Handbook of New Institutional EconomicsClaude Ménard, Mary M. Shirley Springer Science & Business Media, 2008年6月27日 - 884 頁 New Institutional Economics (NIE) has skyrocketed in scope and influence over the last three decades. This first Handbook of NIE provides a unique and timely overview of recent developments and broad orientations. Contributions analyse the domain and perspectives of NIE; sections on legal institutions, political institutions, transaction cost economics, governance, contracting, institutional change, and more capture NIE's interdisciplinary nature. This Handbook will be of interest to economists, political scientists, legal scholars, management specialists, sociologists, and others wishing to learn more about this important subject and gain insight into progress made by institutionalists from other disciplines. This compendium of analyses by some of the foremost NIE specialists, including Ronald Coase, Douglass North, Elinor Ostrom, and Oliver Williamson, gives students and new researchers an introduction to the topic and offers established scholars a reference book for their research. |
搜尋書籍內容
第 1 到 5 筆結果,共 85 筆
... Performance of Economies over Time Douglass C. North .. 21 2 . The Institutional Structure of Production Ronald H. Coase . 31 3 . Transaction Cost Economics Oliver E. Williamson 41 Section II Political Institutions and the State 4 ...
... performance of a market economy depends upon the for- mal and informal institutions and modes of organization that facilitate private transactions and cooperative behavior . NIE focuses on how such institutions 1 C. Ménard and M. M. ...
... performance of government. In particular NIE considers a fundamental dilemma: investment increases when property rights are protected, but a state strong enough to protect property rights is also strong enough to expropriate them ...
... performance since they affect whether governments serve private or public ends. For example, Weingast shows how federal revenue sharing rules can affect levels of corruption. When local governments raise funds locally they have a ...
... performance of similar contracts in different environments (as referenced by Spiller and Tommasi and Shirley). The effects of contracts on performance depend not just on how they are written and implemented. How they are enforced is ...
內容
31 | |
40 | |
67 | |
Presidential versus Parliamentary Government | 91 |
Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle | 123 |
The Many Legal Institutions that Support | 175 |
Paul H Rubin 205 | 204 |
Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking | 229 |
Agricultural Contracts | 465 |
The Enforcement of Contracts and Private Ordering | 491 |
The Institutions of Regulation An Application | 513 |
22 | 573 |
23 | 591 |
24 | 610 |
25 | 639 |
26 | 667 |
Legal Institutions and Financial Development | 251 |
A New Institutional Approach to Organization | 281 |
Vertical Integration | 319 |
Solutions to PrincipalAgent Problems in Firms | 349 |
The Institutions of Corporate Governance | 371 |
Firms and the Creation of New Markets | 400 |
Lessons from Empirical Studies | 433 |
27 | 700 |
28 | 720 |
Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange | 727 |
29 | 788 |
30 | 819 |
Subject Index | 849 |