to be our wish, because the lack of that has cost us very dearly and very heavily in the past.

I have, however, grown skeptical of the possibility of solving great problems merely by repeating old words or inventing new words. I do not believe, myself, that the division of Europe, which so desperately needs to be cured, can be cured by a formula of words. I believe there are some things which need to be done first.

One of the things that needs to be done is to end the division of Germany.

Here is a problem which is our own particular problem. It lies here on this table; it is symbolized by the city in which we meet. And yet we seem unable to even make that start in ending the division of Europe.

103. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
FEBRUARY 16, 19541

For about 2,000 years now there has been a figure in mythology which symbolizes tragic futility. That was Sisyphus, who, according to the Greek story, was given the task of rolling a great stone up to the top of a hill. Each time when, after great struggle and sweating the stone was just at the brow of the hill, some evil force manifested itself and pushed the stone down. So poor Sisyphus had to start his task over again.

I suspect that for the next 2,000 years the story of Sisyphus will be forgotten, when generation after generation is told the story, the tragic story, of the Austrian State Treaty. Austria was promised its independence 11 years ago. When our forces moved into Austria 9 years ago they announced that they were there only to liberate. Now, year after year has gone by, when we have repeatedly been almost at the point of concluding an Austrian State Treaty, and always some evil force manifests itself and pushes the treaty back again. So we have to start again from the bottom of the hill. That is again the tragedy being repeated here today.

I recall that when we were in Moscow in 1947,2 7 years ago, an Austrian State Treaty was almost concluded as the result of the work which the Deputies had been carrying on in London some 6 months previously, and we thought then that an Austrian State Treaty was in sight.

Again it went down to the bottom of the hill. And the Deputies worked and worked for the succeeding 2 years, and finally again it seemed to be on the point of realization. And at our meeting in Paris

1 Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18, 1954 (Department of State publication 5399; 1954), pp. 203-207.

2 The fourth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers; see Secretary Marshall's report (A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 97-106).

in 1949 it was so near to completion that it seemed that the Deputies could conclude it within a few days.

Then began again the series of efforts, and first one excuse after another one was brought forward-Yugoslavia, Trieste, the Soviet claim for payment for the dried peas, and finally, when no more excuses could be thought of, the Soviet Union suddenly realized that it was wrong to work on the treaty at all through deputies and that it all had been a great mistake that the task had been referred to deputies for some 4 years, and, therefore, the whole task had to be withdrawn from the deputies and had to be negotiated through diplomatic channels.

Now, when we came here with real hope that the Austrian State Treaty could at last be concluded, we were completely taken by surprise to find major new proposals put forward by the Soviet Union. The most serious of those proposals, because it cuts the heart out of the treaty, is that providing for an indefinite perpetuation of armed forces of alien nations on the territory of the Austrian State.

It is suggested that the reason is, or one of the reasons is, the fact that a European Defense Community is proposed.

As I recall, the EDC treaty was signed in May 1952.2 I do not believe that even the Soviet Foreign Minister would claim that the treaty signed in May 1952 explains the failure for the 3 preceding years to conclude an Austrian State Treaty.

And if the European Defense Community Treaty of May 1952 was an obstacle to the removal of Soviet troops from Austria, it is indeed surprising and hardly explained why that was kept such a close secret for 2 years, to be sprung on us here just a day or two ago.

It was indeed a rather cruel performance, if in fact that event of 2 years ago completely undermined the proposed Austrian State Treaty, that no inkling of that should be given during this 2-year period. Indeed, that is so incredible that, in the light of all that has transpired during the past 9 years, we must conclude that all we are faced by is another pretext, another excuse, for not carrying out the solemn pledge which assured that Austria would, as quickly as possible, be given its independence as a sovereign state.

It is not at all clear to me as to what the relationship is of Soviet troops in Austria to the alleged reasons.

It is said that there is evidence of the development toward an Anschluss. And presumably the Soviet troops are to be there to prevent that.

The evidence of movement toward an Anschluss is reported by the Soviet Foreign Minister as being found in certain Austrian periodicals. Well, I wonder, is it to be the function of the Allied troops in Austria to censor the publications of the Austrians, and to be sure that nothing appears in any Austrian periodicals that relates to Anschluss?

We can only surmise as to the functions these troops are to perform.

1 The sixth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers; see the quadripartite communiqué of June 21, 1949 (ibid., pp. 110-112).

Treaty of May 27, 1952; supra, pp. 1107-1150.

But on the basis of the reasons given, it would seem they would have a great role indeed in controlling the thinking, the printing of the news-perhaps the social order of the Austrians' supposedly sovereign state.

What are these troops to do? The Soviet Foreign Minister says they are not occupation troops. They certainly, as I said before, Occupy part of Austria. They are there to stop Anschluss, which, it is said, is rearing its ugly head because it is referred to in publications which, presumably, then these troops would suppress.

And there is some evidence, it is said, that in some business circles, they are thinking of economic ties with Germany. Are these troops to have the responsibility of controlling the economic, the commercial life, of Austria? What are they to do there to stop the Anschluss? All of that is very obscure to me.

Another reason given-and to me that is the most curious of all— is that the United States, it is said, has a hundred bases in Europe. Well, let me say first that none of those bases are under EDC, because there is no EDC.

And furthermore, it strikes me as extremely curious to say that, because the United States has a hundred bases in Europe, therefore it must be compelled to have one more in Austria.

I think that the Soviet Foreign Minister will understand that it is at least excusable if we think, and if much of the world will think, that what is actually under way here is another illustration of the unwillingness of the Soviet Union actually to restore genuine freedom and independence in any area where it has once gotten its grip through the use of its army or otherwise.

The interpretation is forced upon us by the otherwise inexplicable amendments proposed and the lack of any valid justification for them. That is really the tragic aspect of this affair. It throws a somber light upon other problems as well.

The Soviet Foreign Minister referred to the question of the so-called neutralization of Austria and indicated that I had agreed with, or was not strongly opposed to, the Soviet position in that respect. I think that the Soviet Foreign Minister must have misunderstood me or perhaps I did not make my position sufficiently clear.

What I have said, as shown by my notes, is this:

"A neutral status is an honorable status if it is voluntarily chosen by a nation. . . . Under the Austrian State Treaty as heretofore drafted, Austria would be free to choose for herself to be a neutral nation. Certainly, the United States would fully respect Austria's choice in this respect." 1

However, I went on to say that it is one thing for a nation to choose to be neutral, and it is another thing to have neutrality forcibly imposed on it by other nations as a perpetual servitude.

The proposed treaty which the Soviet Union has been considering with us here contains certain articles which the Soviet Union has not

1 Statement of Feb. 13, 1954; supra, doc. 101 (the text is slightly different from Mr. Dulles' notes).

objected to. Article 1 says that "the Allied and Associated Powers recognize that Austria is reestablished as a sovereign, independent and democratic State." The essence of sovereignty is to be able to exclude from your country the armed forces of other nations, if you do not want them; and also the essence of sovereignty is to be able to make dependable alliances with other nations, if you so wish. We believe that Austria should have both of these rights, and it is precisely both of these rights which would be denied by the amendments proposed by the Soviet Union. They would, in effect, nullify the provisions of article 1 which I have read, and would equally nullify the provisions of article 2, which says that the "Allied and Associated Powers ... will respect the independence and the territorial integrity of Austria."

As I have said here, the United States does not itself maintain any armed forces upon the territory of any other sovereign state except at its expressed request and desire, and only as it so desires. We believe that that sound system should be applied to Austria.

We are not disposed to go along with a treaty which imposes upon Austria a fundamental, basic impairment of the sovereign rights which ostensibly, in the first articles of the treaty, we give to Austria, and then, in later articles, we entirely take away.

Thus, the treaty would, in effect, become a fraud, offering sovereignty and territorial integrity by the first and second articles, and taking them away by article 4-bis and article 33.1

I beg that the Soviet Foreign Minister will permit this treaty to be promptly signed, as he professes he would like to have it signed, by allowing the treaty to be a genuine treaty for the sovereignty and independence of Austria.

104. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

FEBRUARY 17, 1954 2

I will comment on the observations made by the Soviet Foreign Minister.3

He supports his proposal for troop withdrawal in East and West Germany on the basis that this would give satisfaction to the German people.

I am sure he can speak with authority as far as the Eastern Zone is concerned; I doubt whether he can speak with the same authority as far as the Western Zone is concerned.

I can say that there has been no intimation of any kind received from the authorities of West Germany, or from the people of West Germany, that they would like to see the withdrawal of troops of the Western Powers which are in Germany.

On the contrary, there is evidence that there would be very con

1 See the Soviet draft texts of these two treaty articles submitted to the conference, Feb. 14, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting . , pp. 239-240.

Ibid., pp. 124-127.

Statement of Feb. 17, 1954; ibid., pp. 123–124.

siderable concern if these troops were withdrawn, given the situation which exists in the East.

Therefore, I am afraid that, while the proposal might give satisfaction in the Eastern Zone, it would not give satisfaction in the Western Zone.

If the Soviet Union is eager to give people satisfaction by troop withdrawals, I would suggest that a good place to begin would be in Austria, where there is no question but what all the people eagerly desire all the troops to be withdrawn. There we are assured of a chance to give satisfaction. The Soviet delegation might give further consideration to that matter and perhaps indicate their acceptance of the Austrian State Treaty when we take that up tomorrow afternoon.

There is, however, a reason more fundamental than any I have indicated so far why the United States does not feel itself able to accept the Soviet proposal which is entitled, "On insuring European security." That is the paper which calls for the final withdrawal of forces.

1

What the Soviet Union asks the Western Powers to do, presumably in the rame of European security, is what we did under very analogous circumstances in Korea immediately preceding 1950. Our withdrawal in that case did not produce security; it produced war.

Korea, like Germany, was divided. Korea, like Germany, was divided under conditions so that roughly two-thirds of Korea was occupied by Western forces and the other third occupied by the nonWestern forces.

The analogy is closer because the indigenous forces in North Korea, like the forces in Eastern Germany, were highly organized and trained, whereas those in Southern Korea and in Western Germany were only police forces.

Mr. Molotov has questioned Mr. Eden's [Mr. Bidault's] statements with reference to the East German military personnel. The United States has very reliable information to reveal that the East German military personnel now total 140,200 men under arms. Of this number 100,000 are in the ground forces with an additional 25,000 serving in security formations. There are seven organized divisions of which three are mechanized. Air forces constitute 60 jet fighters manned and trained by 5,000 effectives. These forces are commanded by ex-officers of the Nazi Wehrmacht and of the SS. They are additional to 100,000 East German police.

I can assure the Soviet Foreign Minister that there is nothing comparable in West Germany.

There are ample means of access to information so that anyone can ascertain that fact readily for himself.

There is in West Germany a total of 150,000 police, none of whom have any more than normal police armament. That number is to be thought of in terms of the population of the Western Zone, which is, of course, many times that of the Eastern Zone.

1 Proposal of Feb. 10, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting

.., pp. 230-231.

2 See Mr. Bidault's statement of Feb. 15, 1954; ibid., pp. 164-170.