Handbook of New Institutional EconomicsClaude Ménard, Mary M. Shirley Springer Science & Business Media, 2008年6月27日 - 884 頁 New Institutional Economics (NIE) has skyrocketed in scope and influence over the last three decades. This first Handbook of NIE provides a unique and timely overview of recent developments and broad orientations. Contributions analyse the domain and perspectives of NIE; sections on legal institutions, political institutions, transaction cost economics, governance, contracting, institutional change, and more capture NIE's interdisciplinary nature. This Handbook will be of interest to economists, political scientists, legal scholars, management specialists, sociologists, and others wishing to learn more about this important subject and gain insight into progress made by institutionalists from other disciplines. This compendium of analyses by some of the foremost NIE specialists, including Ronald Coase, Douglass North, Elinor Ostrom, and Oliver Williamson, gives students and new researchers an introduction to the topic and offers established scholars a reference book for their research. |
搜尋書籍內容
第 1 到 5 筆結果,共 89 筆
... efficiently, etc. NIE asks instead how different federalist designs affect the incentives and objectives of ... efficient legal system alters people's incentives to behave opportunistically, improves the efficacy of other forms ...
... efficiency. Benito Arru ̃nada and Veneta Andonova take up the same debate from a his- torical perspective. They document how common and civil laws were both attempts to install market-oriented legal systems and were both efficient in ...
... efficient economic system it is necessary not only to have markets but also areas of planning within organizations of the appropriate size . What this mix should be we find as a result of competition . This is what I said in 2 A fuller ...
... efficient risk bearing plays no role in incentive alignment . Contract theorists who rely on risk aversion for their main results might protest against risk neutrality . Be that as it may , TCE also assumes that contracting parties look ...
... efficient. Reference to feasibility disallows hypothetical ideals (costlessness in any of its forms, including ... efficiency are rebuttable—possibly by showing that the initial conditions (often of a political kind) are not acceptable ...
內容
31 | |
40 | |
67 | |
Presidential versus Parliamentary Government | 91 |
Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle | 123 |
The Many Legal Institutions that Support | 175 |
Paul H Rubin 205 | 204 |
Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking | 229 |
Agricultural Contracts | 465 |
The Enforcement of Contracts and Private Ordering | 491 |
The Institutions of Regulation An Application | 513 |
22 | 573 |
23 | 591 |
24 | 610 |
25 | 639 |
26 | 667 |
Legal Institutions and Financial Development | 251 |
A New Institutional Approach to Organization | 281 |
Vertical Integration | 319 |
Solutions to PrincipalAgent Problems in Firms | 349 |
The Institutions of Corporate Governance | 371 |
Firms and the Creation of New Markets | 400 |
Lessons from Empirical Studies | 433 |
27 | 700 |
28 | 720 |
Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange | 727 |
29 | 788 |
30 | 819 |
Subject Index | 849 |