Handbook of New Institutional EconomicsClaude Ménard, Mary M. Shirley Springer Science & Business Media, 2008年6月27日 - 884 頁 New Institutional Economics (NIE) has skyrocketed in scope and influence over the last three decades. This first Handbook of NIE provides a unique and timely overview of recent developments and broad orientations. Contributions analyse the domain and perspectives of NIE; sections on legal institutions, political institutions, transaction cost economics, governance, contracting, institutional change, and more capture NIE's interdisciplinary nature. This Handbook will be of interest to economists, political scientists, legal scholars, management specialists, sociologists, and others wishing to learn more about this important subject and gain insight into progress made by institutionalists from other disciplines. This compendium of analyses by some of the foremost NIE specialists, including Ronald Coase, Douglass North, Elinor Ostrom, and Oliver Williamson, gives students and new researchers an introduction to the topic and offers established scholars a reference book for their research. |
搜尋書籍內容
第 1 到 5 筆結果,共 75 筆
... action (for example changes in climate, natural disasters) but primarily by the human actors themselves. Humans attempt to reduce that uncertainty (or convert it into risk) by learning. The cumulative learning of a society embodied in ...
... action (usually the imposition of taxes) was required to restrain those whose actions had harm- ful effects on others (often termed negative externalities). What I showed in that article, as I thought, was that in a regime of zero ...
... action costs, what becomes immediately clear is the crucial importance of the legal system in this new world. I ... actions, and the rights which individuals possess are established by the legal system. While we can imagine in the ...
... action in the ex post stage of contract ( where maladaptation problems appear ) , the formal incentive alignment literature annihilates ex post governance.4 One device for accomplishing this is to assume common knowledge of payoffs and ...
... action.” By contrast, Barnard featured coordinated adaptation among economic actors working through administration (hierarchy). The latter is accomplished not spontaneously but in a “conscious, deliberate, purposeful” way (p. 9) and ...
內容
31 | |
40 | |
67 | |
Presidential versus Parliamentary Government | 91 |
Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle | 123 |
The Many Legal Institutions that Support | 175 |
Paul H Rubin 205 | 204 |
Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking | 229 |
Agricultural Contracts | 465 |
The Enforcement of Contracts and Private Ordering | 491 |
The Institutions of Regulation An Application | 513 |
22 | 573 |
23 | 591 |
24 | 610 |
25 | 639 |
26 | 667 |
Legal Institutions and Financial Development | 251 |
A New Institutional Approach to Organization | 281 |
Vertical Integration | 319 |
Solutions to PrincipalAgent Problems in Firms | 349 |
The Institutions of Corporate Governance | 371 |
Firms and the Creation of New Markets | 400 |
Lessons from Empirical Studies | 433 |
27 | 700 |
28 | 720 |
Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange | 727 |
29 | 788 |
30 | 819 |
Subject Index | 849 |