F. NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY, 1953-1954 89. NOTE FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, JULY 15, 1953 1 1 The development of the international situation and the recent events in Eastern Germany and in Berlin have intensified the universal desire to see peace more firmly established and to ease existing tensions in a way consistent with the fundamental right to freedom. While recognizing the fact that enduring peace can only be ultimately assured when certain basic problems, such as controlled disarmament, can be dealt with, the United States Government desires to dispose now of those problems which are capable of early solution. The conclusion of the German and Austrian treaties which are long overdue clearly constitutes an essential element of the European settlement which the United States Government regards as a major contribution to peace. A German peace treaty can only be negotiated with the participation of a free and representative all-German Government in a position freely to discuss such a treaty. Such a government can only result from free elections. The conditions under which such a Government should be formed and enjoy full liberty of action, constitute a problem which is capable of early solution if there is good will on all sides. It is equally clear that no real progress can be made toward a general relaxation of tension in Europe so long as this problem remains unsolved. 2 In its notes to the Soviet Government, the last of which is that of September 23, 1952, to which no answer has yet been received, the United States Government made constructive proposals, which were fully reflected in the resolution of the German Bundestag of June 10th of this year. 3 These proposals are designed to satisfy the unanimous desire of the German people for unity in freedom. Mindful of the even greater urgency which the recent events have given to German unification, the United States Government is determined to make a new effort so as to bring to an end the abnormal situation to which the German people is subjected. It has therefore decided, after consulting the German Federal Government and the German authorities in Berlin, to propose to the Soviet Government a meeting of Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, United States, and the Soviet Union. This meeting of limited duration Department of State Bulletin, July 27, 1953, p. 107. The British and French Governments sent similar notes to the Soviet Government on the same date. Supra, pp. 1819-1821. Documents on German Unity, vol. IV (Bad-Godesberg, 1953), p. 15. might begin about the end of September at a place to be mutually agreed. The subjects for discussion should be the following: (1) The organization of free elections in the Federal Republic, the Eastern Zone of Germany, and in Berlin. This would involve discussion inter alia of the necessary guarantees for freedom of movement, freedom of action for political parties, freedom of the press, and the enjoyment of the basic freedoms by all Germans before, during and after elections. (2) Conditions for the establishment of a free all-German Government, with freedom of action in internal and external affairs. These are essential steps which must precede the opening of discussions with the Soviet Government for a German peace treaty, itself a major element of a general settlement. The United States Government also considers that at this first meeting agreement should finally be reached on the Austrian Treaty. 90. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, AUGUST 17, 19531 2 The United States Government has examined with care the note of July 30 in which the Soviet Government indicated that it was prepared to resume discussion of a treaty for Austria if the "abbreviated treaty" were withdrawn from consideration. In their notes of June 11 the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and France stated clearly, as they had already done on a number of previous occasions, that they were prepared to accept any treaty which would insure Austria's political and economic independence and requested the Soviet Government to inform them of the exact text of the treaty which the Soviet Government was prepared to conclude. The Soviet Government has not responded to this request. Furthermore the Soviet Government declined to attend the meeting of the Austrian Treaty Deputies called for May 27, in London. The United States Government suggested in its note of July 155 that the Austrian treaty should be discussed at the meeting of the four Foreign Ministers. But in view of the Soviet Government's note of July 30, and so as to conclude an Austrian treaty as soon as possible, the United States Government proposes that the Treaty Deputies be convened in London on August 31, 1953, in order to discharge their obligation to report on this matter to the Foreign Ministers. On the understanding that there will be no extraneous issues raised and that the Soviet Government is prepared to conclude 1 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 31, 1953, p. 282; the British and French Governments sent similar notes. a treaty for Austria which will insure Austria's political and economic independence, the United States Government undertakes not to introduce for consideration the abbreviated treaty. In making this proposal the United States Government assumes that the Soviet Government will be prepared in fact promptly to conclude an Austrian treaty and accordingly that the reference to a relationship between a German peace settlement and an Austrian treaty in the final paragraph of the Soviet Government's note of August 4 should not be construed as deferring any hope of an Austrian treaty until other unrelated conditions are met. 91. NOTE FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, SEPTEMBER 2, 1953 2 1. The United States Government, in its customary close consultation with the Governments of the United Kingdom and France, has carefully studied the Soviet Government's notes of August 4 and 15, 1953, which were in reply to proposals presented on July 15' by the three Western powers. The Government of the German Federal Republic and the German authorities in Berlin have also been consulted. 2. The United States Government has no intention once again to refute the Soviet Government's criticisms of policy followed by the three powers, nor of thus prolonging a sterile discussion which can only be harmful to the cause of peace. 3. The United States Government therefore fully reserves its position in regard to the various allegations in the Soviet notes of August 4 and 15, and will confine its comments to the problems of an urgent nature which arise in connection with the meeting of the Foreign Ministers proposed in its note of July 15. 4. Real progress toward peace and toward a lessening of international tension would be achieved were it possible to find an early solution of some of the existing problems concerning Germany and to conclude the Austrian state treaty. It therefore appears desirable that the meeting of the Foreign Ministers should devote itself to these problems; whereas to inject into the discussion a series of other complex questions, as proposed by the Soviet Government, could only delay and prejudice the success of the talks. A solution of the German and Austrian problems could be expected to pave the way for fruitful discussion of other major questions. The United States Government also wishes to point out that the study of some of these other questions has already been entrusted to such international organizations as the United Nations or to international bodies such as the political conference on Korea where the Chinese People's 1 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 14, 1953, pp. 352–353. Ibid., pp. 351–352. on the same date. The British and French Governments sent similar notes 415900-57-vol. 2-13 Republic will be represented.' The latter's participation in the proposed meeting of Foreign Ministers of the four powers could not therefore be justified. 5. The Soviet Government has suggested a procedure for dealing with the German problem which appears complicated, and work on such a basis could, at best, only be long drawn out. The Soviet Government's note of August 15 envisages, in effect, a series of devices which could result in postponing to some indeterminate date the holding of free elections in the Federal Republic, in the East Zone of Germany, and in Berlin. An All-German Government which is not based on the will of the people as expressed in free elections would not be qualified to take vital decisions affecting the future of the United Germany. The problem of free elections is thus the key to any all-German settlement. The United States Government therefore considers that the meeting of the Foreign Ministers should devote itself to the German problem, the solution of which is an essential part of a world settlement, and concentrate in the first instance on the question of free elections and the status of the future German Government. 6. Furthermore, it must be pointed out that when the United States Government proposed, in its note of July 15, that the problem of free elections be considered first, it did not make any prior condition that an investigating commission be established. It seems, therefore, that on this point the Soviet Government has misinterpreted the terms of this note. 7. The United States Government has never considered that the re-establishment of freedom and independence of Austria, which by terms of the Moscow declaration of November 1943 2 must be considered as a liberated country, should be dependent upon progress toward a solution of the German problem. It considers that these two problems are quite distinct. In its view nothing should now prevent the conclusion of an Austrian treaty. It therefore regrets the failure of the Soviet Government to accept its proposal that the Austrian treaty deputies should meet on August 31. It nevertheless. remains the hope of the United States Government that the Foreign. Ministers will be able to agree on the Austrian state treaty when they themselves meet. 8. The United States Government is convinced that progress is more likely to be made by discussion of these problems than by a further exchange of notes. Consequently, it renews its invitation to the Soviet Government to participate in a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers which could take place on October 15 at Lugano. It understands that this would be agreeable to the Swiss Government. See infra, pp. 2685-2693 and 2695-2701. A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 11. See the American note of Aug. 17, 1953, to the Soviet Government; supra. 92. STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE, SEPTEMBER 3, 19531 The continued partition of Germany is a scandal. It is more than that. It is a crime. Originally, there were four zones of occupation, one each for Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union. This was designed as a convenient way for the Allies to administer the first phases of the surrender terms. It was never intended that Germany should be indefinitely partitioned. Britain, France, and the United States over 4 years ago put their zones together. The Soviet Union has stubbornly held on to the part of Germany it occupies. This is not only wrong to the Germans; it is a menace to the peace. The Germans in the Soviet zone, now cut off from their fellows for over 8 years and subjected to the despotic rule of Soviet puppets, are becoming increasingly restless. Their pathetic economic plight is shown by the eagerness with which they seek the food packages made available to them in West Berlin. They have sought these by the millions, even at great personal risk. Their growing resentment at their rulers is shown by the riots and strikes which led even unarmed Germans with stones to seek to resist the Red Army tanks which were sent to subdue them. 6 Now, in an effort to curry favor with the Germans, particularly having in mind the coming elections, the Soviet leaders have made another of a long series of propaganda gestures in giving lip service to the idea of German unity. However, they have surrounded this with conditions which would effectively nullify any practical result. For example, in their note of August 4, the Soviet Union proposed that Communist China should be brought into Foreign Minister consultations dealing with such proposals as that of German unity. It is hard to conceive of any proposition better calculated to prevent any constructive result. Surely the solution of Germany should not be subordinated to a solution of China nor should the fate of Germans be left to Chinese Communists. The Soviet Union has also said that before there could be German unity, there must be a German peace treaty and that its own puppet regime in East Germany must participate in the making of that peace treaty. A peace treaty with the Allies, including the Soviet Union, when German sentiment was purportedly represented by the Soviet puppet regime in East Germany, would hardly be a peace treaty which gave genuine expression to the wishes of the Germans. Such a treaty could not be expected to be indefinitely accepted by the Germans. 1 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 14, 1953, p. 353. See protocol between U.S., Ú.K., and U.S.S.R., Sept. 12, 1944, as amended Nov. 14, 1944, and July 26, 1945; TIAS 3071 (5 UST 2078.) Act of Surrender, May 8, 1945; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 505-506. 6 See trizonal fusion agreement of Apr. 18, 1949; ibid., pp. 588-590. The elections held throughout the German Federal Republic, Sept. 6, 1953. Department of State Bulletin. Sept. 14, 1953. pp. 352-353. |