Handbook of New Institutional EconomicsClaude Ménard, Mary M. Shirley Springer Science & Business Media, 2008年6月27日 - 884 頁 New Institutional Economics (NIE) has skyrocketed in scope and influence over the last three decades. This first Handbook of NIE provides a unique and timely overview of recent developments and broad orientations. Contributions analyse the domain and perspectives of NIE; sections on legal institutions, political institutions, transaction cost economics, governance, contracting, institutional change, and more capture NIE's interdisciplinary nature. This Handbook will be of interest to economists, political scientists, legal scholars, management specialists, sociologists, and others wishing to learn more about this important subject and gain insight into progress made by institutionalists from other disciplines. This compendium of analyses by some of the foremost NIE specialists, including Ronald Coase, Douglass North, Elinor Ostrom, and Oliver Williamson, gives students and new researchers an introduction to the topic and offers established scholars a reference book for their research. |
搜尋書籍內容
第 1 到 5 筆結果,共 83 筆
... role in reducing transaction costs by improving the security of property rights and enforcement of contracts (North 1997, p. 150). But states do not necessarily play this role; indeed, many are ineffectual at protecting rights or ...
... role in putting that item on the research agenda. But this section suggests that the case for legal origins is still a matter for debate. The argument for common versus civil law origins suffers from a number of missing links. What is ...
... role of cultural, legal, and political precedents in determining regulatory outcomes. Libecap examines state regulation of resources where private property rights are not feasible; Lee Alston and Bernardo Mueller examine the state's role ...
... role of independent variables , with candidates ' and parties ' strategies of coordination , persuasion and mobilization in the role of dependent ( or sometimes intermediate ) variables.2 Although not the focus of this essay , it may be ...
... vote percentage of 49.9% but not with 50.1%. 6See Lijphart and Gibberd 1977 for a study of thresholds. 9The third feature, P (proportionality), also plays a role—though it Electoral Institutions and Political Competition 73.
內容
31 | |
40 | |
67 | |
Presidential versus Parliamentary Government | 91 |
Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle | 123 |
The Many Legal Institutions that Support | 175 |
Paul H Rubin 205 | 204 |
Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking | 229 |
Agricultural Contracts | 465 |
The Enforcement of Contracts and Private Ordering | 491 |
The Institutions of Regulation An Application | 513 |
22 | 573 |
23 | 591 |
24 | 610 |
25 | 639 |
26 | 667 |
Legal Institutions and Financial Development | 251 |
A New Institutional Approach to Organization | 281 |
Vertical Integration | 319 |
Solutions to PrincipalAgent Problems in Firms | 349 |
The Institutions of Corporate Governance | 371 |
Firms and the Creation of New Markets | 400 |
Lessons from Empirical Studies | 433 |
27 | 700 |
28 | 720 |
Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange | 727 |
29 | 788 |
30 | 819 |
Subject Index | 849 |