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Hitler's action Austria seemed hopelessly doomed to be forever the victim of alien occupation.

The Soviet Union proposes to continue military occupation of Austria "pending the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany."

Since the Soviet Union has rejected all proposals for the unification of Germany on the basis of free elections, and by its own latest German proposal treats the division of Germany as a semipermanent condition, the Soviet Austrian proposal would mean an indefinite occupation of Austria. By requiring the withdrawal of all allied troops from Vienna, while retaining Soviet forces in the Soviet Zone, the capital of Austria would thus be left as a defenseless island, surrounded by a sea of Russian soldiers.

That occupation of Austria could never be terminated by any action of her own. It would be wholly within the power of the Soviet Union to prolong the occupation forever merely by perpetuating the division of Germany and blocking an all-German peace treaty.

If the Soviet proposal were adopted, it would pervert the Austrian State Treaty and require its being rewritten from the preamble to the

end.

How could we any longer in the preamble describe the treaty as being one designed to liberate Austria and to make it a free and independent state?

How could we any longer stipulate by article 1 that Austria shall be "reestablished as a sovereign, independent and democratic State"? How could we any longer declare as in article 2 that we "will respect the independence and territorial integrity of Austria"?

Article 33 entitled "Withdrawal of Allied Forces" would be obliterated and have to be replaced by an article entitled "The Indefinite Military Occupation of Austria."

The treaty would thus become not a treaty for the liberation of Austria but a treaty for the subjection of Austria.

A second major and related change in the treaty is proposed by the Soviet Union in terms of subjecting Austria to "neutralization."

A neutral status is an honorable status if it is voluntarily chosen by a nation. Switzerland has chosen to be neutral, and as a neutral she has achieved an honorable place in the family of nations. Under the Austrian State Treaty as heretofore drafted, Austria would be free to choose for itself to be a neutral state like Switzerland. Certainly the United States would fully respect its choice in this respect, as it fully respects the comparable choice of the Swiss Nation.

However, it is one thing for a nation to choose to be neutral. It is another thing to have neutrality forcibly imposed on it by other nations as a perpetual servitude.

A state subjected to such imposed neutralization is not in fact a Sovereign and independent state. Such a demand makes a mockery of the language which the Soviet proposal retains that “Austria shall be reestablished as a sovereign, independent, and democratic state." It is difficult to understand why the Soviet Union, at this moment when an Austrian State Treaty seemed to be on the point of realizaProposal of Feb. 4, 1954; ibid., pp. 228–229.

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tion, should now propose provisions which would basically alter the entire character of the treaty and which would violate the Moscow Declaration on Austria of November 1, 1943, whereby the Three Powers with the subsequent adhesion of France undertook "to see reestablished a free and independent Austria." If the Soviet proposal were accepted, there would be not a free Austria, but an enslaved Austria; not an independent Austria, but a subject Austria.

If this Four Power meeting accepted the Soviet proposal, we would expose ourselves before the world as being morally and politically bankrupt. We would have forfeited all right to the confidence of others in our willingness to fulfill our solemn pledges.

We do not know, we can only suspect, the reasons which prompt the Soviet to make its present proposal. The reasons given are grotesquely inadequate.

It is given as a reason that there is lacking a treaty with Germany whereby Germany undertakes to respect the independence of Austria. It is said that, until that undertaking is given, Äustria must remain occupied.

The Soviet Foreign Minister would have us believe that, during the period when Germany is occupied and totally disarmed-at least in the Western Zones, the danger to Austria from Germany is so great that Austria must be occupied to protect it against that German danger; but that, once Germany is restored to a unified and independent status with a national army of its own, then it will be safe to end the occupation of Austria. Such reasoning will not carry conviction anywhere.

A plausible explanation is the fact that article 22 of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary and article 21 of the Treaty of Peace with Rumania 2 provide that the Soviet Union may maintain its armed forces on the territory of these countries so long as this is needed for the maintenance of the lines of communication of the Soviet Army with the Soviet Zone of occupation in Austria.

I can understand that the Soviet Union fears a withdrawal from Austria which would also require it to withdraw its Red Armies from Hungary and Rumania.

Is it, however, really decent that little Austria should have to continue to be an occupied state so that the Soviet Union will have a pretext for continuing to occupy also Hungary and Rumania? So cynical an attitude will surely shock the conscience of the world.

We have heard from the Soviet Foreign Minister many words condemning "militarism." But everything which he proposes, whether it be in relation to Germany or in relation to Austria, or indirectly in relation to Hungary and Rumania, shows dependence on military power. No considerations of humanity prevail as against naked force.

The Soviet Minister has introduced in his Austrian proposal a proposal for the four of us to consider the question of Trieste.3 That

1 Treaty of Feb. 10, 1947; TIAS 1651 (61 Stat., pt. 2, p. 2065).

2 Treaty of Feb. 10, 1947; TIAS 1649 (61 Stat., pt. 2, p. 1757).

3 Foreign Ministers Meeting ..

..., p. 239.

proposal is unacceptable to the United States. In any event, it has no proper relationship to the Austrian question. I hope that its introduction does not mean that it is the intention of the Soviet Foreign Minister to make a conclusion of a State Treaty with Austria dependent upon the prior solution of all other European questions, so that the first victim of Hitlerite aggression would automatically be the last to be relieved of the consequences of that aggression.

I earnestly plead with the Soviet Foreign Minister to withdraw the two Austrian proposals which he made yesterday, which, as I say, would completely revolutionize not only the text but also the character of the Austrian State Treaty. If he will make that withdrawal, then I have every confidence that the remaining differences, which are very slight, can be composed. Then we could in fact conclude the Austrian State Treaty at this meeting of the Foreign Ministers and crown our efforts here with an honorable success.

102. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
FEBRUARY 15, 1954 (Excerpt) 1

1

I would like first of all to answer the last questions which the Soviet Foreign Minister put. He said, "Do we want collective security in Europe?" The answer to that is, "We want collective security everywhere in the world."

2

We have tried to get that security during the war and postwar years in many different ways.

3

We tried to get it by the Atlantic Charter, to which all of our governments subscribed. I am afraid none of us can feel that the provisions of the Atlantic Charter have been lived up to, provisions which assure the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live and to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been deprived of them.

We tried to get it by the Declaration of Yalta, which provided, among other things, a Declaration on Liberated Europe which provided for the establishment of free governments by free elections throughout Europe.

And then we tried to get it by the U. N. Charter, which requires all of us—and most of the nations of the world-not to use force against the political independence or territorial integrity of other

states.

Why have we not gotten European security and world security out of these documents we have signed? Nothing is wrong in the wording. What has been wrong is, at least in the opinion of some, that other parties to the agreements have not lived up to these agreements, and

1 Ibid., pp. 171-174.

This statement by Mr. Molotov was not printed.

Declaration of Aug. 14, 1941 (A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1-2); see also the United Nations declaration of Jan. 1, 1942 (ibid., p. 2). Protocol of Proceedings of Feb. 11, 1945; ibid., pp. 27–32.

there has followed a great sense of insecurity in the world because of lack of trust and confidence in men's and nations' will to live up to their pledged word.

That is why there has grown up in the world, in addition to the proposed universal system of the United Nations, other regional collective security arrangements exercising what the charter calls "the collective right of self-defense."

These special security arrangements do not have any words that add anything not already in the United Nations Charter. The addition which they provide is that they are agreements between nations which, over long periods of time, have come to trust and have confidence in each other. They provide the element of confidence which unfortunately has not been present on a universal basis.

The Soviet Foreign Minister has asked why, if the 21 American nations had made a Rio pact,2 is it not equally logical that the mysterious "32" nations of Europe should not make a pact.

The Rio Pact, the pact of the Americas, is not just a regional pact. It is a pact which, as the treaty itself provides, contains this declaration:

"Peace is founded on justice and moral order and . . . the protection of human rights and freedoms."

These are not mere words in the case of the pact of the Americas. That is an expression of reality which has been demonstrated by close association for 150 years. And the ingredient which makes the Rio Pact a dependable reality is the fact of confidence which is based upon 150 years of peaceful association.

And so it is that groups of countries have sought to augment the words of the United Nations Charter with the essential element of confidence based upon long historic association.

That is true of the British Commonwealth of Nations. It is true of the nations which are bound together by the North Atlantic Treaty.3 The North Atlantic Treaty is based upon the expressed determination of their peoples to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.

And those words, again, are not just ink on paper. Those words are the expression of a reality which has been demonstrated over many generations and which are bound not by ink, but by blood which has been shed in protecting that common heritage.

It is suggested that this North Atlantic Treaty is a cause of division. It is clearly evident that history has revealed that the coming into closer association of the Western nations is not a cause of disunity, but is caused by the fear and apprehension which, to an increasing degree, seized hold of these countries as the result of actions which occurred elsewhere.

I recall that this postwar coming together had its first major beginning in the Brussels Pact of March 17, 1948.4 I recall, however, Statement of Feb. 10, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 159-161.

2 Treaty of Sept. 2, 1947; supra, pp. 789-796.

3 Treaty of Apr. 4, 1949; supra, pp. 812-815.

4 Supra, pp. 968-971.

that that was preceded by the Communists' armed efforts to overthrow the lawful government of Greece' and by the forceable coup d'état whereby the Czech Government was overthrown and a Communist government installed in its place.2

Then I recall that there was the blockade of Berlin,3 which brought war very close to Europe.

And it was during that period that the idea of strengthening the Brussels Pact by bringing in the United States, Canada, and other countries first was conceived, and that treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty, was then realized in 1949.

Even then, however, it was not thought to be necessary to implement that treaty with any large military organization.

I recall that I was in the U. S. Senate at the time of the ratification of that treaty, and we did not think it would be necessary actually to implement any large military organization under the Atlantic Treaty.

But then came the armed aggression in Korea, in June 1950, followed by the Chinese Communist aggression of November 1950.* And these events created fear to such a degree that it seemed necessary to build a sufficient strength in Europe to create a respectable balance of power.

General Eisenhower came over at the end of December 1950 to be the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, and under his inspiration there was developed military strength in Europe.

Now that there is at least a reasonable defensible posture in sight, that expense is being leveled off.

I think it would be very difficult for any impartial observer to say that the North Atlantic Treaty or the organizations under it have created the division of Europe. It has been responsive to a division of Europe which already existed and the danger of which was accentuated by such events as I have outlined.

The Soviet Foreign Minister has asked us to study and analyze the precise words and drafting of his project. I must say in all frankness that I am not interested in the words.

I could heap this table high with past words that are just as fine as the human hand and mind can pen. I have referred to some of them this afternoon.

What I ask is, will these words bring with them confidence? The words already exist; they exist in the United Nations Charter. They have existed in many other documents.

The essence is not the words but whether in fact the proposal will bring a confidence which will end the disunity of Europe.

I can say with, I hope, assurance that I will be believed, that there is no international objective which is as dear to the hearts of the American people as real peace and security in Europe. That ought

See A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 753-782.

2See Communist Takeover and Occupation of Czechoslovakia (H. Rept. No. 2684, 83d Cong., 2d sess., Part 14).

See Germany, 1947-1949: The Story in Documents (Department of State publication 3556; 1950), pp. 202-274.

See infra, pp. 2536-2626.

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