5

general equipment (formerly Quartermaster and Engineer functions). Secretary McNamara approved this disposition without further changes. Similar procedures were followed in developing the internal organization of the Combat Developments Command.

The Traub Committee Report

While Secretary McNamara was principally interested in Army logistics, the Traub Committee worked on training and Army headquarters organization. These were also the major areas where the final decisions made departed substantially from the Hoelscher Committee recommendations. At the insistence of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Lt. Gen. Russell L. Vittrup, the Traub Committee deliberately avoided the area of personnel management on the grounds that this function should be dealt with by DCSPER. The only substantive comment the Traub Committee made was that OPO begin operations by simply taking over in place the personnel management staffs of the technical services pending physical consolidation when space became available in the Pentagon. There were no organization charts or annexes on OPO's internal structure. Neither its functions nor its relations with DCSPER and the rest of the Army were clearly defined."

The Traub Committee rejected the principal Hoelscher Committee recommendations on Army headquarters except for agreeing that OPO should be an additional Army staff agency. Its members were unanimous in opposing a Director of the Army Staff as unnecessary. They objected to the Hoelscher Committee's recommendation for splitting DCSOPS into one agency for joint planning and military operations and a separate one for training and programs. Neither the Vice Chief of Staff, General Clyde D. Eddleman, nor the Deputy Chief of Staff for

(1) Army General Staff Council Minutes, 15 Nov 61. (2) Interview, Blumenson with McGregor, 1 Mar 62. (3) Draft of proposed Talking Paper for General Traub c. 21 Nov. 61, and Draft of Fact Sheets for Sec Def to Remind Him of Sequence of Events, no date. Kjellstrom Briefing files. (4) Traub Committee Report, P. 11.

(1) Traub Committee Report. On OPO, see pages 2-4, 17. (2) Interview, Blumenson with McGregor, 1 Mar 62. (3) Interview, Hewes with Lt Col Lewis J. Ashley, 21 Sep 62. Colonel Ashley had been a member of Group F (Personnel) and remained as a member of DARPO to assist in carrying out the final decisions on Project 80. (4) Memo, General Kjellstrom for Hewes, 21 Sep 71.

(1) Traub Committee Report, p. 4. (2) Army General Staff Council Minutes, 24 Oct 61. (3) Carlisle Barracks Briefings, Project 80 files.

Military Operations, Lt. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, saw any need for a separate Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Programs, and Systems. Instead the committee recommended creating a new post of Director of Army Programs within the Chief of Staff's secretariat who would be responsible for co-ordinating plans, programs, and systems within the Army staff itself. It rejected the proposal for a new Chief of Administrative Services and the abolition of The Adjutant General's Office. On the other hand it accepted the Hoelscher Committee proposal to abolish the Office, Chief of Military History, assigning its functions to TAGO.

To reduce the number of separate agencies reporting to the Chief of Staff directly, the committee proposed to group the special staff, except for the Chief of Information, the Inspector General, and the Judge Advocate General's Office, under the existing Deputy Chiefs of Staff, including the vestigial technical and administrative services. Finally the Traub Committee ignored recommendations concerning improved management and co-ordination of the Army's plans, programs, and systems and for streamlining Army staff procedures.8

Concerning training, the Traub Committee, following recommendations from DCSOPS and CONARC, recommended making "individual training" a directorate within CONARC headquarters under a Deputy Commanding General for Training instead of creating a separate command. The training centers would in this case continue to remain under the several CONUS armies.9

In accepting the Hoelscher Committee proposals for a Combat Developments Agency which it designated as a field command, the Traub Committee recommended expanding its functions. It suggested transferring from the Army's school system those functions and personnel connected with the development of doctrine, preparation of tables of organization and equipment, and combat developments field manuals. Within the schools these functions were often assigned to individuals whose main responsibilities were for training or teaching and who neglected combat developments as a consequence.

10

(1) Traub Committee Report, pp. 1-4, 17, 20. (2) Memo, General Kjellstrom for Hewes, 21 Sep 71.

Traub Committee Report, pp. 7-9.

10 Ibid., pp. 11-13.

Considering the magnitude of the proposed reorganization the Traub Committee thought eighteen months would be a highly optimistic estimate for an operation involving nearly 200,000 people and nearly two hundred installations. There would be three phases: planning, activation, and adjustment. While it might take only three months to reorganize Army headquarters and the Office of Personnel Operations, it might take ten months to set up the Combat Developments Command headquarters. Another factor determining how long it would take to complete the reorganization was the location of the new commands. To avoid losing key technical service personnel, the committee thought the logistics command should be headquartered in the Washington area where the people were.11

The Traub Committee recommended assigning "General Staff responsibility" for planning and co-ordinating the actual reorganization to the Comptroller of the Army, General Traub. To assist him it recommended creating a special "project office" within the Office of the Comptroller to "maintain current information on the progress of the planning or execution as appropriate" of the reorganization and to serve as "the focal point for all coordination, periodic reports, and information required prior to and during the transition." Other Army staff agencies should "assist" as required.12

The Approval and Execution of Project 80

After approving the Hoelscher Committee report, as amended by the Traub Committee and himself, Secretary McNamara sought the support of General Maxwell D. Taylor, then President Kennedy's military adviser. A formal briefing for him by Mr. Hoelscher and the Department of the Army Reorganization Project Office (DARPO) staff was arranged for 22 November 1961.

General Taylor had earlier told members of the Hoelscher Committee personally that he considered the Army's mission was to support the fighting man and that everything should be subordinated to this goal. Mere change for its own sake was

11 (1) Ibid., pp. 10-21. (2) Tab C, Preliminary Study Plan of Implementation for a Systems and Materiel Command in the Department of the Army (OSD Project 80), DCSLOG, 1 Nov 61, pp. 80-98. (3) Tab E, A Study of the Establishment of a Combat Developments Agency, OCRD, 1 Nov 61, p. 17.

12 Inclosure 1 to Traub Committee Report.

wrong because any organization the size of the Army required stability to function effectively. This comment represented the position of combat arms officers generally. He might organize the services along functional lines, were he starting from scratch. But, considering Army traditions and the large number of people accustomed to them and to the existing system, he questioned whether any drastic changes were really desirable such as a major overhaul of the technical services. 18

At his Thanksgiving DARPO briefing General Taylor repeated these ideas, again emphasizing the importance and value of Army traditions for Army morale. The proposal to eliminate the technical services was not new, and he wryly wished the committee good luck in its venture.

While impressed with the thoroughness of the Hoelscher Committee report, he wanted further details on Army logistics under the current organization as well as the proposed future organization. Taylor also asked for more details on personnel management and training, the impact of the Combat Developments Command on the combat arms, and the effect of the reorganization on the Army's "combat readiness." Last he wanted to know the views of the technical service chiefs and other Army staff officials on Project 80 proposals.14

To answer these questions a second briefing for General Taylor was scheduled for 21 December. In the meantime two formal briefings for the technical service chiefs were held on Friday, 8 December, known afterward as Black Friday among the once proud technical service headquarters, to obtain their views. Observers noted at the outset three empty chairs reserved for Secretary Stahr, General Decker, and Mr. Vance. When they did appear toward the end of the briefing they were preceded by Secretary McNamara whose presence had been unannounced. He said that while he would welcome the views of the technical service chiefs, he also felt that when the

13 (1) Memo, Colonel McGregor to General Tyson, 16 Nov 61, on briefing for General Taylor. Kjellstrom Briefing files. (2) Memo for Record, Group A, OSD Project 80 (Army), 31 May 61, sub: Meeting With General Maxwell D. Taylor. Located in Various Military and Civilian VIPS-Briefing and Meeting Memos. Hoelscher files.

(1) Memo for Record, Colonel Kjellstrom, 24 Nov 61, sub: Briefing of General Maxwell D. Taylor, Special Assistant to the President, on Reorganization of the Army, Kjellstrom Briefing files. (2) Memo, General Kjellstrom for Hewes, 21 Sep 71.

President made his decision, they should support it and not engage in public controversy.

The technical service chiefs did not present a united front. General Colglazier, a Reserve officer and civil engineer in private life, was not a career technical service officer himself and had spent most of the previous decade dealing with DCSLOG management problems. The new Defense Supply Agency would remove the bulk of the Quartermaster Corps from the Army and as a result had created some confusion among the chiefs. Few appeared to have digested the details or to have read the several volumes of the Hoelscher Committee report. They were very concerned about those proposals which would relieve them of their responsibilities for training and for officer personnel management. They did not believe the new organizations could or would provide the kind of trained specialists the Army needed to keep up with changing technology.

The Chief of Ordnance, Lt. Gen. John H. Hinrichs, questioned some details of the organization, to which Secretary McNamara replied that he was interested primarily in the view of the chiefs on the broad concepts of Project 80, not the details. Maj. Gen. Webster Anderson, the Quartermaster General, complained that the new DSA had practically eliminated his agency. The Surgeon General, Lt. Gen. Leonard D. Heaton, was neutral. Maj. Gen. Ralph T. Nelson, the Chief Signal Officer, favored the reorganization, while Maj. Gen. Marshall Stubbs, the Chief Chemical Officer, violently opposed Project 80 since it proposed to eliminate his office entirely. The Chief of Engineers, Lt. Gen. Emerson C. Itchner, objected to Project 80 proposals dealing with the training functions of his office. Maj. Gen. Frank S. Besson, Jr., the Chief of Transportation, who favored the reorganization, strongly endorsed the basic management concepts advanced by the Hoelscher Committee. Those present at the briefing were not surprised later when General Besson was selected as commanding general of the Army Materiel Command and promoted rapidly to a four-star general.

After Secretary McNamara had left, General Hinrichs returned to the attack, accusing the Army staff of allowing itself