Handbook of New Institutional Economics

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Claude Ménard, Mary M. Shirley
Springer Science & Business Media, 2008年6月27日 - 884 頁
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New Institutional Economics (NIE) has skyrocketed in scope and influence over the last three decades. This first Handbook of NIE provides a unique and timely overview of recent developments and broad orientations. Contributions analyse the domain and perspectives of NIE; sections on legal institutions, political institutions, transaction cost economics, governance, contracting, institutional change, and more capture NIE's interdisciplinary nature. This Handbook will be of interest to economists, political scientists, legal scholars, management specialists, sociologists, and others wishing to learn more about this important subject and gain insight into progress made by institutionalists from other disciplines. This compendium of analyses by some of the foremost NIE specialists, including Ronald Coase, Douglass North, Elinor Ostrom, and Oliver Williamson, gives students and new researchers an introduction to the topic and offers established scholars a reference book for their research.

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Institutions and the Performance of Economies over Time
21
The Institutional Structure of Production
31
Transaction Cost Economics
40
Coordination
67
Presidential versus Parliamentary Government
91
Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle
123
The Many Legal Institutions that Support
175
Legal Systems as Frameworks for Market Exchanges
204
Agricultural Contracts
465
The Enforcement of Contracts and Private Ordering
491
The Institutions of Regulation An Application
513
State Regulation of OpenAccess CommonPool Resources
545
Property Rights and the State
573
Licit and Illicit Responses to Regulation
591
Institutions and Development
610
Institutional and NonInstitutional Explanations
639

Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking
229
Legal Institutions and Financial Development
251
A New Institutional Approach to Organization
281
Vertical Integration
319
Solutions to PrincipalAgent Problems in Firms
349
The Institutions of Corporate Governance
371
Firms and the Creation of New Markets
400
Lessons from Empirical Studies
433
Institutions and Firms in Transition Economies
667
Social Capital Social Norms and the
700
The Nature
727
Economic Sociology and New Institutional Economics
788
Digging Deeper than
819
Subject Index
849
Author Index
867
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第 156 頁 - If men were angels, no Government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on Government would be necessary. In framing a Government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this : you must first enable the Government to control the governed ; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.
第 552 頁 - Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit — in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.
第 42 頁 - Economics is the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.
第 37 頁 - It makes little sense for economists to discuss the process of exchange without specifying the institutional setting within which the trading takes place since this affects the incentives to produce and the costs of transacting.
第 45 頁 - The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism.
第 700 頁 - Social capital [...] refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions".
第 38 頁 - ... fundamental insight". This also is true. But the interrelationships which govern the mix of market and hierarchy, to use Williamson's terms, are extremely complex and in our present state of ignorance it will not be easy to discover what these factors are. What we need is more empirical work. In a paper written for a conference of the National Bureau of Economic Research. I explained why I thought this was so. This is what I said: "An inspired theoretician might do as well without such empirical...
第 34 頁 - I argued that in a competitive system there would be an optimum of planning since a firm, that little planned society, could only continue to exist if it performed its co-ordination function at a lower cost than would be incurred if it were achieved by means of market transactions and also at a lower cost than this same function could be performed by another firm. To have an efficient economic system it is necessary not only to have markets but also areas of planning within organizations of the appropriate...

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