proposals. The Army staff considered the test a failure and attempted only to define more precisely the housekeeping responsibility of Army commanders for Class II installations in Special Regulation 10-500-1 of 11 April 1950.

This regulation listed more than sixty administrative and support functions that Army commanders were responsible for providing for Class II installations in their areas. The principal functions were repairs and utilities, accounting for 48 percent of the funds involved, and motor transport, accounting for another 17 percent. Others included manpower ceilings and authorizations; personnel funds; security and intelligence; information, education, and special services for military personnel and public relations; inspections; and common supply services such as food, medical care, and general supplies for installation operation.86

Despite this effort Army commanders and technical service chiefs continued to quarrel over responsibility for repairs and utilities, personnel authorizations, and motor pools. The Management Division of the Army Comptroller's Office, after a series of detailed investigations of technical service installations between 1950 and 1953, concluded that at least budgets and personnel required for repairs and utilities at these installations should be charged to the technical services.87

During this same period the Management Division of Headquarters, First Army, surveyed the housekeeping problems of selected technical service installations within its area. One major finding was that First Army did not have sufficient personnel to carry out its assigned housekeeping responsibilities. On the average, 32 percent of the military personnel spaces authorized in 1953 were not filled. Requests to convert these spaces to civilian positions were rejected by the General Staff because of arbitrary manpower ceilings imposed by Congress. As a result, Class II installations often had to divert their own funds to these functions.88

86

Repairs and utilities (R&U) created conflicts between

' (1) See Chapter V, above, pages 171-74. (2) Management Division, Headquar ters, First Army, First Army Survey Appraisal of Relationships Now Established by Special Regulation 10-500-1, c. Oct 53, pp. 1-4, and Annex, pp. 1-6. In OCMH files. Hereafter cited as First Army Survey.

87 First Army Survey, p. 4.

Ibid., Tab H, pp. 1-4.

Army commanders and their technical service tenants because failure to perform these functions directly interfered with the latter's primary functions. Without them they could not operate. These functions included changes to and maintenance of real property, permanently installed equipment, utility services, plants and systems, fire protection, packing and crating, and insect and rodent control. Ordnance Department and Chemical Warfare Service industrial plants and arsenals which built and operated their own utilities were exempted.

It was difficult to determine what was properly repairs and utilities and what was the responsibility of the technical services. Maintaining and repairing production machinery and equipment, a responsibility of the technical services, was "dependent upon❞ maintenance functions paid for by R&U funds. Often there were separate repair shops set up for each category.

Planning and budgeting through two separate command channels created frequent delays, particularly when there was disagreement over priorities. The technical services resorted to diverting funds from their primary missions when they could not obtain sufficient funds from Army commanders. The First Army survey pointed out that had the technical services not diverted these funds the operations of their installations might have broken down or at least been seriously impaired. At one Quartermaster depot in upstate New York there were no R&U funds for snow removal. Prompt shipments in and out of the depot were considered vital for national defense; therefore Quartermaster funds were diverted to meet the immediate emergency. The Ordnance Corps often used emergency “expediting-production" funds for R&U projects. In defense of the Army commanders, the First Army survey said that they were often not informed sufficiently in advance of Class II requirements for R&U projects, a weakness it attributed directly to the system of dual command.

The survey concluded that, while there were many areas that could be improved within the existing system, basically the system of dual command was at fault. The Army commanders ought not to be assigned responsibility for support functions directly affecting the primary operations of Class II installations. Such matters as Red Cross, military police and justice, or fire protection did not fall in this category and

should remain the responsibility of Army commanders. These minor functions aside, "Class II installations and Class II activities should be provided with funds and personnel authorizations for mission and support functions through a single channel-the Parent Department or Army agency."

" 89

The Davies Committee studied the First Army survey and recommended that responsibility for funds and personnel required to support Class II installations be assigned to the technical services. The Slezak report agreed and decided that this time unity of command, the basic concept that "a Commander must have control of the resources required for the accomplishment of his mission," should be decided in favor of the technical services instead of the Army commanders. As a result, under Army Regulation 10-50 of 25 March 1955 Army commanders were relieved generally of responsibility for providing funds, personnel, and other resources for principal Class II mission and support activities. They retained responsibility only for common support functions incidental to these primary missions: chaplains, military justice and provost marshal services, counterintelligence, medical and dental services, public information and troop education programs, and general inspection and review. Thus ended a decade of constant irritation and friction between the continental armies and the technical services.

The Establishment of CONARC

The Davies Committee's major criticism of the continental armies was that the Army's organizational framework for military operations and training was diffuse and confusing. The commanders of all the continental armies and the Military District of Washington reported directly to the Chief of Staff, and the General Staff was too involved in minor administrative decisions concerning the continental armies that ought to be made at a lower level.

The committee believed a Continental Army Command along the lines of the wartime Army Ground Forces would provide more effective control over the continental armies and relieve the General Staff of unnecessary involvement in operations. In addition to absorbing the current functions of the Ibid., Tab I, pp. 1-19, and Main Report, pp. 6-8.

Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, a revitalized AGF should review plans, programs, and budgets for the continental armies, supervise individual and unit training, and direct the activities of the testing boards and the preparation of long-range combat developments plans.90

The Slezak report approved these recommendations, and under Change 7 of 1 February 1955 to Special Regulation 10-5-1 the Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, was redesignated Headquarters, Continental Army Command, with command over the six continental armies, MDW, the five service test boards, an Arctic Test Branch, and three Human Resources Research units.91

In addition to performing the functions recommended by the Davies Committee, CONARC was also to be responsible for logistical and administrative support of the continental armies, except Class II installations. It assumed the functions of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, for approving tables of organization and equipment and for preparing and reviewing tables of allowances. It was also assigned responsibility for preparing and executing plans for the "ground defense of the United States" and for preparing plans to assist civil authorities in disaster relief and controlling domestic disturbances.92

Despite its increased responsibilities on paper for financial management CONARC remained in concept and practice a tactical command like an Army group headquarters, "with the ZI Army Commanders acting as deputies to the CG, USCONARC for the administration of their own army areas," functions they had been performing since 1948. McKinsey and Company in its 1955 report thought effective control over the continental armies required that CONARC assume greater administrative responsibilities for supporting the ZI armies and eliminating General Staff involvement in these functions.98

More specifically McKinsey and Company recommended

Davies Committee Report, pp. 39-41.

1 Summary of Major Events and Problems, Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, 1 Jul 54-31 Jan 55, and 1 Feb-30 Jun 55, pt. I, Introductory Narrative, pp. 1–2. Ibid., pp. 3-10.

3 (1) Expansion of the United States Continental Army Command Mission-1, General Concept of CONARC Mission. Summary of Major Events and Problems, Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, 1 Jul 56-30 Jun 57, p. 1. Hereafter cited as CONARC Annual Summary, FY 1957. (2) McKinsey Report, pt. II, pp. 3-1-3-3.

that CONARC be assigned responsibility for distributing bulk manpower authorizations and for allocating personnel spaces within its command. Instead of confining itself to the Army's troop training program, CONARC should direct development and execution of all programs and missions of the CONUS armies, including supply and administrative support. The essential requirements, it asserted, was that CONARC gain “control over missions, programs, money, and manpower resources for managing the ZI Armies." 94

Under Army Regulation 10-7 of 4 April 1957 the Army group concept of CONARC was replaced by that of an overseas theater command with full control over the resources needed to direct the operations of the ZI armies as McKinsey and Company had recommended. CONARC's new responsibilities included manpower controls over both civilian and military personnel and the planning, direction, and control of nearly all major administrative and logistical support activities within the ZI armies. Under the Army's revised "Program System," as outlined in Army Regulation 11-1 of 31 December 1956, CONARC was made responsible, beginning in fiscal year 1959, for development, execution, and review and analysis of the new installations, matériel, reserve components, and research and development programs. Its new financial management responsibilities included the direction of progress and statistical reporting and the provision of "management engineering" assistance. It was also assigned responsibility for intelligence activities within the continental armies and for the management and direction of Army aviation training except for units under the command of the Chief of Transportation.

Further changes gave CONARC control over training of civil affairs and military government personnel and units in both the active Army and Reserve Components and over the management of hospitals, dispensaries, and other medical facilities. Following the 1958 recommendations of the "Report of the Officer Education and Training Review Board," in September 1960 the Commanding General, USCONARC, was designated Director of the Army Service School System and assigned responsibility for supervising curricula and instruction, among other things. The Military Academy and certain McKinsey Report, pp. 3-10-3-22.

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