Handbook of New Institutional EconomicsClaude Ménard, Mary M. Shirley Springer Science & Business Media, 2008年6月27日 - 884 頁 New Institutional Economics (NIE) has skyrocketed in scope and influence over the last three decades. This first Handbook of NIE provides a unique and timely overview of recent developments and broad orientations. Contributions analyse the domain and perspectives of NIE; sections on legal institutions, political institutions, transaction cost economics, governance, contracting, institutional change, and more capture NIE's interdisciplinary nature. This Handbook will be of interest to economists, political scientists, legal scholars, management specialists, sociologists, and others wishing to learn more about this important subject and gain insight into progress made by institutionalists from other disciplines. This compendium of analyses by some of the foremost NIE specialists, including Ronald Coase, Douglass North, Elinor Ostrom, and Oliver Williamson, gives students and new researchers an introduction to the topic and offers established scholars a reference book for their research. |
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第 1 到 5 筆結果,共 83 筆
... evidence that common law origin is significantly correlated with in- dices measuring how much a country's current rules protect the rights of mi- nority shareholders and creditors during reorganizations of firms. These indices are ...
... evidence that institutions in the transitional economies of Eastern Europe have improved very rapidly, thanks in part to political consensus on the need for change. The demand for institutional change from voters and businesses was an ...
... Evidence from Coal Markets ” . American Economic Review 77 ( 1 ) : 168–185 . . 2000. “ Transaction Cost Economics and Competition Policy ” . Unpublished manuscript . Kenney , Roy W. and Benjamin Klein . 1983. “ The Economics of Block ...
... Evidence Empirical evidence supporting the M + 1 rule comes in a variety of forms . Here , I shall briefly discuss evidence from mass surveys documenting the existence of strategic voting ; and evidence from cross - national aggregate ...
... evidence in favor of the idea that district-based electoral systems promote transfers at the expense of general public goods, Persson and Tabellini (2000) show that expenditures on welfare are higher in more proportional systems ...
內容
31 | |
40 | |
67 | |
Presidential versus Parliamentary Government | 91 |
Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle | 123 |
The Many Legal Institutions that Support | 175 |
Paul H Rubin 205 | 204 |
Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking | 229 |
Agricultural Contracts | 465 |
The Enforcement of Contracts and Private Ordering | 491 |
The Institutions of Regulation An Application | 513 |
22 | 573 |
23 | 591 |
24 | 610 |
25 | 639 |
26 | 667 |
Legal Institutions and Financial Development | 251 |
A New Institutional Approach to Organization | 281 |
Vertical Integration | 319 |
Solutions to PrincipalAgent Problems in Firms | 349 |
The Institutions of Corporate Governance | 371 |
Firms and the Creation of New Markets | 400 |
Lessons from Empirical Studies | 433 |
27 | 700 |
28 | 720 |
Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange | 727 |
29 | 788 |
30 | 819 |
Subject Index | 849 |