Europe in the wake of the Red armies, it does not require much wit to see what that means. It means that anyone who dares to express the slightest doubt concerning communism is automatically deemed a Fascist or a militarist or a monopolist. If this system were to be applied to Western Germany, no organization opposing the Communists or the policies of the Soviet Communists, which are the same thing, would be permitted to take part in the elections. It would only be the Communist Party and the Communist front organizations which under Mr. Molotov's plan would participate in the elections. I have no doubt that the Soviet Foreign Minister would protest that his plan does not really involve the sovietization of Western Germany. I recall that, in the October 1939 speech to which I have already referred, the Soviet Foreign Minister explained that the mutualassistance pacts which he had recently negotiated with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania "no way implies any interference on the part of the Soviet Union. . as some foreign newspapers are trying to make out. . . We declare that all the nonsensical talk about the sovietization of the Baltic countries is only to the interest of our common enemies and of all anti-Soviet provocateurs." 4 ... The memory of what happened within a few months to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and of having seen that same pattern extend to the countries of Eastern Europe by the use of the methods which the Soviet proposal prescribes for Germany, will, I hope, explain some skepticism at the Soviet proposals for restoring freedom to Germany. Mr. Molotov is too intelligent to believe that the people or government of West Germany would accept his proposals or that the three Western Powers would suggest that they do so. The Western German Bundestag, representing 70 percent of the entire German people, has unanimously refused to accept the East German regime as having any legitimate status or right to speak for the people of East Germany. One can only conclude that the Soviet Foreign Minister does not submit his proposal with any expectation that it might be acceptable. His purpose is quite different. He is actually attempting to hold on to the Soviet position in East Germany by preventing free elections. We can well understand the dread with which Soviet leaders view any prospect of really free elections in East Germany, elections of the kind set out in the proposals which have been presented and supported by the three Western Powers. Those proposals call for "freedom of movement throughout Germany"; "freedom of presentation of candidates"; "immunity of candidates"; "freedom from arbitrary arrests or victimization"; "freedom of association and political meetings"; "freedom of expression for all"; "freedom of the press, radio 1 Speech of Oct. 31, 1939; Soviet Peace Policy: Four Speeches by V. Molotov (London, 1941), pp. 27-46. 2 Pact of Sept. 28, 1939; League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 198, pp. 223–229. Pact of Oct. 5, 1939; ibid., pp. 381-387. Pact of Oct. 10, 1939; Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 16, 1939, pp. 705-707. and television and free circulation of newspapers, periodicals, etc."; "secrecy of the vote"; "security of polling stations and ballot boxes.' Thus, could anyone doubt the effect of elections of that kind on the future of the East German regime? Clearly the Soviet proposal is a maneuver designed to protect this puppet regime in Eastern Germany from being subjected to the test of what the 18 million people who live there would say if they were ever given the right to say it. The four of us came together 2 weeks ago for the first time in 5 years. We met before the whole world, a world to whom a certain promise was implicit in our meeting. That promise was that world tensions should somehow be eased by the good will and common sense of the participants. The three of us accepted the Soviet proposal that we should meet in Berlin, a city which symbolizes the division of Germany. We hoped that solutions could be found here for the problem of German unity. So far at this Conference, Mr. Molotov has adopted a different approach. First, he devoted his efforts to delaying, for as long as possible, our discussion of German unity. Now, his proposal shows that he has no intention of seriously seeking German unity with freedom. I would say to Mr. Molotov that it is late, but not too late to redeem the promise of Berlin. 100. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE, FEBRUARY 10, 1954 (Excerpts) 2 Since Mr. Molotov has been kind enough to say that the United States can be an "observer," I thought it would be in order to make some observations on his plan. The proposals submitted are in two parts, one of which deals primarily with Germany 3 and the other of which represents the draft of a proposed European treaty on collective security.* The paper with reference to Germany contains the statement: "that we shall continue our efforts to seek a settlement of the German problem," and that, of course, the United States is disposed to do. Then the paper in its paragraph 2 goes on to repeat the proposal which has heretofore been made a number of times by the Soviet Union with reference to the withdrawal of so-called occupation forces from East and West Germany. [Discussion concerning translation.] 1 The last previous meeting of the four Foreign Ministers was held in Paris, May 23-June 21, 1949; see A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 110-112. Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18, 1954 (Department of State publication 5399; 1954), pp. 162-164. 4 Proposal of Feb. 10, 1954; ibid., pp. 230-231. Proposal of Feb. 10, 1954; ibid., pp. 231-232. It makes it relevant, therefore, only for me to repeat what has been said before by me and others around this table: that the proposal would leave West Germany and consequently much of Western Europe exposed to any threat of external aggression. The second paper is the text of a proposed general European treaty on collective security in Europe. Since the United States would presumably not be a part of that treaty, my observations are not directed primarily to the actual text of the treaty, although there are certain implications in it which do affect the United States. It is perhaps implicit in the draft, although not entirely clear, that it is designed to replace the North Atlantic Treaty. I assume that from the provisions of article 7 and perhaps 10 and the fact that the Soviet Foreign Minister, in introducing his text, made a serious attack upon the North Atlantic Pact as resembling in many ways "the AntiComintern Pact which led to the unleashing of the Second World War." He went on to say that "there are no reasons to doubt that the fate of the North Atlantic Pact shall be any better than that of the Anti-Comintern Pact."2 So I presume, although the Soviet Foreign Minister can correct me if I am wrong, that his proposed treaty for European collective security would be in reality a replacement of the North Atlantic Treaty. The United States certainly cannot take offense at the suggestion of the Soviet Foreign Minister that the European countries should get together for their own collective security without the participation of the United States. The United States, I think, has never intruded itself as an unwanted participant in European affairs, and we do not have any intentions of doing so in the future. The American people have a very deep and legitimate interest in Europe. Most of us derive from Western Europe. We share the culture and traditions and religion of Western Europe, and there are many bonds which tie us very closely together. But we do not feel that on that account we have any right to demand participation in European affairs. The United States sent its armed forces to Europe in the First World War when the West was threatened by German militarism under the Kaiser. We delayed somewhat in doing so. But at the urgent appeal and desire of the threatened peoples of Western Europe, and because our own interests became involved, we did participate and certainly contributed to the final defeat of the German militarists represented by the Kaiser. And When that war was over, we took our troops home at once. then the same story was repeated under Hitler in the Second World War, and again, after some delay and when the danger, not only to Western Europe but also to the Soviet Union, was immense and when we ourselves seemed threatened, we made a gigantic effort of putting troops and supplies in Europe to help to save Europe from the renewed militarism of Germany. 1 Protocol of Nov. 6, 1937; Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941, vol. II, pp. 159–160. 2 Statement of Feb. 10, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 159-161. And after the Second World War we withdrew all our forces from Europe, except a relatively small number who were required for occupation purposes in Germany. Now, for the third time in this century we have sent forces back to Europe and again the reason was that there were many in Europe who were afraid and who asked us to do so. That fear is, I imagine, a fear which cannot be allayed by new words and new promises, because the fear was inspired by a country which was already bound by the United Nations Charter not to use force against the territorial integrity or independence of any state. Whether that fear will be allayed by any repetition of that pledge is not for me to decide. It has been suggested that our participation in the present defense of West Europe to which I now refer caused the division of Europe. That is one of these strange reversals of history-the upside-down talk-to which unfortunately we have had to accommodate ourselves. Everyone knows that the division of Europe was created before the action to which I refer and that our action was taken only because of the division of Europe. It cannot, I think, be forgotten that, when the United States proposed the Marshall plan,' which involved the contributions of many billions of dollars to the rehabilitation of Europe, that plan was initially made available to all of the European states. It was at that juncture that the Soviet satellites, under the direction of the Soviet Union, were not permitted to share in that plan. Perhaps if that plan had been carried out in its original scope, it would have prevented the division of Europe or at least mitigated the division of Europewhich unfortunately was intensified by the Soviet action. The division of Europe, I am afraid, comes from causes which considerably antedate the organization of the North Atlantic Treaty 2 and the proposed European Defense Community. It goes back to the date when the Soviet control, initially confined to the Soviet Union. itself, was extended to a vast area which now includes one-third of the human race. 5 6 I recall the pacts of mutual assistance which the Soviet Union made in 1939 with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania which the Soviet Foreign Minister at the time described in language which is almost exactly the same as the second preamble of the proposed new European treaty. The pacts with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Mr. Molotov said on October 31, 1939, "strictly stipulate the inviolability of the sovereignty of signatory states and the principle of non-interference in each others affairs.” 7 The second preamble to which I refer speaks of the "respect for 1 See A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1268-1328. ? Treaty of Apr. 4, 1949; see supra, pp. 812-815. See treaty of May 27, 1952; supra, pp. 1107-1150. Pact of Sept. 28, 1939; League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 198, pp. 223-229. Pact of Oct. 10, 1939; Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 16, 1939, pp. 705–707. 415900-57-vol. 2- -14 the independence and sovereignty of States and noninterference in their internal affairs." What quickly happened to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania has gone on and on and has, I suggest, created the division to which the Soviet Foreign Minister refers. It is a division between those who have been absorbed and the others who do not want to be absorbed. Whether or not the Soviet proposal of today will obliterate that division in Europe is, as I say, something which is primarily to be considered by other states than the United States. So far as the United States is concerned, we are determined that we will not be absorbed. 101. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE, Yesterday afternoon the Soviet Foreign Minister presented us with a rather peculiar sandwich.2 The top and the bottom of his remarks stressed the necessity for the early conclusion of an Austrian State Treaty, which would reestablish a free and independent Austria. But in between the top and bottom he inserted some poisonous proposals. They meant that the treaty, instead of reestablishing a free and independent Austria, should establish an Austria without freedom and without independence. I earnestly hope that these new proposals will be withdrawn, so that we may in fact conclude an Austrian State Treaty at this very meeting, as promised in 1943.3 The Soviet Foreign Minister's statement completely confirms the view I expressed yesterday that, if we adhere to the present draft of the Austrian State Treaty, there remain only minor differences between us. As the Soviet proposals state, that draft treaty "was in the main agreed among the Four Powers in 1949." Only five articles remain partially unagreed, and I am confident that with good will those articles could quickly be agreed upon. It will not take, as the Soviet Union suggests, 3 months to reach that agreement. It can be reached in 3 days or even less, so that we can in fact conclude the treaty at this Conference in accordance with the proposal made yesterday by the three Western Powers.5 However, the Soviet Union has now introduced new proposals which would totally alter the situation. They would cut the heart out of the proposed treaty and turn the clock back, not to 1949, not to 1947, not even to 1943, but to the darker earlier period when by 1 Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18, 1954 (Department of State publication 5399; 1954), pp. 188–191. 2 Ibid., pp. 180-183; see also the Soviet proposal of Feb. 12, 1954 (ibid., pp. 233-234). 3 See the Declaration on Austria of Nov. 1, 1943; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 11. Statement of Feb. 12, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting 5 See ibid., p. 233. pp. 184-187. |