It is the view of Great Britain, France, and the United States that the first step for the solution of the problem of Germany is to have all-German free elections to bring about unification. When that has happened, then there will be a truly representative German government and then the Allies can make a peace treaty which, if accepted by the all-German Government, will have a true endorsement on the part of the German people which they can be expected to honor.

In the hope of bringing this matter to a prompt solution, the three Western allies have proposed a meeting with the Soviet Union on October 15 to discuss in the first instance the establishment, by allGerman free elections, of a government which would unify Germany. We also hope at that meeting to conclude an Austrian peace treaty.

In the interest of speed the three Western allies have eliminated from their note1 all controversial matter and have not attempted to rebut the vast series of arguments and implications contained in the two preceding Soviet notes of August 4 and August 15.2 Our proposal is simple a meeting on October 15 which would concentrate in the first instance on the question of free elections and the status of the future German government. This is what the Germans themselves want, as shown by the Bundestag resolution of June 10,3 adopted with the support of all political parties, except the Communists.

The response of the Soviet Union to this proposal will be another test of whether the Soviet Union desires in good faith to solve outstanding problems which threaten international peace and which create grave international tension. We hope for a favorable response.

5

93. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AT MOSCOW TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER, OCTOBER 6 1953

18,

1. The United States Government in its customary close consultation with the Governments of the United Kingdom and France, has carefully studied the Soviet Government's reply of September 28 7 to the proposals of the three Western powers for a four-power meeting at Lugano on October 15. The Government of the German Federal Republic and the German authorities in Berlin have also been consulted.

2. A satisfactory settlement of the problems relating to Germany and Austria is clearly essential for any real and lasting relaxation of international tension and is vital to the future of the people of those countries. The United States Government, recalling its earlier notes

1 Note of Sept. 2, 1953; supra.

2 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 14, 1953, pp. 354–356.

3 Documents on German Unity, vol. IV (Bad-Godesberg, 1953), p. 15. Charles E. Bohlen.

5 Vyacheslav M. Molotov.

Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 26, 1953, pp. 547-548. The British and French Ambassadors delivered similar notes.

7 Ibid., pp. 548-550.

of July 151 and September 2,2 is firmly of the opinion that real progress towards a solution of major international questions, including the problem of European security, can be made by frank discussions on Germany and Austria at a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K. and France and not by embarking upon a further exchange of notes. The U.S. Government trusts that the Soviet note reflects a willingness promptly to discuss these subjects. 3. Such a meeting will enable the Soviet Government to state its views on any aspect of the German and Austrian questions which it may wish to present. For its part, the U.S. Government welcomes the opportunity to put forward its views concerning questions dealt with in its previous notes.

4. As regards the Soviet proposal that the Austrian question be discussed in the ordinary diplomatic way, it is the view of the U.S. Government that diplomatic channels are always available and this. government will continue to give its most careful consideration to any Soviet proposal regarding the treaty which may be thus submitted. However, as no progress has been made through such channels during the past few years, the United States Government is of the opinion that discussion by the four Foreign Ministers themselves represents the most practicable way to end the present stalemate and reach agreement on a treaty.

5. A solution of the German and Austrian questions is long overdue. The Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom and France, conscious of the special responsibilities which their governments together with the Soviet Government share in regard to Germany and Austria, therefore, desire to consider these questions together with the Soviet Foreign Minister as soon as possible. Since the date of October 15 originally suggested has now passed, the United States Government proposes that the Foreign Ministers should meet at Lugano on November 9. They sincerely hope that the Soviet Government will agree to participate.

6. The Soviet note also proposes an additional five power conference to consider measures to lessen tension in international relations. The United States Government is always ready and willing to discuss the underlying causes of such tension with a view to their removal. But it wishes to do so under conditions which offer reasonable prospects for positive results and assure that the views of the directly interested governments are properly represented. Accordingly, the United States Government has already agreed to the political conference on Korea in the form proposed by the Communist side in the Korean armistice negotiations and recommended in the armistice agreement, and by the United Nations General Assembly. It has been proposed that discussions shall take place at Panmunjom on arrangements for the conference. All the five governments mentioned in the Soviet note could be represented at this conference which it is hoped will meet at an early date. Its object is precisely to remove one of the

major sources of tension in the Far East, thus opening the way for an early peaceful settlement of other international problems now existing in this part of the world. Other matters mentioned in the Soviet note, such as the disarmament question, are under either current or projected discussion in the United Nations General Assembly. Indeed, several of the subjects mentioned in the Soviet note were recently inscribed on the agenda of the current General Assembly' at the request of the Soviet Union. In addition, the United States Government remains ready to discuss through ordinary diplomatic channels any points which any government may wish to raise.

7. Thus, on these various questions, the way is open for progress. If in addition a fruitful discussion can now take place at Lugano, the way would be paved for discussion of other major questions and for restoring the necessary conditions for peaceful and friendly relations among nations.

94. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AT MOSCOW 2 TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER,3 NOVEMBER 16, 1953 +

In close consultation with the Governments of France and the United Kingdom, the United States Government has carefully studied the Soviet Government's note of November 3 5 in reply to the note of October 18 in which the U.S. Government proposed that the four Ministers of Foreign Affairs should meet at Lugano on November 9. The Government of the German Federal Republic and the German authorities in Berlin have also been consulted.

The U.S. Government notes with regret that the Soviet Government has for the third time within the past four months ignored its invitation to discuss the most urgent international problems. The U.S. Government is still of the opinion that the best way of reducing international tension is to persevere in constructive efforts for the progressive solution of outstanding problems, starting with those which most urgently require an early settlement. With this in mind, the United States Government proposed a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers in order to reach agreement on Germany, especially on its reunification in freedom, and on the Austrian State Treaty. In the same spirit, it is continuing its efforts to enable the political conference on Korea to take place."

To judge from its note of November 3, the Soviet Government contemplates a meeting of the Foreign Ministers, "with the participation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese People's

1 i. e., the Eighth Session of the General Assembly.

2 Elim O'Shaughnessy.

Vyacheslav M. Molotov.

Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 30, 1953, p. 745. The British and French representatives delivered similar notes on the same day.

5 Ibid., pp. 745-748.

• Supra.

7 See infra, pp. 2685–2693 and 2695-2701.

Republic," of such a different character that it would not only become involved in futile and endless debate, but would also prevent all progress in the settlement of questions which are both urgent and concrete.

The United States Government laid down no conditions in its invitation and made every possible effort to take into account the views of the Soviet Government. But the latter has made a meeting of the Foreign Ministers conditional upon the acceptance of a number of demands. Some of these have no relation to Europe, but must in the Soviet view be met before even the study of European problems could be initiated. Others would entail the abandonment by the U.S., U.K. and France of all their plans to safeguard their own security. A defenseless Western Europe appears to be the price demanded by the Soviet Government for participation in a conference. The Soviet Government must be well aware that such demands are totally unacceptable.

The United States Government can only conclude from the latest Soviet note that the Soviet Government does not wish at the present time to enter into any negotiations which might have positive results. The U.S. Government nevertheless remains determined to seek by all appropriate means agreement on the most urgent question the solution of which is essential to the lessening of international tension. Therefore it leaves open the invitation addressed to the Soviet Government on October 18. The U.S. Government is convinced that negotiations on these vital problems would open the way to broader agreement and would thus improve the chances of re-establishing real peace in the world.

95. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, NOVEMBER 25, 1953 1

In its note of November 3,2 the Soviet Government ignored the U.S. Government's invitation to discuss the Austrian State Treaty at a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers at Lugano. It said that it awaited a reply to its note of August 283 on this subject and confined itself to recalling the suggestion contained in its earlier notes for pursuing this question through diplomatic channels, without however putting forward by this means any proposal on the Austrian problem.

Ten years after the Moscow Declaration* the Austrian people have still not obtained their complete political and economic independence. Wishing to fulfill the promise made in that Declaration and to comply with the U.N. resolution of December 20, 1952,5 the U.S. Gov

1 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 7, 1953, pp. 785-786. Ibid., Nov. 30, 1953, pp. 745-748.

Not printed; see The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. V, No. 35, Oct. 10, 1953, p. 19.

Declaration of Nov. 1, 1943; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 11. • General Assembly Res. 613 (VII); supra, doc 83.

ernment has not relaxed its effort for the conclusion of a treaty. During the present year it has three times proposed that the treaty be discussed by the Deputies,' and since August 28 it has twice suggested that this question be taken up at the proposed conference at Lugano.2

It is all the more surprising that the Soviet Government has not been willing to resume discussions on Austria in that the three Western Governments, in order to meet Soviet wishes, had in their note of August 17 withdrawn the short draft treaty, the sole object of which was to achieve the earliest possible restoration of Austrian freedom and independence. In order to remove any possible misunderstanding, the U.S. Government wishes once more formally to state that this draft is withdrawn.

The U.S. Government believes that nothing stands in the way of the resumption of discussion on the Austrian State Treaty except the attitude of the Soviet Government. The U.S. Government is prepared to study any Soviet proposal which would promote an Austrian settlement and which does not raise extraneous issues. If the Soviet Government does not feel able to participate in the very near future in a conference of the Foreign Ministers, the U.S. Government hopes that it will see no objection to the resumption of the work of the Deputies at a date which the Soviet Government finds convenient. If, however, the Soviet Government would prefer to make proposals through diplomatic channels and, in particular, would give an indication of the basis on which it would be prepared to conclude the treaty, the U.S. Government would give any such proposal prompt and careful consideration.

96. NOTE FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT, JANUARY 12, 1954+

6

With reference to the Austrian Government's note of January 5,5 the Government of the United States has shared for many years the deep desire of the Austrian nation for an early conclusion of a State Treaty. To this end the Government of the United States on July 15, 1953, in proposing a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, the U.S.S.R. and the United States, declared that an Austrian Treaty clearly constitutes an essential element of European settlement which the United States Government regards as a major contribution to peace, and that agreement on such a treaty should be reached finally whenever the four Foreign Ministers might meet. Again in its notes to the Government of the U.S.S.R. on September 2, October 18, November 16, November

1 See American notes of Jan. 12, 1953, Jan. 29, 1953, and Aug. 17, 1953; supra, docs. 84, 85, and 90.

93.

2 See American notes of Sept. 2, 1953, and Oct. 18, 1953; supra, docs. 91 and

3 Draft treaty of Mar. 13, 1952; supra, doc. 80. Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 25, 1954, p. 111.

5 Ibid.

0 Supra, doc. 89.