By Paweł Machcewicz

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The documents published below are among those gathered by historians from the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences for the international conference "Poland 1986-1989. The End of the System," held at Miedzeszyn near Warsaw on 21-23 October 1999 and co-organized with the National Security Archive at George Washington University and the Cold War International History Project. They come from several archives: those of the Polish Senate (Archiwum Biura Informacji i Dokumentacji Senackiej), where a great portion of the "Solidarity" documents from 1988-1989 were deposited; the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University, where several leaders of the Polish Communist Party (PUWP) deposited their papers; and private collections of former Solidarity activists Andrzej Paczkowski, Andrzej Stelmachowski, and Stanisław Stomma. With the exception of Document No. 8,2 these documents have never been published. The "Solidarity" documents, dealing with the preparation of key decisions by the opposition which led to the removal of communists from power, are unique. To date, no comparable Polish materials have been published in English.3

The selection below covers some of the most important issues and events from 1986 to 1989 relating to the end of communist rule in Poland. The first document is a September 1986 letter from Lech Wałęsa (chairman of the "Solidarity" trade union movement, banned by authorities after the imposition of martial law in December 1981) to the Council of State, following the government's announcement of an amnesty for political prisoners. In his letter, Wałęsa offers to open a dialogue with the authorities. Documents 2 and 3 chronicle the talks between the authorities and circles close to both the Episcopate and Lech Wałęsa concerning the participation of independent forces in the Consultative Council created by the Chairman of the Council of State, Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski. The creation of that consultative body with very limited powers (in December 1986) was the first half-measure by the authorities to broaden the scope of social dialogue within the political system created by the martial law declaration. In the end, none of the mainstream opposition representatives (centered around Wałęsa) cooperated with the Council which assured its failure. Paczkowski argues convincingly that the authorities' strategy during that period was one of "cooptation," i.e. of attempting to include opposition representatives in façade institutions (instead of opening any real or substantive negotiations) which would (had they succeeded) have legitimized the Jaruzelski regime.

The next document (No. 4) presages change in that

strategy, due to the catastrophic economic situation and the authorities' growing awareness of the political deadlock in which they found themselves. A report prepared by three experts (government spokesman Jerzy Urban; CC Secretary Stanisław Ciosek; and high-level Interior Ministry official Gen. Władysław Pożoga) for the party and government leadership helps explain why in 1988 the regime decided to seek a new understanding with the opposition. Document No. 5 presents the authorities' offer to cooperate with the opposition in the first half of 1988 (after the first wave of workers' strikes in April and May) when they still believed that it might be possible to make the opposition share responsibility ("a pro-reform coalition" or an "anti-crisis pact") without restructuring the system or restoring any form of legality to "Solidarity."

The subsequent documents (nos. 6-12) illustrate the positions and beliefs held by the opposition circles around Wałęsa during the many long months of negotiations, which eventually led to the establishment of the "Roundtable" on 6 February 1989. Documents 13 and 14 present arguments of the Working Group of the "Solidarity" National Council from the period of its legal existence in the years 1980-1981 charging Wałęsa and his advisers with using undemocratic practices and usurping the right to speak on behalf of the whole Union. The Working Group also contests some elements of the negotiation strategy with the authorities. These differences of opinion within the "Solidarity" camp foreshadowed the subsequent internal conflicts after the "Roundtable" deliberations ended, particularly after the formation of Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government that summer.

Document No. 15 is an internal PUWP summary of an April 1989 meeting between Jaruzelski and Gorbachev in Moscow at which the Polish leader reported to his Soviet counterpart on the results of the "Roundtable." The last four documents illustrate debates within the "Solidarity" camp on the most important issues during the critical months between the elections (4 June 1989) and the formation of the "Solidarity government:" the parliamentary elections (No. 16), the presidency of Jaruzelski (No. 17), and finally the formation of the government (Nos. 18 and 19). It is worth noting that as late as 1 August 1989 (less than two weeks before Mazowiecki's designation as prime minister of the coalition government), most leading "Solidarity" politicians considered participation in the government, much less taking over the premiership, as premature and even highly risky. Mazowiecki himself warned that such a step would provoke a very negative reaction from those groups that constituted the backbone of communist power. (“There are the remaining centers of

Poland and created possibilities for a broader social dialogue. It is very much needed due to the many unsolved problems and the deteriorating social and economic situation despite some normalization. Among these problems one should include the following: 1) a sense of lack of prospects and any chances for the future for many people, particularly the youth; 2) the lack of credibility of the authorities, frequently connected with deep aversion to them; 3) [problems] stemming from economic and technical development, or even some regress vis-a-vis the developed countries.

Getting out of the crisis and moving [into] recovery, and particularly undertaking efforts to reform and achieve economic equilibrium, requires, in the first place, changes in peoples' attitudes. Such changes will not be achieved in a sufficiently broad scale without:

a) conviction, in the sense of effort and sacrifice, b) an understanding of the government's policies, c) approval of such policies.

So far, signs of any such changes are lacking, and in this respect the situation is getting worse.

II. Taking the initiative [to arrange] meetings with Chairman of the Council of State could be an important factor on the road toward a broadly defined understanding and renewal, if it is conceived:

1) as one factor harmonized with other measures contributing to renewal, understanding, and social cooperation, and particularly a change of [the political] climate and human attitudes. Consideration of this initiative apart from the specific social situation and other measures is doomed to failure; 2) as a factor in the increasing rationalization of political and economic decisions. However, one needs to note that: a) in observing the work of the state organs one doesn't detect any particular interest in a dialogue with different social groups, and b) experiences of the Consultative Economic Council or the Socio-Economic Council at the Sejm [Polish Parliament] have not been encouraging so far;

3) as a factor in strengthening the government's position through some kind of legitimacy, as these meetings can and should be recognized as a form of support and cooperation from social circles. It will have an effect both inside and outside, but it will be durable only when these meetings will not be a façade and of temporary character;

4) as a factor of dialogue and mediation, particularly in difficult situations.

III. For the dialogue conducted at these meetings to bring about the desired results, it has to:

1) meet decisively the postulates of the Polish Episcopate and broad social circles relating to the freedom of association. The question of trade union pluralism' is meeting with particular opposition [by the government]. In the long run, however, one cannot imagine social development without the implementation of this postulate. Right now broad social circles do not have legal opportunities for social activity and expression [a lack] of which will unavoidably lead to tensions and conflicts. Thus, opening broader opportunities to form socio-cultural associations is becoming indispensable. Catholics will attempt to form professional, agricultural, intellectual, youth or women's associations, acting on the basis of Catholic social teachings, charitable associations and institutions, as well as those preventing social pathology;

2) adopt the principle of philosophical neutrality in the school and educational system and accept the principle of philosophical pluralism in scientific and cultural circles;

3) invite to those meetings not only publicly known people, but, above all, people who are representative of their [social] groups. In this way opinions and considerations of those circles could be directly presented and defended. This postulate should not contradict the conditions of factual dialogue and limits on the number of participants;

4) assure the truly independent character of invited participants, among whom, besides people connected with the Catholic Church, should be properly chosen representatives of other independent circles.

IV. Proceeding to the organization of the above meetings and the possible formation of a consultative body, the following questions should be resolved:

1) What is the real motive for organizing these
meetings and forming a consultative body?"
2) What are going to be the tasks and powers of that
body?

3) Should this body be created by Gen. Jaruzelski as
Chairman of the Council of State, or by the Council of
State [as a whole]?

4) What will be the composition (what social circles
and proportions), the manner of appointment, and the
size of this body?

5) In what way will the society be informed about the
work of this body and the opinions of its members?
6) Will it be possible to adopt the principle that people
who are not representing official political structures
and the state organs also be invited?

7) Is there a possibility to hold proper consultations
with Lech Wałęsa on the participation of people from
the "Solidarity" circles?

8) Would the state authorities, before the final decision on meetings and setting up the consultative body, publicly take a positive position on the proposal

The conversation started at about 9 a.m. and lasted three and a half hours. K. Barcikowski referred to questions which he had received from the Episcopate. He expressed their mutual lack of trust. The proposal [for the Council] is new and startling. It would be the only means to get involved in difficult decisions. Participation in [the proposed Council] is a matter of citizenship, a duty. Its composition [is] well balanced: 30-40 people [would be involved] for certain (but there are proposals to expand that list and to invite other people on an ad hoc basis). Of the Catholics from the circles close to the Episcopate, 8-10 people [would be active]. Besides representatives of the [ruling] party and other parties, non-party people, including those not connected with the authorities (but not extremists, who are re-activating the "S[olidarity]" structures) [would also actively participate].

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The proposed Consultative Council is meant to increase trust and develop recommendations, which the Chairman of the Council of State (Gen. Jaruzelski) would pass on to the proper state organs as important proposals. Its effectiveness will depend on the authority [that it can command]. There will be a place for the opinions of its members, and the circles to which they belong. The Consultative Council has to work out some consensus.

The Consultative Council would be set up by the Chairman of the Council of State personally and not by the Council of State as such, which has too narrow a range of responsibilities and competence.

A possible range of activities of the Council [is] building: 1) social understanding, 2) functioning of the State, 3) conditions for economic progress, 4) scientifictechnical progress, 5) development of socialist democracy, 6) current and prospective social policy, 7) environmental protection, 8) improvement of the moral condition of society; as well as other important matters.

The creation of approximately ten similar “citizens' convents" for larger agglomerations or several voivodships [districts] and also the appointment of a Citizens' Rights Ombudsman is expected.18

K. Barcikowski, referring to a note he received at the beginning of the meeting from A. Wielowieyski, said that there is some skepticism toward these proposed bodies, but that he was sure that a "façade counts too." Criticism towards consultative bodies is incorrect, anyway, as they are actively operating.

Taking a position on particular points of the "Note"

he called into question an assertion that union pluralism is indispensable for the longer term;

-he expressed surprise that Catholics would aim at forming associations and said that the authorities might take a position on this matter, but only if all the interested parties would first take a position toward the proposed Council (ref. to question 8);

-in schools one can see an aversion shown by Catholics (question 9);

-[he said that] the demand that the Council be representative creates the impression that it was to be made according to a "prescription;"

[he noted that] the question of informing public opinion about the workings of the Council requires further thought; certainly discretion will be needed (question 5);

-[he questioned if] the participation in the Council, of people connected with the authorities (e.g. with the Party) mean that only people opposed to the authorities should be in the Council? (to question 6—it would be an issue to raise);

[he said that] consultations with Wałęsa are not being foreseen without [Wałęsa] fulfilling conditions which the government's spokesman talked [about] (on TV), i.e. cutting himself off from other "S" leaders;

He thought the note was one-sided.