expanded in the event of war into a consolidated service force or matériel command without any major reorganization. He asserted the technical and administrative services had functioned successfully and effectively during two world wars, and he could see no reason for any major change in their structure or missions. The Director of Logistics was directed to study the possibility, however, of reducing the number of procurement agencies to three: Quartermaster, Ordnance, and Signal. He recommended that The Adjutant General's Office absorb the functions of the Chief of Special Services except for procurement, which the Quartermaster General should perform. He recommended giving the Comptroller the status and authority of a Deputy Chief of Staff but not the title.

Collins would retain the General and Special Staff system on the grounds "that our departmental staff organization should be as analogous as possible" to Field Manual 101-5, "with which the entire Army is familiar and which has proven itself so often." This meant returning to a four-division General Staff with each division headed by an Assistant Chief of Staff. He recommended consolidating the Organization and Training and the Plans and Operations Divisions into one staff agency and transferring manpower controls from Organization and Training to G-1 and Army Field Forces. He would initiate programs for improving the quality of officers assigned to the General Staff while reducing its numbers by decentralizing more operating responsibilities to the Chief of Army Field Forces, Army commanders, and the chiefs of the technical and administrative services.

He rejected the recommendations for consolidating all personnel functions in a single agency, removing personnel functions from The Adjutant General's Office, and consolidating all Army training, including the technical services, into a single agency.

59

General Collins' recommendations were another clear vic

50 (1) Recommendations of the Chief of Staff on the Organization of the Department of the Army, 23 Dec. 49, especially Inclosure 1, An Analysis of Recommendations-Table Showing Principal Issues, CMP Proposals Relating Thereto, Final Recommendations of the Chief of Staff, and Brief Analysis. Army: O&M: SR's on Organization, 1st Typed Draft, RG 117, NARS. (2) Compare this with Recommendations of the Vice Chief of Staff to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army on the Organization of the Department of the Army, 17 Nov 49, with inclosures. CS/USA 320, Box 504, 1949, RG 110, NARS.

tory for the technical services over functional reformers. A memorandum of 14 November 1949 from General Larkin to General Haislip shows how much influence he had on the Chief of Staff's final recommendations. General Larkin, reviewing once more the history of recent organizational developments affecting Army logistics, repeated arguments he had made earlier against the Johnston plan and the Cresap, McCormick and Paget report. The technical services had performed their missions effectively during war and in peace time. They had "an esprit de corps, a professional focus and internal and external relationships" impossible in the "indistinctive,' "nebulous" functional organization proposed to replace them.6o

Secretary Gray replied to General Collins on 9 January 1950, accepting with minor exceptions his recommendations. He had serious reservations, however, about General Collins' preference for adhering as closely as possible to the principles of Field Manual 101-5.

The organizational arrangements envisaged by Field Manual 101-5 have indeed admirably met the exacting demands of combat operations and I do not question their suitability. But we are here concerned with different problems and different requirements. To me the differences are striking, and it does not seem logical that the organizational design of the headquarters of an Army Group, an Army, Corps or Division should closely resemble the organizational design of the D/A. He listed dissimilarities, such as public and Congressional relations, relations with other defense and governmental agencies, industrial mobilization, the military implications of foreign policies, and relations with the Army's civilian components.

A field army, corps or division, etc. it [sic] is not required to provide for most of these responsibilities, except in unusual circumstances. And when such circumstances arise; as for example, during occupation, the organization of the field headquarters concerned undergoes many changes. There are perhaps, therefore, persuasive reasons for supposing that the influences which have twice compelled major reorganizations at the Seat of Government when war was upon us, flow from the inclination to conform our organization here to that of a field army and the like.

Gray had a number of other questions he thought needed answers. What steps could be taken to provide the Secretary ∞ Memo, General Larkin, 14 Nov 49, on Reducing the Number of Procuring Technical Services. Inclosure 5 to Recommendations of the Vice Chief of Staff 17 Nov 49. CS/USA 320, Box 504, 1949, RG 110, NARS.

"with knowledge commensurate with the responsibilities for the Army's budget?" What steps should be taken to minimize the number of instances in which important decisions had to be made under the most extreme pressure without adequate background information. Perhaps consolidating his own office and those of his civilian staff with the General Staff into "a single Executive Office" would produce greater teamwork and more informed participation.

Secretary Gray did not think that General Collins' preference for maintaining organizational stability and the status quo was necessarily sound. "I am at a loss to know how we can meet new challenges or deal with old ones if we are to limit ourselves to what has already been tried. I feel we should all continuously maintain inquiring, open, and receptive minds respecting these matters." 61

SR 10-5-1 and SR 10-500-1,11 April 1950

General Collins assigned the Management Division and the Organization Branch of the Directorate of Organization and Training responsibility for monitoring the changes Secretary Gray and he had agreed upon, for co-ordinating their details with the Army staff, and for preparing their publication. The results of this struggle between the functionalists in the Management Division and the traditionalists on the General Staff appeared in two Department of the Army special regulations, SR 10-5-1, Organization and Functions of the Department of the Army, of 11 April 1950, effective at once, and SR 10-500-1, Organization and Functions, Continental Armies and Army Areas (Including the Military District of Washington), of the same date, but effective 1 July 1950. Over the next several years additional regulations in the SR-10 series appeared, prescribing the organization and functions of all Department of the Army agencies, including the technical services and special staff agencies.

62

1 Memo, Secy of Army for CofS, 9 Jan 50, sub: Recommendations of the Chief of Staff to the Secretary of the Army on the Organization of the Department of the Army. Unclassified Xeroxed copy of carbon copy, Misc. 320.1, Army Reorganization, 1950, OCMH files. Also located in Tab 2, Left, Army: O&M: SR's on OrganizationCorrespondence-Nov-Feb 50, pt. VIII, RG 117, NARS.

62 Army: O&M: SR's on Organization-Correspondence-Nov-Feb 50, pt. VIII,

RG 117, NARS.

SR 10-500-1 listed the new or increased responsibilities of Army commanders over Class II installations and activities including inspection of personnel and administration, intelligence, training, and logistics. Most of the functions assigned were still of a local administrative or housekeeping nature, ranging from Quartermaster laundries to administrative motor pools. These details remained a constant source of irritation between post commanders and the commanders of Class II installations, particularly where the funds involved were limited.

SR 10-5-1 began with a summary of Army organization history since 1789. Pending Congressional action on a new Army organization act, the legal basis for the current organization of the Department of the Army remained the First War Powers Act of December 1941, the National Security Act of 1947, and the Constitutional powers of the President as Commander in Chief of the armed forces. It listed thirteen major military and civil functions of the Army based on a series of program definitions prepared in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and designed to assist the Army in controlling its operations through the program review and analysis techniques recommended by Cresap, McCormick and Paget. Besides traditional Army staff functions there were programs for command and management, construction, joint projects with other services, and civil works. These programs were functional in nature, and few of them coincided with the missions or budgets of the several technical services.68

The new organization adopted the three-deputy concept recommended by Cresap, McCormick and Paget and Colonel Johnston. (Chart 18) It provided for a Secretary, Under Secretary, two assistant secretaries, one for General Management and another for Materiel, and a Counsel as the Secretary's special legal adviser. The Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff had three deputies, one for Administration, another for Plans, and the Comptroller as a third. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans

63 (1) Opening remarks of Lt Gen Matthew B. Ridgway, DCofS, Administration, Conference on Draft of Special Regulations 10-500-1 and 10-5-1, 30 Mar 50. Tab 15, Right, Army: O&M: SR's on Organization-Correspondence-Mar-Apr 50, pt. VI. RG 117, NARS. (2) Haislip Board Report, pp. 53-56. (3) Johnston Plan, pt. V-C, pp. 15-21. (4) Cresap, McCormick and Paget, Survey of the Department of the ArmyFinal Report, pt. IV. pp. 1-45. (5) Mosher, Program Budgeting, pp. 64-70.