at such time as it seems likely to the Commission that it can do so with a prospect of positive results. 14. The following four representatives on the Commission, whose signatures are appended below, unanimously adopted the report at the 25th meeting of the Commission held on 5 August 1952 in the Palais des Nations, Geneva. Signed: Brazil Netherlands A. MENDES VIANNA A. H. ABBASI 71. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1952 1 The United States Government has carefully considered the Soviet Government's note of August 23 about Germany. It had hoped that the note would have marked some progress towards agreement on the essential question of free all-German elections. This is the first question which must be settled among the four powers so that Germany can be unified, an all-German Government formed and a peace treaty concluded. Possibly in order to divert attention from this issue, the greater part of the Soviet note of August 23 is, however, devoted to wholly unfounded attacks upon the Atlantic Pact, the European Defense Community and the conventions signed at Bonn on May 26. As the United States Government has often emphasized, these agreements are purely defensive and threaten no one. The Bonn conventions and the EDC treaty, far from being imposed on the German people, are a matter for free decision by freely elected Parliaments, including of course that of the German Federal Republic. Insofar as the Bonn conventions reserve certain strictly limited rights to the three Western powers, a fundamental consideration has been specificcally to safeguard the principle of German unity and to keep the door open for agreement with the Soviet Union on the unification of Germany. The United States Government must insist on the necessity of starting four-power discussions at the only point where they can in fact start, which is the organization of free elections. In its note of July 10, the United States Government drew attention to the obvious fact that this is the first point which must be settled if any progress is to be made towards uniting the Soviet zone with the Federal 1 Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 6, 1952, pp. 517-518. The British and French Embassies sent similar notes on the same date. The Soviet Government did not reply to the notes of the three powers. 2 Ibid., pp. 518–521. See the treaty of May 27, 1952; supra, pp. 1107-1150. 'S. Execs. Q and R, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 9-22, 25-165. * Supra, doc. 69. Republic, which constitutes the greater part of Germany. In its first note, as in its last, the Soviet Government has evaded this clear issue. Instead of putting first things first, it now relegates to the background the problem of elections and proposes that the fourpower conference "should discuss in the first place such important issues as a peace treaty with Germany and the formation of an allGerman Government". But until elections are held, no all-German Government can be formed, nor can Germany be unified. Until an all-German Government is formed which will be in a position to negotiate freely, it is impossible to discuss the terms of a German peace treaty. In complete accord with the views of the United States, French and United Kingdom Governments, the Soviet Government originally said that "the preparation of the peace treaty should be effected with the participation of Germany in the form of an all-German Government".1 The Soviet Government has now shifted its ground. It now substitutes for this, the participation of representatives of the Soviet zone and the Federal Republic in the four-power meetings "during the discussion of relevant questions". The United States Government cannot accept this proposal. A peace treaty for the whole of Germany cannot be negotiated with, and accepted by, any German representatives other than the all-German Government which would have to carry it out. Such a government can only proceed from free elections. It is moreover well known that the East German administration is not representative of the German population of the Soviet zone. This fact is not controverted by the assertion in the Soviet note of August 23 that this administration acted "at the request" of that population in enforcing recent measures further dividing East and West Germans in defiance of their clear desire for unity in freedom. The United States Government is compelled to remind the Soviet Government that conditions have altered radically since the Potsdam Agreement of 1945, which laid down certain political and economic principles to govern the initial control period. The Soviet conception of a peace treaty drafted by the four powers and imposed upon Germany is entirely unsuitable in 1952. The United States Government could never agree to a peace treaty being drafted or negotiated without the participation of an all-German Government. Any other procedure would mean a dictated treaty. That indeed would be "an insult to the German nation". 2 The United States Government again insists that genuinely free elections with a view to the formation of an all-German Government must come first. It has however learned by hard experience in recent years that terms such as "free elections" have one meaning in common parlance and another in the official Soviet vocabulary. The contrast between the concept of free elections which obtains in West Germany and that which prevails in the Soviet Zone is clear. It is for the 1 For a translation of the Soviet note of Mar. 10, 1952, in which the translation of this passage is slightly different, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 7, 1952, pp. 531-532. 2 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 34-48. German people to choose between these alternative ways of life. But they must be able to make their choice in genuine freedom and full responsibility. Only genuinely free elections can reflect the will of the German people and permit the formation of an all-German Government with the necessary freedom of action to discuss and accept a peace settlement. In order to create the conditions necessary for free elections, there has been four-power agreement that there should be a commission of investigation. The Soviet Government has now proposed that this commission should be composed of representatives of the People's Assembly of the "German Democratic Republic" and of the Bundestag of the German Federal Republic. A commission of investigation must, however, be genuinely impartial. A German commission would be no more able than a four-power commission to meet this requirement. The underlying principle of the present Soviet proposal was contained in one which emanated from the Soviet zone on September 15, 1951.' This was rejected by the Bundestag, which then suggested investigation by a United Nations Commission. It was thus the freely elected representatives of fifty millions of the German people who themselves proposed the creation of a neutral investigation commission under United Nations supervision. Nevertheless, the United States Government repeats its readiness to discuss any practical and precise proposals, as stated in its note of the tenth of July. The United States Government continues to seek a way to end the division of Germany. This will not be accomplished by premature discussions about a peace treaty with a Germany not yet united and lacking an all-German Government. The United States Government therefore renews the proposal made in its note of July 10 for an early four-power meeting-which could take place in October-to discuss the composition, functions and authority of an impartial commission of investigation with a view to creating the conditions necessary for free elections. The next step would be to discuss the arrangements for the holding of these elections and for the formation of an allGerman Government, as proposed in paragraph 11 (IV) of the United States Government's note of May 13. When free elections have been held and an all-German Government formed, the peace settlement can be negotiated. The United States Government, in concert with the French Government and the United Kingdom Government and after consultation with the German Federal Government and the German authorities in Berlin, most earnestly urges the Soviet Government to reconsider its refusal to join the other powers in a singleminded effort thus to come to grips with the problem of free elections in Germany. 1 See resolutions of this date by the Soviet Zone People's Chamber concerning all-German elections and an appeal to the Bundestag at Bonn; Documents on German Unity vol. I (Frankfurt, 1951), pp. 196, 197. Cf. statement of Sept. 15. 1951, by President Grotwohl to the People's Chamber; ibid., pp. 198–201. E. AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY NEGOTIATION, 1950 1953 72. DECLARATION BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND FRANCE, MAY 19, 1950 1 1 The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France reaffirm that their policy with respect to Austria requires the earliest possible completion of an Austrian treaty which will lead to the restoration of a free and independent Austria in accordance with the pledge given in the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943,2 and to the withdrawal of the forces of occupation. To this end the three Governments are ready at any time to settle without delay all outstanding issues of the treaty, provided that this will definitely bring about agreement on the treaty as a whole. If, however, the unwillingness of the Soviet Government to settle all outstanding issues continues to prevent the conclusion of the treaty, the occupation will have to be maintained for the present. But the three Governments are themselves prepared to carry out such measures as may properly be taken to strengthen within the framework of existing quadripartite agreements the authority of the Austrian Government and to lighten the burden of the occupation on Austria. In accordance with the provisions of Article 9 of the control agreement of June 28, 1946, the three Governments have decided to proceed at any early date to the appointment of civilian High Commissioners. 73. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AT MOSCOW TO THE SOVIET MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,5 JUNE 12, 1950 ° 6 I have the honor to refer to the situation in which the deputies for the Austrian treaty negotiations have been unable to reach agreement on the terms of an Austrian state treaty. It will be recalled that Austrian independence was pledged in the Moscow Declaration of 1943, and my Government regrets exceedingly the failure to reach an agreement which would result in the fulfillment of this pledge. The Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States at their meeting in London on May 18 reaffirmed that their policy with respect to Austria requires the earliest possible completion of an Austrian treaty which will lead to the restoration 1 Department of State Bulletin, May 29, 1950, p. 828. 2 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 11. 3 Ibid., p. 618. Adm. Alan G. Kirk. 5 Andrei Y. Vyshinsky. Department of State Bulletin, July 10, 1950, p. 74. 7 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 11. of a free and independent Austria in accordance with the pledge given in the Moscow Declaration and to the withdrawal of the forces of occupation. The three governments further agreed that they are ready at any time to settle without delay all outstanding issues of the treaty, provided that this will definitely bring about agreement on the treaty as a whole.' In the absence of a treaty, the three governments agreed that they are prepared to carry out such measures as may properly be taken to strengthen, within the framework of existing quadripartite agreements, the authority of the Austrian Government and to lighten the burden of the occupation on Austria to the greatest extent possible as requested by the Austrian Government in recent notes to the occupying powers. The three Foreign Ministers further agreed to proceed at an early date to appoint civilian high commissioners in Austria in accordance with the provisions of Article 9 of the Control Agreement of June 28, 1946.3 My Government would be pleased if the Government of the Soviet Union, pending final decision on the treaty, would associate itself with the program determined upon by the three Foreign Ministers. In the meantime, my Government will, on its part, as a first step in such a program, proceed at an early date to designate a civilian high commissioner to replace its present military commander in Austria and hopes that the Soviet Government will take similar action. 74. STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE, JULY 12, 1950 4 The deputies for the Austrian treaty negotiations met in London on July 10 for their 256th meeting. In obvious preparation for this meeting, the Soviet Government on July 8 sent to the American Embassy in Moscow a second note regarding the Allied position in Trieste. This second note merely repeats the unfounded allegations in the Soviet note of April 20. 6 7 This Government's reply of June 16 adequately answered those allegations. There is, of course, no valid reason for linking the two questions, but, true to the Soviet propaganda pattern, the Soviet deputy for the Austrian treaty negotiations, at the July 10 meeting, instead of discussing the remaining unagreed articles of the Austrian treaty, utilized the meeting to read a prepared statement on Trieste.8 This Soviet action once again emphasizes that the Soviet Govern See the tripartite declaration of May 19, 1950; supra. Notes of Mar. 7, 1950; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Apr. 15–22, 1950, p. 10660. A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 618. Department of State Bulletin, July 24, 1950, pp. 131-132. Documents on International Affairs, 1950 (London, 1953), pp. 519-521. Ibid., pp. 515–519. 7 Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1950, p. 1054. *Not printed. |