Handbook of New Institutional EconomicsClaude Ménard, Mary M. Shirley Springer Science & Business Media, 2008年6月27日 - 884 頁 New Institutional Economics (NIE) has skyrocketed in scope and influence over the last three decades. This first Handbook of NIE provides a unique and timely overview of recent developments and broad orientations. Contributions analyse the domain and perspectives of NIE; sections on legal institutions, political institutions, transaction cost economics, governance, contracting, institutional change, and more capture NIE's interdisciplinary nature. This Handbook will be of interest to economists, political scientists, legal scholars, management specialists, sociologists, and others wishing to learn more about this important subject and gain insight into progress made by institutionalists from other disciplines. This compendium of analyses by some of the foremost NIE specialists, including Ronald Coase, Douglass North, Elinor Ostrom, and Oliver Williamson, gives students and new researchers an introduction to the topic and offers established scholars a reference book for their research. |
搜尋書籍內容
第 1 到 5 筆結果,共 89 筆
... incentives and intentions and the beliefs , norms and rules that they create in pursuit of their goals ( see North 2004 , forthcoming ) . Answering new questions requires institutionalists to devise new methodolo- gies . Elinor Ostrom ...
... incentives and performance of government. In particular NIE considers a fundamental dilemma: investment increases when property rights are protected, but a state strong enough to protect property rights is also strong enough to ...
... incentives and objectives of government officials to further citizens' welfare and whether federalism is self-enforcing. 5. LEGAL INSTITUTIONS OF A MARKET ECONOMY An important regularity in NIE, that goes back to Coase (Coase 1960), is ...
... incentives, monitoring and coop- eration interact with the varying nature of intra-firm transactions and to show why different types of contracts work better for different kinds of transactions in different settings. Firms use different ...
... incentives, yet empirical tests find no support for the hy- pothesis that share contracts are likely to be chosen over cash rent contracts as crop risk increases. Transaction cost analyses do not treat contracting parties as principal ...
內容
31 | |
40 | |
67 | |
Presidential versus Parliamentary Government | 91 |
Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle | 123 |
The Many Legal Institutions that Support | 175 |
Paul H Rubin 205 | 204 |
Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking | 229 |
Agricultural Contracts | 465 |
The Enforcement of Contracts and Private Ordering | 491 |
The Institutions of Regulation An Application | 513 |
22 | 573 |
23 | 591 |
24 | 610 |
25 | 639 |
26 | 667 |
Legal Institutions and Financial Development | 251 |
A New Institutional Approach to Organization | 281 |
Vertical Integration | 319 |
Solutions to PrincipalAgent Problems in Firms | 349 |
The Institutions of Corporate Governance | 371 |
Firms and the Creation of New Markets | 400 |
Lessons from Empirical Studies | 433 |
27 | 700 |
28 | 720 |
Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange | 727 |
29 | 788 |
30 | 819 |
Subject Index | 849 |