Engineering the reorganization for Sears was Robert E. Wood, General Goethals' Quartermaster General in World War I.10

General Marshall's experience as Chief of Staff in 1939-41 led him to the same general conclusion on the necessity for centralized over-all control and decentralized responsibility for operations if the War Department and the Army were to function effectively. After World War I he had foreseen that members of the General Staff might become "so engrossed in their coordinating and supervisory functions" that they would neglect their primary missions of preparing war plans and tactical doctrine." In the two years before Pearl Harbor the War Department staff, including the General Staff, became a huge operating empire increasingly involved in the minutiae of Army administration. The pressing requirements of the moment eliminated all other considerations.12

Co-ordinating the technical services, for example, was difficult because of the complicated division of responsibility for their activities among the General Staff. Not only did they report to the Under Secretary on industrial mobilization and planning, but also to each of the General Staff divisions: G-1 on personnel, G-2 on technical intelligence, G-3 on training, and to G-4 only on supply requirements and distribution. The new lend-lease program of all aid short of war to the Allies created further complications, and a special Defense Aid Director was established in the department to co-ordinate this function among the numerous agencies concerned with it. Still another problem was created by the Army Air Forces' drive

10 (1) Chandler, "Management Decentralization: An Historical Analysis." (2) David Novick, "Origin and History of Program Budgeting," RAND Corporation Paper No. P-3427, Oct 66. Reprinted in 90th Cong., 1st sess., Committee Print, Planning-Programming-Budgeting: Selected Comment, prepared by the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate (Washington, 1967), pp. 28-29.

11 Marshall War College Lecture, 19 Sep 22, pp. 14-15.

12 (1) Nelson, National Security and the General Staff, pp. 329, 390. (2) Morison. Turmoil and Tradition, pp. 402-07, 446-47. (3) Watson, Chief of Staff, pp. 57-81. (4) Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 24-28, 37-39. (5) Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 238. (6) Reorganization of the War Department: Discussion With General Marshall, 5 Sep 45, pp. 1-3. Typed memorandum in Patch-Simpson Board files, copy in OCMH. (7) See the testimony of General McNarney in Patch-Simpson Board files, pp. 15-21.

for autonomy including separate administrative and supply agencies.13

Serious delays in military camp construction led to the transfer of responsibility for this function and for construction of airfields and other installations from an overburdened Quartermaster Corps to the Corps of Engineers, a transfer made permanent by law in December 1941.14

To assist him in administering the department, Marshall added in 1940 two additional Deputy Chiefs of Staff. The existing Deputy Chief, Maj. Gen. William Bryden, was responsible for general administration of the department and the Army. Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Chief of Army Air Forces, served also as Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and participated with Marshall in the development of joint strategy. After Pearl Harbor Arnold became a member of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff. This arrangement reflected Marshall's appreciation of the Air Forces' desire for autonomy.1

Maj. Gen. Richard C. Moore became Deputy Chief of Staff for supply, construction, and the newly designated Armored Force. Congress, acting on General Pershing's recommendation, had deprived the Tank Corps, created during World War I, of its status as a separate combat arm. Between the wars the roles and missions of the armored forces in this country as in Europe were the subject of bitter internal dissension within the Army. The strongest opposition to the tank came naturally from the Cavalry whose chief, Maj. Gen. John K. Herr, in 1938 urged:

13 (1) Watson, Chief of Staff, pp. 69-78. (2) Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 20-30. (3) John D. Millett, The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1954), pp. 11-22. (4) Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955), pp. 79-80.

14

(1) Morison, Turmoil and Tradition, p. 418. (2) Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, pp. 444-47. (3) War Department Bulletin No. 15, 16 Dec 41. (4) Lenore Fine and Jesse A. Remington, The Corps of Engineers: Construction in the United States, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1972), Pp. 244-72.

15 (1) Nelson, National Security and the General Staff, p. 329. (2) Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, pp. 49, 84-86, 282, 290–91. (3) Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 21-23, 67-70. (4) Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., Men and Planes, vol. VI, "The Army Air Forces in World War II" (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 12-28. (5) See War Department General Order 6, 14 Jun 40, on the appointment of General Bryden.

"We must not be misled to our own detriment to assume that the untried machine can displace the proved and tried horse."'1o

Asking Congress for authority to re-create a separate armored force risked public ventilation of this dispute within Army ranks. This in turn might have embarrassed the Army in its efforts to obtain Congressional support for expanding the Army to meet the threat of Axis aggression. Consequently, the Armored Force came quietly into existence at Fort Knox, Kentucky, on 10 July 1940 by direction of the Secretary of War. Congress did not designate the Armored Force as a separate combat branch until the Army Organization Act of 1950 when as the Armor Branch it officially replaced the horse cavalry. General Herr went to his grave asserting the Army had betrayed the horse.17

The man who delivered the coup de grâce to the horse was an ardent armor supporter, Brig. Gen. Lesley J. McNair. General Marshall personally selected him as his deputy in charge of General Headquarters, when it was activated in July 1940. The primary mission of GHQ was to raise and train the new Army, but, in accordance with the Harbord Board concept, it was also supposed to become the commanding general's military operations staff in the event of war.

General McNair set up his headquarters across town from the War Department in the Army War College. As in 1917 physical separation from the War Department as well as preoccupation with training made it difficult for GHQ to maintain effective personal contact with General Marshall and to keep up with the rapidly changing complexion of the war. It was the War Plans Division, physically close by, upon which Marshall came to rely for immediate assistance in planning and preparing for military operations.18

16

Mary Lee Stubbs and Stanley Russell Connor, Armor-Cavalry, Part I: Regular Army and Army Reserve, ARMY LINEAGE series (Washington, 1969), p. 54.

17 (1) See War Department General Order 7, 15 Aug 40, on General Moore's appointment as Deputy Chief of Staff. (2) Stubbs and Connor, Armor-Cavalry, pp. 48-58, 75. (3) Coffman, The Hilt of the Sword, p. 245.

18

I (1) Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 11, 61-67. (2) Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1947), pp. 1-30, 128-42. (3) Kent Roberts Greenfield, A Short History of the Army Ground Forces, Army Ground Forces Historical Study No. 10, c. 1944, pp. 1-19. Copy in OCMH. (4) See Chapter I, pages 27-28, for the same problem encountered by the War College in 1917-18. (5) Interview, Cline with Brig Gen Harry J. Malony, 6 Aug 46. In Col Frederick S. Haydon 1942 Reorganization Notes, Cater files, OCMH.

Such was the jury-rigged, extempore manner in which the War Department under General Marshall organized for war. He had hoped to change things in this manner gradually without publicity or stirring up antagonisms among powerful interests groups like the chiefs of the supply services. Tinkering with the machinery did not produce satisfactory results, and two days after Pearl Harbor Marshall asserted that the War Department was a "poor command post.'

" 19

The pressing need, he later said, was for "more definite and positive control by the Chief of Staff." The General Staff, as he had warned, "had lost track of the purpose of its existence. It had become a huge, bureaucratic, red tape-ridden, operating agency. It slowed down everything." 20 Too many staff divisions and too many individuals within these staff divisions had to pass on every little decision that had to be made by the Chief of Staff. "It took forever to get anything done, and it didn't make any difference whether it was a major decision" or a minor detail.21 The Chief of Staff and the three deputy chiefs were "so bogged down in details that they were unable to make any decisions."

You had so many different people in there that there wasn't anybody who could get together and make a decision. The Cavalry didn't agree that an Infantryman could ride on a tank; the Infantry said "Yes, we have some tanks, and we can ride tanks." General Herr said "Anybody who wants to ride in a tank is a damn fool. He ought to be riding a horse." And it was almost impossible to get a decision. There were too many people who had too much authority.22

The Reorganization of March 1942

The decision General Marshall reached was to substitute the vertical pattern of military command for the traditional horizontal pattern of bureaucratic co-ordination. This centralization of executive control would enable him to decentralize operating responsibilities. He would then be free, like

10 (1) Marshall Statement, re: Single Department of Defense, 18 Apr 44. Stimson Correspondence files. Stimson Manuscripts. (2) Cline, Washington Command Post, p. 90, is the source of the quotation.

20 Summary of Patch-Simpson Board interview with General Marshall, 5 Sep 45. Patch-Simpson Board files.

" Interview, Patch-Simpson Board with Brig Gen William K. Harrison, 8 Oct 45. Patch-Simpson Board files.

22

Interview, Patch-Simpson Board with General Joseph T. McNarney, 26 Sep 45. Patch-Simpson Board files.

the top managers of DuPont, General Motors, and Sears, to devote his time to the larger issues of planning strategy, allocating resources, and directing global military operations.28

Instead of the General Staff and three score or more agencies with direct access to the Chief of Staff's office, the Marshall reorganization created three field commands outside the formal structure of the War Department: Army Ground Forces (AGF), Army Air Forces (AAF), and Army Service Forces (ASF), initially the Services of Supply. Army Ground Forces under Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, responsible for training the Army, and Army Air Forces under Lt. Gen. Henry H. Arnold were for practical purposes already functioning, the former under its designation of General Headquarters. Army Service Forces under Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell was an agency new to World War II and hastily thrown together to include the Army's supply system, administration, and "housekeeping" functions within the United States. With the creation of these commands, said Maj. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, who became the Deputy Chief of Staff in March 1942. "Immediately 95 per cent of the papers that came up to the General Staff ceased just like that." 24 During the war both ASF and AAF operated as integral parts of the War Department because they were intimately involved in military planning. AGF, on the other hand, remained a field command separate from the War Department.

The War Plans Division (soon renamed the Operations Division) became General Marshall's command post or GHQ. The rest of the General Staff, drastically reduced in numbers, were forced out of operations and confined in theory to a broad policy planning and co-ordination role for which their long, drawn-out staff procedures were more appropriate. General

23(1) Solis S. Horwitz, later Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration under Secretary McNamara, asserted the principle that the only way to decentralize or delegate authority for operations is to centralize executive control first as General Marshall did. Solis S. Horwitz, Secretary McNamara's Concept of Management, speech before U.S. Army Management School, Ft. Belvoir, Va., 20 Jun 63. Reprinted in U.S. Army Management School, Ft. Belvoir, Va., "Management Views," Selected Speeches, 1962-1963, vol. VIII, pt. 2, pp. 452-53. (2) See comments by Brig Gen John H. Hilldring, the G-1, in OCS, Notes on Conference in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff at 10:50 a.m., Thursday, February 5, 1942 [hereafter cited as Reorganization Conference, 5 Feb 42], p. 4. Collected in OCS, Notes on Conferences— 1942 file. Copy in Cater files (1942 Reorganization folder), OCMH.

24 (1) War Department Circular 59, 2 Mar 42. (2) Marshall to Palmer, 12 Mar 42. Copy furnished OCMH by Dr. Forrest C. Pogue. (3) McNarney Interview, pp. 12-13.