proposals between 1943 and 1946 aimed at rationalizing the Army's supply and administrative systems.

The first, made in both April and June 1943, would have established General Somervell formally as the Chief of Staff's principal adviser on supply and administration, replacing G-1 and G-4. The opposition of the Army staff, including OPD, killed this plan. The next three proposals made in the fall of 1943, the summer of 1944, and late 1945, all would have "functionalized" the technical and administrative services out of existence as autonomous commands. Secretary Stimson himself vetoed the first, Under Secretary Patterson the second, while the third effort, disguised as logistics "Lessons Learned" in World War II, remained buried in the files of ASF and its successor agencies.

General Somervell was not satisfied with his informal status as General Marshall's chief adviser on supply and administration. With his passion for organizational tidiness and clear-cut command channels he wanted to make this position formal, resurrecting the dual position held by General Goethals in World War I. In his view there was no need for G-1, G-4, or the Logistics Division of OPD, and in April and June 1943 he proposed to abolish them. His argument was that separating operations from planning was impractical. G-1 and G-4 were unnecessary because ASF was actually performing their functions. "The enforcement of policy inevitably tends to become the actual operation of that policy with all of the extra administrative detail and personnel required for an additional agency to do the work of another." "1 Going one step further Somervell argued that the Operations Division ought to absorb G-3 functions, leaving as the General Staff only OPD and the Military Intelligence Service, both essentially operating agencies. Thus the General Staff would be eliminated as a coordinating or supervising agency. Summarizing this concept several years later as one of the lessons learned in the war, General Robinson wrote:

The commander of the logistic agency must be recognized as the adviser to and staff officer for the Chief of Staff on logistic matters. The General Staff should be a small body of direct advisers and assist

11 Memo, General Somervell for Chief of Staff, 3 Apr 43, sub: Suggested Changes in the Organization of the War Department. Copy in ASF-Somervell Post-War Organization files, OCMH.

ants to the Chief of Staff, concentrating its attention primarily on strategic planning and the direction of military operations. The Chief of Staff and the General Staff should not be burdened with the coordination and direction of administrative and supply activities, procedures and systems.12

Without commenting one way or another, General Marshall submitted these proposals to the General Staff and other interested agencies that almost unanimously opposed them. G-1 and G-4 remained, and their staffs and functions actually increased during the rest of the war, probably as a reaction to General Somervell's projected plans.18

General Somervell's next campaign was to integrate the operations of the technical services along functional lines. (Chart 12) This was the heart of a proposed wholesale reorganization of the Army Service Forces from the top down known as the Long-Range Organization Plan for the ASF prepared in the Control Division. The reorganization of ASF headquarters actually carried out was that in November 1943, which centered on a Directorate of Plans and Operations. The headquarters of the several service commands were to be realigned similarly.

The offices of the chiefs of the technical services were also to be reorganized on parallel lines as the first step toward their complete functionalization. In the last stage they would be divested of their field commands and combined with the staff of ASF headquarters into a single functional staff for procurement, supply, personnel, administration, fiscal, medical, utilities, transportation, and communications. The field activities of the technical services were to be transferred to six instead of nine service commands and their various field operating zones realigned to correspond to the latters' geographical boundaries. There would be no more Class IV installations or "exempted stations" except for certain special installations such as ports

Draft Chapter 16, Logistics Organization, prepared for but not included in Logistics in World War II (Nov 45). Copy in ASF-Somervell Post-War Organization files, OCMH.

12 (1) Memo, General Somervell for Chief of Staff, 3 Apr 43, sub: Suggested Changes in the Organization of the War Department and 1 Jun 43, sub: Reorganization of Service Activities. Copies of both in ASF-Somervell Post-War Organization file, OCMH. (2) Millett, Army Service Forces, pp. 138-43. (3) Draft Chapter 16, Logistics Organization. (4) Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-45, pp. 100-104. (5) Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 266-77.

of embarkation and proving grounds which would report directly to ASF headquarters in Washington.14

General Marshall and General McNarney supported General Somervell's plan, which they both recognized would wipe out the traditional technical and administrative services. Secretary Stimson, Under Secretary Patterson, and Mr. McCloy, on the other hand, realized the opposition and resentment this would provoke among the technical services. The Secretary doubted that the game would be worth the candle. General Somervell, "whose strong point is not judicial poise," the Secretary confided in his diary, reminded him in many ways of General Wood, especially "in his temperament." He recalled for General Marshall how Wood's efforts to reform the Army back in 1911-12 aroused such opposition that Stimson had all he could do to prevent Congress from abolishing the position of Chief of Staff altogether. General Marshall, whose experiences under General Pershing had taught him the political power of the technical service chiefs, yielded at this point to the Secretary's judgment. General McNarney, although overruled, continued to believe "washing out" the technical services was a sensible idea.15

As if to underline Secretary Stimson's arguments, opponents of General Somervell's plan within the Army leaked information about it to the press, which in turn stirred up a hornet's nest in Congress, just as the Secretary feared it would.16 One of those most strongly opposed to functionalization was the resourceful Chief of Ordnance, General Campbell, who complained to Bernard Baruch, a member of his Industrial Advisory Committee. Mr. Baruch protested to President Roosevelt personally and also wrote Mr. Stimson. The Secretary in reply said: "I stopped the foolish proposal in respect to the Technical Services when it first reached me several weeks ago." ❞ 17 General Somervell was abroad on an important political mission for General Marshall during all these events. Surveying the

14 (1) Control Division History, vol. II, Report No. 56, 1943. (2) Millett, Army Service Forces, pp. 398-405. (3) Director of Service, Supply, and Procurement, The Pros and Cons of a Logistics Command, 1948. ASF-Somervell Post-War Organization files, OCMH.

15 McNarney Interview. Patch-Simpson Board files.

16 (1) Millett, Army Service Forces, pp. 405-13. (2) Stimson Diary, entries of 16-18, 21, and 24 Sep 43.

17 Wyckoff, The Office of Secretary of War Under Henry L. Stimson, p. 299.

damage on his return, he ordered all papers and studies on the whole project destroyed.18

Undaunted, General Somervell and the Control Division continued to press for consideration of their plan to functionalize the technical services. Responding to a request from the Special Planning Division, the Control Division on 15 July 1944 resubmitted a combined and revised edition of its earlier proposals as a Plan for Post-War Organization of the Army Service Forces. This included its recommendations to confine the General Staff to strategic planning and the direction of military operations, to make the Commanding General, ASF, the Chief of Staff's adviser on supply and administration, and to create a "single, unified agency for all supply and administrative services for the Army," including the AAF. In addition to abolishing G-1 and G-4, the report requested restoration of the War Department's budget function to the ASF because "all fiscal operations should be placed in one organizational unit," suggested abolition of the New Developments Division because it duplicated and complicated the research and development work of ASF headquarters, and asked that the civilian personnel functions be transferred from the Office of the Secretary to ASF on similar grounds.

Complaining that the AAF was attempting to make itself completely "self-contained and independent," the report recommended that ASF should be responsible for most AAF housekeeping functions and for "the procurement and supply of all items of supply and equipment, including those peculiar to Army Air Forces. There is no more reason for making the present exception for aircraft than for making an exception for tanks or radio or artillery." Under the ASF there would also be one transportation system for land, sea, and air, except for elements organic to tactical units.

18 (1) Control Division History, vol. II, Report No. 56, 1943. (2) Millett, Army Service Forces, pp. 405-13. (3) Stimson Diary, entries of 16-18 and 21-22 Sep and 5, 13, and 29 Oct 43. (4) McNarney Interview. Patch-Simpson Board files. (5) For Secretary Lovett's later views, see Chapter VI, page 218. (6) Wyckoff, The Office of Secretary of War Under Henry L. Stimson, ch. VII, pp. 10-11. (7) Baruch, The Public Years, pp. 298-99. (8) Morison, Turmoil and Tradition, p. 499. (9) Harry C. Thomson and Lida Mayo, The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1960), p. 425. (10) Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943-1945 (New York: The Viking Press, 1973), pp. 263-71.