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CHART 30-DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY REORGANIZATION PROJECT, FEBRUARY 1962

* Member Planning Council

Source: DARPO files

Plans Office, as its name implied, developed and co-ordinated the detailed planning and execution of the reorganization.

The Planning Council met weekly to review progress and resolve problems and conflicts that arose among its members on the basis of majority rule. Two of the planning group chairmen, General Besson and Lt. Gen. John P. Daley, were also slated to be the first commanding generals of Army Materiel Command and Combat Developments Command and thus had a vested interest in the success of the reorganization. Maj. Gen. George E. Martin, temporary chairman of the OPO Planning Group, was in ill-health and about to retire. Not until April was a commanding general of the Office of Personnel Operations selected, Maj. Gen. Stephen R. Hanmer, who then became the OPO Planning Group chairman.

General Traub in addition to being Comptroller of the Army and Project Director was also chairman of the Headquarters, Department of the Army, Planning Group. Consequently, Col. Frederick B. Outlaw of ODOMS, acted as chairman of the latter group most of the time. General Decker, General Eddleman, and General Traub were all to retire soon and, unlike Generals Besson and Daley, would not have to live with the consequences of their decisions. As a result the Headquarters, Department of the Army, Planning Group, lacked strong executive support in dealing with other General Staff agencies and planning groups.

General Traub's position as Comptroller and merely one among equals also complicated his role as Project Director because his colleagues on the General Staff refused to accept the decisions of the Planning Council, composed largely of "outsiders," where their interests were involved. General Vittrup, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, bluntly told the Chief of Staff that he would accept the Planning Council's decisions so long as CDC and AMC did not attempt to make decisions affecting the General Staff. General Decker and General Eddleman finally agreed that they personally would have to settle disagreements arising between the DARPO Planning Council and the General Staff. As a result General Eddleman

himself had to decide finally which individuals were to be transferred from the General Staff to the new commands.24

Secretary McNamara played as vital a role in the execution of Project 80 as he had in its initiation. The principal reason for his later intervention was the Army's slowness in carrying out the reorganization. The final detailed planning directive, known as DARPO 10-1, did not appear until 19 March. Preliminary implementation plans, or PIPS, would not be ready until the end of April. They were then to be revised as "Activation Plans." The Army Materiel Command was scheduled to begin its operations on 19 September 1962 and assume full responsibility for the Army's logistics system in February or March 1963.

At the end of March 1962 Secretary McNamara told Secretary Stahr to accelerate the reorganization so that AMC would be in full operation by 1 July 1962, nine months ahead of the DARPO schedule. Secretary Stahr protested. This decision was only the latest in a series of what he considered unwarranted interferences by Secretary McNamara in the internal affairs of the Army. On 2 May he resigned and was replaced in July by Cyrus Vance, who supervised the final stages of Project 80.25

The General Staff also protested that the proposed revised schedule would seriously disrupt current operations, create unnecessary turmoil among personnel, and turn the reorganization into a series of crash actions of "gargantuan proportions." Several DARPO planning group chairmen complained that the General Staff was dragging its feet and delaying decisions. At this stage neither the principal subordinate commanders of Army Materiel Command had been selected nor the sites of their headquarters. The location of AMC headquarters was also undecided.26

24 (1) Blumenson, Project 80 History, pp. 84-93. (2) Army General Staff Council Minutes, 15 May 62, for General Vittrup's remarks and General Decker's reaction. (3) Memo, Hq, DA, Planning Group, for General Traub, 15 May 62, sub: Establishment of Preliminary Ceilings for Army Staff Agencies for Implementation of Project 80 Reorganization. DARPO Chronological Stayback file, No. 110.

25

26 (1) Zuckert, "The Service Secretary," p. 465. (2) Interview, John Raymond with Mr. Stahr, c. Jul 62. Cited in John Raymond, Power at the Pentagon (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 298. (3) Blumenson, Project 80 History, pp. 98-102.

20 (1) Blumenson, Project 80 History, pp. 98-102. (2) DARPO 10–1, 19 Mar 63. (3) AMC Annual Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1963, pp. 25-26, 41-50. (4) DARPO Planning Council Meeting No. 6, 2 Apr 62, MDLC Agenda Items for DARPO Planning Council Meeting on 9 April 1962, attached to Minutes of Planning Council Meeting No. 7, 9 Apr 62. (5) DARPO Early Activation of MDLC file.

Despite these problems General Besson and his staff developed a three-stage plan under which Army Materiel Command would assume responsibility for the Army's logistics system by 1 July, simply by "taking over in place" the matériel functions and elements of the technical services. This depended on the prompt assignment of two hundred key personnel for AMC headquarters and those of its subcommands to provide essential continuity of operations. The complete transfer of all personnel assigned to AMC would take another six months beyond 1 July.

After approval by the General Staff and Under Secretary Ailes, the Besson plan was finally approved by Secretary McNamara on 25 April. The only change made in the Besson plan timetable was to advance the date when Army Materiel Command would assume its operational responsibilities from 1 July to 1 August.27

On 1 August 1962, when AMC assumed responsibility for the Army's wholesale logistics system, the Offices of the Quartermaster General, the Chief of Ordnance, and the Chief Chemical Officer disappeared. AMC took over most of the Chief of Ordnance's responsibilities. The Defense Supply Agency had already assumed most of the Quartermaster General's functions. The remainder, certain personnel support and supply services, including the care and disposition of deceased Army personnel and responsibility for the National Cemetery System, became the responsibility of the new Chief of Support Services.

The most difficult problem DARPO and the Planning Council had to deal with was the transfer of functions and personnel from DA headquarters to the field commands. Ultimately about 3,200 persons were transferred from the Army staff to the field, although most of them remained in the Washington area in Army Materiel Command or Combat Developments Command headquarters.

27

(1) Blumenson, Project 80 History, pp. 103-04. (2) AMC Historical Summary, pp. 50-78. (3) Department of the Army General Order 23, 4 May 62, activating AMC on 8 May. (4) AMC General Order 4, 23 May 62, activating AMC commands. (5) Department of the Army General Order 27, 17 Mar 62, activating CDC on 20 Jun. (6) Department of the Army General Order 34, 19 Jun 62, activating OPO on 1 Jul. (7) TAGO Ltr, 13 Jun 62, on assumption of responsibilities by these new commands, and CONARC on 1 Jul and 1 Aug 62. (8) Department of the Army General Order 46, 25 Jul 62, transferring over 250 installations and activities in place from the technical services on 1 Aug 62.

Secretary McNamara's intervention had exacerbated the already existing antagonism between the General Staff and the DARPO Planning Council.28 The General Staff's refusal to accept decisions by "outsiders" on the DARPO Planning Council continued to delay transferring people from Headquarters, Department of the Army, to the new field commands because, among other reasons, the demand for such personnel exceeded the supply. How to separate command and staff functions inextricably intertwined at the General Staff level, how to deal with the "hidden field spaces" in various Washington headquarters staffs, how to allocate spaces for overhead administrative support, and how to determine where to assign an individual performing functions belonging to several organizations under the new dispensation-were the specific issues which delayed action.29

Faced with this critical situation, the new Vice Chief of Staff, General Barksdale Hamlett, agreed that he would personally decide what people were to be transferred based on recommendations from DARPO. On 8 June he approved the personnel ceilings for the Army staff and the new commands on the basis of which DCSPER then made bulk allocations to the new commands which they could draw on as needed.30

There were other disagreements about transferring functions and personnel. Beginning in March, CONARC and CDC disagreed over assigning responsibility for preparing tables of organization and equipment and field manuals. CONARC insisted that transferring these functions to CDC, as the reorganization directive proposed, would disrupt the operations of its school system. The Planning Council backed by the Chief of Staff decided in favor of CDC, but dividing the functions, spaces, and personnel involved remained a problem. The basic issue was the fragmentation of these disputed functions among CONARC school personnel whose primary responsibilities were for training. In many cases, the same person was perform

28 (I) Blumenson, Project 80 History, p. 112. (2) Notes on Special DARPO Planning Council Meeting, 13 Apr 62.

29

'(1) Summary of DARPO Planning Council Meeting No. 15, 25 May 62. (2) Blumenson, Project 80 History, pp. 110-12. (3) General Traub's Remarks at General Staff Council Meeting, 15 May 62.

30

(1) Blumenson, Project 80 History, pp. 110-12. (2) Minutes of General Staff Council Meeting, 15 May 62. (3) DARPO Biweekly Progress Report to Mr. Horwitz, 22 Jun 62.

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