in the hard and contradictory process of transition. On the basis of these facts and conditions, organizations of the Opposition Roundtable, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, the Left Wing Alternative Union; the Patriotic People's Front; the Hungarian Democratic Youth Association; the Association of Hungarian Resistance Fighters and Anti-Fascists; the National Council of Hungarian Women; the joint delegation of the Ferenc Münnich Society; and the National Council of Trade Unions express their wish to commence substantial political negotiations. The equal negotiators accept the following governing principles for the talks: -the basis of power is the sovereignty of the people; none of the political forces can monopolize it and declare themselves the sole repository of the people's will, and none can aspire to unconstitutionally curtail political rights; -the will of the public has to be expressed without preceding limitations, in the course of free elections, the result of which is binding for everyone, and from which no political organization that complies with the requirements of the constitution can be excluded; -handling the crisis, ensuring a democratic transition and resolving political conflicts is only possible in a peaceful way, avoiding violence; none of the civil organizations can have direct control over military forces; -an important condition of the successful and constructive political negotiations is that the nation and [the parties'] interests are considered and respected; a further condition is mutual and anticipatory confidence; -only mutually acceptable conditions can be the basis of co-operation and agreement; —when determining the participants of negotiations and their legal standing, exclusion of a political nature is unacceptable, although the functioning of the negotiation process must be considered; -the objective of negotiations is the formation of political agreements that can be accompanied by the necessary government measures and bills, together with the deadline for their realization; the negotiations themselves, however, do not directly exercise functions of constitutional law; -during the course of negotiations the parties refrain from all unilateral steps that would obliterate the goal of negotiations; legislation cannot precede political agreement; -all negotiating partners will have the political agreements accepted in their own organizations, and represent them in public as well, while assisting the enforcement of the agreements by every possible political means. II. Three parties take part in the political conciliation talks, with the intent of reaching political agreements. a) The Opposition Roundtable (Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Friendship Society; Alliance of Young Democrats; Independent Smallholders' and Farmers' Civic Party; Christian Democratic People's Party; Hungarian Democratic Forum; Hungarian People's Party; Hungarian Social Democratic Party; Alliance of Free Democrats; and the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions as observer); b) Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party; c) The following civil organizations and movements: Left Wing Alternative Union; the Patriotic People's Front; Hungarian Democratic Youth Association; the Association of Hungarian Resistance Fighters and Anti-Fascists; the National Council of Hungarian Women; the Ferenc Münnich Society and the National Council of Trade Unions. All three negotiating partners are endowed with equal rights in forming a consensus. A speaker represents each of the three parties, who [will] express the opinions of the negotiating parties. Civil associations and movements listed under point c) above, whose participation in substantial negotiations was agreed by the Opposition Roundtable as a compromise during preparatory talks, do express that they support the intention of both the Hungarian Social Workers' Party and the Opposition Roundtable to conduct a constructive dialogue and reach an agreement. They intend to take an active part in the negotiation process. The Opposition Roundtable determines the number and composition of their delegates. Civil associations and movements listed under point c) above decide among themselves about the method of reconciliation and the method of joint representation of their disputable issues. 1. Representatives of the participating organizations are endowed with a written mandate, which contains their right to make agreements. They present their mandate to the president of the plenary session. a) Substantial negotiations are conducted in plenary The opening plenary session is scheduled on 13 June Representatives of all three negotiating parties are In the course of the opening plenary session, negotiat- b) Agreements are prepared by working committees, according to specific issues on the agenda. Statutes of the plenary session logically refer to committee sessions as well. Working committees can form subcommittees with the participation of experts. Preparing bills for legislation must involve governmental bodies as well. In the course of political conciliatory talks, some propositions may be opened to public debate. Final documents are ratified by the plenary session. Propositions of the working committees can only be submitted to the plenary session when heads of delegations have signed them. The approved documents are signed by the heads of the delegations who then take care of their publication. Every session is recorded in the minutes, which have to be publicized in case the negotiations are interrupted. c) Coming to an agreement is our mutual interest, based on the principle of consensus. Should discord persist in a particular detail, consensus can be reached nevertheless, provided that the dissenting negotiating partner admits that it does not concern the general principle of the agreement. d) Plenary sessions are open to the press. Working committees, however, will operate behind closed doors. It has to be assured that [the public] receives regular and substantial information about the negotiation process. From time to time, negotiating parties will issue a joint communiqué to the Hungarian Telegraphic Agency. Separate statements can only be issued if negotiations break off or a common declaration cannot be agreed on. Nevertheless, this does not concern the right of the parties to express their opinions about the content of certain issues on the agenda. e) The parties think it necessary that expenses of the negotiations are covered by the state budget. Handling of documents, photocopying, postage, the costs of organizing meetings, and the wages of possible experts are included in the expenses. Representing the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party: György Fejti Secretary of the Central Committee Representing the Opposition Roundtable: Dr. Zsolt Zétényi16 Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Friendship Society Dr. László Kövér Alliance of Young Democrats Péter Hardi Independent Smallholders' and Farmers' Civic Party György Szakolczai Christian Democratic Party Dr. László Sólyom Hungarian Democratic Forum Csaba Varga Hungarian People's Party Tibor Baranyai Hungarian Social Democratic Party Dr. Péter Tölgyessy Alliance of Free Democrats Imre Kerényi Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions, as observer Representing the Left Wing Alternative Union; the Patriotic People's Front; the Hungarian Democratic Youth Association; the Association of Hungarian Resistance Fighters and Anti-Fascists; the National Council of Hungarian Women; the joint delegation of the Ferenc Münnich Society and the National Council of Trade Unions: Csaba Kemény Left Wing Alternative Union Dr. István Kukorelli People's Patriotic Front Ferenc Gyurcsány Hungarian Democratic Youth Association Imre Kerekes Association of Hungarian Resistance Fighters and Anti-Fascists Mrs. Soós Dr. Mária Dobos National Council of Hungarian Women Ferenc Berényi Ferenc Münnich Society Mrs. Kósa & Dr. Magda Kovács National Council of Trade Unions [Source: Published in Ellenzéki kerekasztal. Portrévázlatok. [Opposition Roundtable. Political Portraits. Ed. and interviews by Anna Richter] (Budapest: Ötlet Kft, 1990), pp. 294-300. Translated by Csaba Farkas.] *** DOCUMENT No. 5 Minutes of the Meeting of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party [HSWP] CC Political Executive Committee," 24 July 1989 [The end of July brought a definite hardening in the position of the HSWP at the National Roundtable talks. This was obvious in the Communists unexpected refusal to sign an agreement on party law, although it had already been accepted by the experts. The opposition attributed the harder line to a change in personnel at the top of the HSWP delegation, when Imre Pozsgay's position was taken over by the less flexible György Fejti. 18 At the 27 July meeting of the National Roundtable, Fejti made it clear that the HSWP was not willing to give a full account of all of its property, emphasizing that the greater part of it had been acquired legitimately and therefore this issue should not be discussed at the tripartite talks. The HSWP's uncompromising stand on reaching agreement on the depoliticization of the armed services, and concerning the withdrawal of party organizations from work places, finally led to the suspension of the tripartite negotiations. The talks were not resumed until 24 August, when the HSWP delegation was headed again by Pozsgay. Fejti's speech at the 24 July meeting of the HSWP Political Executive Committee, published below, provides insight into the making of this new, less flexible and more intransigent policy towards the opposition.] (EXCERPT) György Fejti: We are in a complicated situation now, but still, we have to make up our minds. In many questions, especially when it comes to specific details, we have made quite some progress. However, in a series of fundamental and cardinal questions the antagonism seems irreconcilable; apparently the date of the general elections is one of these controversial issues. So, with a flexible negotiating strategy, namely that we give in to certain demands but stand our ground firmly in other issues, we cannot resolve the prevailing antagonism for the time being. Yet time is pushing us. Technically, we have some three or four weeks left to work out the legal conditions of the parliamentary elections in late autumn. 19 Three or four weeks, that's all we have. On the other hand, this more or less open, hesitant, obstructive behavior is physically impeding the process of calling elections. That's why we have to come to a decision, on the basis of the previous issue on the agenda, as to what to do in the face of the present economic situation and the international financial conditions. Because either we accept the fact that we cannot make a compromise in this case, while emphasizing that the ongoing negotiation process should not be jeopardized-it is another question, though, whether the danger holds only for the elections-or, alternatively, we come up with overt reasoning and publicize in due time what the rationale is behind advancing the date of elections. In the latter case we should look to make compromises on other issues instead of this one. Undoubtedly, we jeopardize the success of negotiations; what is more, we even risk their termination. The later we express our intention to call earlier elections, the bigger the danger is. Rezső Nyers: The only reason to hasten negotiations is to advance the elections? I believe that even if we called elections for next spring, we should speed things up all the same, shouldn't we? György Fejti: It is a markedly different situation if we want to submit the fundamental laws to parliament in midSeptember rather than in December. The meaning of hastening things now depends on whether we show the magnanimous gesture of government-abolishing these laws in a very broad sense, or the government makes it clear that, even though they are curious how political negotiations will end, they want to submit the bills at the next session anyway, so that nothing can change the date of election. Rezső Nyers: I have one question otherwise I completely agree that we hasten the process and the government keep to their schedule, with the one compromise of September. But why does it have to be connected with elections in November? György Fejti: Because we have no other plausible reason for speeding things up. (...) György Fejti: Yes, but we have to get back to the unfortunately irrevocable question, that we should decide in a very short time, to what extent the elections of this year are important for us. As long as there is no decision. on this issue, we cannot follow a clear and unequivocal line in the negotiations. I can imagine that we might lose this, so let me point out that despite all appearances there is no covert reason that would make it important for me. Yet we cannot carry on the negotiations under such pressure without knowing how important this issue is for our own Party. Rezö Nyers: Comrade Fejti, it is very important for us. Under one condition, that is if they pass these fundamental laws in September, then the November elections are 100 percent to our advantage. If they do not vote for the bill in September, then nothing is good enough for us. Absolutely nothing. This is the decisive factor. So, I am totally and immediately for the November elections, if these three issues are accepted. Or at least two of the three. Three would be most expedient, though. György Fejti: You mean if they accept it? It is still a bone of contention. There are and will be several disputable issues. It is definite that the documents can only be submitted in September with much controversy. This is part of the negotiation strategy. We shouldered responsibility for negotiating these bills. However, the HSWP cannot take responsibility for striking a deal with those powers. We will not be able to come to terms; it is the Parliament's task to ask for a decision, making known and objectively presenting the opposing views. In the present state of negotiations it is an illusion that in these questions— whether it be the party law or election law a total agreement and final consensus can be reached. An illusion. Possibly we should reduce the number of points that induce confrontation-and there are a lot, at the moment. Just to mention one example: so far, when it came to the party law, the opposition has put in the minutes at every single meeting that the HSWP is not willing to give consent to proposing the bill to parliament if either the assessment or the redistribution of their total property is on the agenda. I think it is absolutely impossible that such a position would be acceptable for us right before the elections. I can't tell when they might take a U-turn on this issue. They will only relinquish if there is a final deadline, by which the negotiations should be completed, otherwise we can stand up, wash our hands and say that the agreement has fallen through but we are not the ones to blame. So that's why entirely clear statements are needed, saying that there is a set schedule and deadline for negotiations; the delegates of the HSWP are unable to do this. (...) [Source: MOL M-KS-288-5/1072 ö.e. Translated by Csaba Farkas.] |