Overseas, the President and the Secretary delegated this broad authority over military matters to General John J. Pershing and later to Maj. Gen. William S. Graves who commanded the small expeditionary force in Siberia. In line with their Jeffersonian philosophy of limited government both men also opposed controls over the national economy even during war.

There were serious political problems also. Both the President and Congress ducked the issues of economic mobilization wherever and whenever possible because of serious political disagreements throughout the country over the role the government should play in the economy. It was a lot easier to meet each specific issue or crisis as it came up and devise what Mr. Root had referred to as a "jury-rigged extempore" solution. Only the near collapse of the economy in the winter of 19171918 forced the President and Congress to act.36

Consequently, soldiers like General Pershing regarded Baker as a great Secretary of War because he left them alone, while business leaders like Bernard M. Baruch were critical of him because he failed to exert effective control over the War Department. Unlike Root and Stimson, Baker had had little contact with the management of large-scale enterprises where the necessity for firm executive control was taken for granted. When urged to adopt such programs, he took refuge in procrastination because as a southern gentlemen he instinctively avoided controversy. Without effective leadership the War Department bumped its way from one crisis to another toward disaster.

As Assistant Secretary of War Frederick P. Keppel saw it, "Baker has learned only too well the lesson that if you leave them alone many things will settle themselves. . . . Newton D. Baker succeeds in getting to first on balls oftener than any other

(1) Frederick Palmer, Newton D. Baker, America at War (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1931), pp. 156-59, 370-73. The quotation is from page 159. (2) Daniel R. Beaver, Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort (Lincoln, Nebr.: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), pp. 50-109, 243-44. (3) Daniel R. Beaver, "Newton D. Baker and the Genesis of the War Industries Board," The Journal of American History, LII (June 1965), 43-48. (4) Edward M. Coffman, The Hilt of the Sword: The Career of Peyton C. March (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), pp. 94-103. (5) Paul A. C. Koistinen, "The Industrial-Military Complex in Historical Perspective: World War I," Business History Review, XLI (Winter 1967), 385-89. Koistinen sees Baker as a typical Jeffersonian progressive favoring local solutions to modern problems (page 388).

man in public life. Sometimes he is called out on strikes with no evidence he has lifted the bat from his shoulders." 37 The broad delegation of authority by the President and Secretary Baker to General Pershing resurrected the position of Commanding General which had caused so much trouble in the nineteenth century and which Mr. Root had deliberately abolished for this reason. Mr. Baker apparently failed to appreciate Mr. Root's purpose in replacing the Commanding General by the Chief of Staff as the Secretary's principal military adviser. The divided authority created by the President and Mr. Baker inevitably led to serious friction between General Pershing and General Peyton C. March, the Chief of Staff after May 1918. March was the first to assert vigorously his 1917 statutory "rank and precedence over all other officers of the Army." In ignoring Mr. Root's advice Mr. Baker was in large measure responsible for the troubles that arose.88

37

Another issue Baker ducked repeatedly was War Depart

(1) Bernard M. Baruch, The Public Years (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), pp. 41-51. (2) Koistinen, "The Industrial-Military Complex," p. 388. (3) Quotation is from a draft of a proposed article on Baker by Mr. Keppel, circa October 1919. Newton D. Baker Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Box 255 (Hayes-Baker Correspondence).

38 Coffman, The Hilt of the Sword, pp. 104-19, 169-70.

ment red tape, which became as serious a problem as in 1898. Tradition and regulations dictated that a great many trivial matters required the signature of either the Secretary or the Chief of Staff personally, especially when they involved accountability for funds. Maj. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, when Assistant Chief of Staff during 'the early part of the war, continually urged drastic pruning of the department's paper work, complaining:

In time of peace, it is possible that the Chief of Staff had time to give some consideration to the question as to whether the allotment would be made to repair a roof on a set of quarters, to repair a stable that had fallen down, etc. It is entirely impossible to do so now, and the signature of the Chief of Staff on such papers means nothing.39

Traditionalists in the bureaus opposed any changes in the system, and Mr. Baker sided with them. Consequently, by September 1917, the paper work in the department was in serious disorder. Important documents were being delayed, lost, or mislaid. Red tape again threatened to slow down the war effort, “. . . that governmental tradition of shifting decisions about detail to higher rank, that 'passing of the buck,' which often wagged a paper along its slow course with its tail of endorsements, was to persist through the early months after our entry into the war." 40 Criticism of the Secretary increased in Congress and business circles, but the President's strong personal support and confidence enabled Baker to survive repeated crises. 41

Mr. Baker administered the War Department during the first year of the war along the lines indicated in Chart 1. Despite his own earlier interpretation of the National Defense Act he acted during this period without an effective Chief of Staff, dealing with the bureaus directly in the traditional manner. He

Frederick Palmer, Bliss, Peacemaker: The Life and Letters of Tasker H. Bliss (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1934), pp. 131-39, 170-71. Quotation from P. 171.

40 Ibid., p. 131.

(1) Memo, Chief of Engineers for Secretary Baker, 3 Jul 17, sub: Delay in Handling Papers. Baker Manuscripts. (2) Memo, Baker for The Adjutant General. 10 Sep 17; Memo, Baker for Ralph Hayes, 25 Sep 17; Memo, Hayes for Dean Keppel, 27 Oct 17. All in Baker Manuscripts, Box 255 (Hayes-Baker Correspondence). Hayes was Baker's private secretary during the first year of the war. (3) Beaver, Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort, pp. 79-81, 93-44, 243-44. (4) Edward M. Coffman, "The Battle Against Red-Tape: Business Methods of the War Department General Staff," Military Affairs, XXVI (Spring 1963), 1–3.