Soviet-sponsored "National Front" and its proposed plebiscite. These devices fraudulently excite and exploit the natural wish of the German people for unity while denying to them the free and democratic processes by which unity can be attained. The reluctance of the Communist usurpers of East Germany to submit to free elections, or to permit the unification of Germany to proceed thereby, makes it abundantly clear that they are unwilling to trust the choice of the German people. My Government stands ready to assist the German people to achieve unity, based on true democratic principles and reflecting the aspirations of the entire German nation.

Unity and freedom can be attained in Germany only if there be full and equal opportunity for all parties throughout Germany to propose candidates, advance programs, and compete for the electorate's favor. All candidates must be assured complete freedom of action without discrimination or official favoritism, together with access to all essential media of communication and material facilities. Every voter must be assured the protection of the law in the free expression of his opinion at the polls. The press must have unhindered access to all areas in order to report the election campaign accurately.

Meanwhile, my Government is extending its full support to the Bundesrepublik, which has evolved from those democratic processes to which all Germans can aspire.

55. DECLARATION BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND FRANCE, MAY 14, 1950 1

1

In reaffirming the determination of their Governments to work together, in cooperation with the German Federal Government and all like-minded Powers, for the unification of Germany, the three Foreign Ministers agreed that German unity should be achieved on the basis of the following principles:

(a) A freely-elected all-German government.

(b) Individual freedom of movement, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of speech, press and radio throughout Germany.

(c) Freedom of action throughout Germany for all democratic political parties.

(d) Independence of the judiciary.

(e) Prohibition throughout Germany of political secret police and police formations constituting a military force.

(f) Assurance of German economic unity through action by a German government on matters such as a unified currency and customs, and through quadripartite agreement on matters such as cessation of reparations from current production, and prohibited and limited industries.

1 Department of State Bulletin, June 5, 1950, p. 885.

(g) Surrender and disposal, in accordance with appropriate German legislation, of any industrial enterprise in Germany whose ownership or control was acquired after May 8, 1945 by or on behalf of any foreign Power, unless such acquisition has quadripartite approval and the interest so approved is subjected to German Law.

(h) Establishment of quadripartite supervision through a fourPower Commission, exercising its reserve powers in such a way as to permit the German Government to function effectively.

The Foreign Ministers further agreed that the first step towards the restoration of German unity should be the holding throughout Germany of free elections to a Constituent Assembly. They, accordingly, welcome and endorse the resolution of the German Federal Republic of March 22, 1950,1 inviting free all-German elections for a national assembly empowered to frame an all-German constitution. These elections should be held under international supervision and on the basis of an electoral law to be agreed between the four Occupying Powers which would take into account the principles set forth above. The Constituent Assembly when elected should have the sole task of drafting a constitution for submission to the German people for ratification.

Finally, the Ministers agreed that with the formation of an allGerman government on the basis of the foregoing principles, the Four Powers should immediately address themselves to a peace settlement.

56. LETTER FROM THE UNITED STATES COMMANDANT IN BERLIN 2 TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SOVIET CONTROL COMMISSION,3 MAY 25, 1950 *

DEAR GENERAL CHUIKOV: Throughout the five year period during which our two governments have participated in the occupation of Germany, repeated efforts have been made to effect the political and economic unity of the country. The matter was recently reviewed again by the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States at London. Their conclusions on the matter of German unification and the manner in which it might be accomplished are attached. (See Annex A.)5 This document has been transmitted to the Chancellor of the German Federal Republic.

You will note that the Ministers agreed that the formation of an all-German Government on the basis of the principles set forth in their statement would prepare the way for a peace settlement with Germany. In this connection, you will also have noted that in the

1 Department of State Bulletin, June 5, 1950, p. 885.

2 Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor.

3 Gen. Vassily I. Chuikov.

Department of State Bulletin, June 5, 1950, pp. 884-885. The letter was sent on behalf of the United States High Commissioner.

High Commissioners sent similar letters.

5 Tripartite declaration of May 14, 1950; supra.

The British and French

public communiqué released by the Ministers on May 14,' it was stated that the Western Powers did not contemplate the conclusion of a separate peace treaty with the Federal Republic: one consideration in the formulation of this conclusion was that the Western Powers believe that a separate peace treaty with one or more zones of occupation connotes acceptance of a concept of a more permanent partition of Germany. The Western Powers do not wish to associate themselves with any such concept.

You will also note that the Ministers endorsed the resolution of the Federal Republic under date of March 22, which invited allGerman elections to a National Constituent Assembly under conditions found to be acceptable to my government. A copy of the text of this resolution is attached (See Annex B),2 and I direct your attention especially to paragraph 1 thereof, which suggests that the four occupation powers should assume the responsibility of framing an electoral law under which all-German elections might be conducted. My government would be prepared for me to share in the responsibility of framing an electoral law under which all-German elections, pointing toward the formation of an all-German Government in conformity with the principles set forth in the attached statement of the Foreign Ministers, could be held.

Should your government declare its acceptance of these principles and be willing to share such responsibility, it is the belief of my government that any discussions on the subject should be conducted via the following principles:

1. Conversations would initially be undertaken at the level of the four Commissioners for the limited purpose of drafting an electoral law to implement the Federal Republic's proposal of free all-German elections for a National Constituent Assembly. The proposal to limit discussions to the framing of an electoral law proceeds from a belief that it is unrealistic to discuss or arrange the desired peace settlement until it is established that a unified German Government, freely elected, can be brought into being.

2. If agreement is reached on an electoral law, the way would be clear for the drafting by the elected representatives of the German people of a constitution for all Germany, within the framework of the principles set forth in the attached statement of the Foreign Ministers, and for the emergence of an all-German Government.

3. A basis would thus be laid for the establishment of a four power commission which should exercise its reserved powers in such a way as to permit the German Government to function effectively.

I would welcome your views on this subject.

In view of the vital interest of the German people in the unification of their country, I feel it appropriate to make a copy of this letter available to the press and will do so after it has reached you.

1 Supra, pp. 1709-1711.

For translation of the resolution, see Department of State Bulletin, June 5, 1950, p. 885.

57. STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE, OCTOBER 25, 19501

I should like to anticipate your questions and make a few observations on the communiqué issued at Praha after the meeting of the Eastern European Communist Foreign Ministers. It is designed to give the impression that a new approach is being made to the German problem. I cannot find anything new in it; in fact, it is a return to old and unworkable proposals.

The record shows that we have always been eager to cooperate in the search for a plan which would relieve tensions, restore German unity, and liquidate the tragic heritage of the last war. But the time has long since passed when the world can be stirred to hope by general phrases from the Soviet Union about disarmament and peace and German unity. We, who have striven so hard for these things, want actions-we want the threatening East German army disbanded, the capricious restraints on internal German trade removed, and free democratic elections held in all of Germany. We want an end to threats such as that uttered by the Communist Ulbricht, deputy head of the East German regime, on August 3 when he declared that the Government of the Federal Republic would share. what he hoped was going to be the fate of the Republic of Korea.

The Praha statement makes four proposals in an attempt to deflect us from our resolve to proceed to build real strength in a free world as the best means of safeguarding the peace.

First, it is proposed that the United States, British, French, and Soviet Governments should publish a declaration that they will not permit the remilitarization of Germany or its inclusion in any sort of aggressive plans. Why is this necessary? We solemnly agreed at Potsdam in 1945 to bring about the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany. As a result, Western Germany lies disarmed today. The Praha communiqué should be directed to the Government of the Soviet Union, which could make the implementation of the Potsdam Agreement 100 percent complete in Germany by taking the required steps in the Soviet zone. The only remilitarization in Germany has occurred in the Soviet zone where factories are producing armament for Eastern European use and where 50,000 soldiers have been organized, trained, and equipped with tanks and artillery. And against whom are all these and similar preparations being made? The United States and the free world which have seen these developments with increasing anxiety would be a thousand times more reassured by Soviet action to implement previous declarations than by new declarations, however high-sounding. The West can find no reassurance of peace in Soviet actions whether these be the

1 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 6, 1950, pp. 727–728.

2 Resolutions adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria and the Albanian Minister to the Soviet Union, Oct. 21, 1950; Documents on German Unity, vol. I (Frankfurt, 1951), pp. 158-161.

Protocol of proceedings of Aug. 1, 1945; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 34-48.

rearming of East Germany, the maintenance of so many mobilized Soviet divisions, or the hostile Soviet propaganda with which the world is constantly bludgeoned. These are the reasons why proposals are made today which would permit the Germans to join their own defensive efforts with the common efforts being made to strengthen the defense of the West, while preventing the rebirth of a German national army.

Second, the Praha communiqué urges the removal of restrictions that are obstructing the development of German peacetime economy. If this demand is addressed to Moscow, we will heartily support it. We have spent billions in an effort to develop the German economy on a sound and self-supporting basis. We made innumerable attempts-fruitless because of Soviet opposition-to bring about the creation of central German economic agencies and with hopeful, if misplaced, tolerance we long left the Eastern borders of our zones open to the free exchange of goods and persons. If the German economy, as a national whole, is to be restored on a sound basis, what we need is action from the country which blockaded Berlin, which imposes the most arbitrary and erratic restrictions on commerce entering or leaving its zone of occupation, and which has destroyed all economic initiative in its zone by the system of Communist monopoly of enterprise and industry.

The Praha communiqué demands, in the third place, that a peace treaty with Germany be concluded forthwith. We state, as we have so many times in the past, that this cannot be done in the absence of a unified democratic national government in Germany. The peace treaty cake looks very delicious, but to whom is it to be served? There must be a German government with whom a treaty can be concluded. Let the German people freely elect a national government, as we have proposed again and again, and we can then move toward a peace treaty.

As for the fourth proposal, it is even more insubstantial than the rest. It suggests that an all-German constitutional convention composed of equal numbers of representatives from Eastern and Western Germany should prepare the way for the formation of a provisional all-German government. Would the East German representatives be appointed by the Communist Party regime or would they perhaps have the added cover of a fake election of the type held in Eastern Germany on October 15? And why should the 18 million captive Germans of the East have equal representation with the 47 million free Germans of the West? This violates the most elementary ideas of democracy. We strongly support the views which have been expressed by Chancellor Adenauer and the Government of the Federal Republic. We have repeatedly urged upon the Soviet Union a plan for free, open, supervised democratic elections all over Germany for a new constitutional convention. Only in this way, can a German Government responsive to the will of the majority be obtained, and only then can we talk sensibly of a peace treaty.

We will always hope for and welcome tangible proof that Soviet intentions have changed. The Praha statement gives us no such