The situation in Germany is thus comparable to the situation which existed in Korea prior to 1947. Up to that time the United States had its own armed forces in South Korea; and there was peace. United States took its troops out of South Korea in 1949, and in 1950 there was war.

The

It is not necessary at this point to indulge in argument as to just where the responsibility for that war lay. No one can dispute the two facts: First, that the United States troops were taken out; and, immediately following that, there was war.

Therefore, I am sure that Mr. Molotov will understand, even if he does not agree with, our state of mind, when we say that we are highly skeptical of a proposal put forward in the name of peace which involves our following the same course of action which, under remarkably similar circumstances, in fact led to war.

It is to fly in the face of the teachings of history, and indeed of elemental reasoning, to seek peace by continuing the disunity of a people who are bound together by sentiments of patriotism and by ethnic

unity.

The way to get peace and promote peace in Europe is not simply to think of various devices whereby we can mitigate the dangers of a disunited Germany. We should seek a united Germany.

That is why I regret that in this topic of item 2 the Soviet Union has gotten lost in its great grandiose scheme, piling words upon words, and it has left the central problem, which is the peaceful unification of Germany.

It is not an accident that the three Western Ministers, under this item 2, have concentrated their attention on the problem of Germany and the creation of a united Germany through free elections. It is because we believe that this goes to the heart of the problem of security for Europe.

We are also convinced that a united Germany should be allowed to develop along peaceful lines of its own choosing. A Germany which is coerced, which is told what it cannot do, is a Germany which almost surely will follow the same course that was followed by the Germany which succeeded the Treaty of Versailles. There the restrictions which were imposed were the very thing that enabled the extreme nationalists to come to power.

Therefore, our second point is that Germany must be allowed to pursue her inclinations so long as these are peaceful and compatible with the security of the rest of us. Since, in fact, Germany wishes to associate herself with the Western countries of Europe, it is essential to peace that she be allowed to do so. If she had wished to associate herself with the powers of Eastern Europe, we would not have wanted to force her otherwise. The main point is that we should. not attempt to apply such a coercion to Germans that they will not feel that Germany is an independent sovereign state. In that way,

I repeat, lies great danger.

It is a fact, which all of us who really want peace should eagerly welcome, that certainly the greater part of the Germans want to adopt a course which will end, for at least 50 years, and I believe for all time, a distinctively national army, and equally end the German general staff. The fact that the Germans want to do this gives us a unique opportunity to go to meet them, and to consolidate that present will. That will may not always be with us. If today we reject that will of the German people which goes in the direction of peace, if we try to substitute provisions which will be forcibly imposed upon Germany, if we perpetuate the division of Germany, if we impose limitation and controls of the nature of the Versailles treaty then, I say, we would be accepting a heavy responsibility before history.

105. CONCLUSION OF THE BERLIN CONFERENCE: Communiqué by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, February 18, 1954 (Excerpt)1

The four Ministers have had a full exchange of views on the German question, on the problems of European security, and on the Austrian question. They were unable to reach agreement upon these matters.

106. CONCLUSION OF THE BERLIN CONFERENCE: Communiqué by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, February 19, 1954 2

3

The major problem facing the Berlin conference was that of Germany. The three Western delegations urged that the reunification of Germany should be achieved through free elections, leading to the creation of an all-German Government with which a peace treaty could be concluded. They put forward a practical plan to this end. Their proposals were not accepted by the Soviet delegation, even as a basis for discussion, and they were forced to the conclusion that the Soviet Government is not now ready to permit free allGerman elections, or to abandon its control over Eastern Germany. The three Western Governments will continue their efforts to achieve German reunification in freedom and by peaceful means. In the meantime, they have suggested certain measures which could reduce the effect of the present division of Germany and its consequences for Berlin. They have proposed that the three High Com

1 Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25–February 18, 1954 (Department of State publication 5399; 1954), pp. 217–218.

2 Ibid., pp. 218-219.

See ibid., pp. 223-225.

missioners should study these questions with the Soviet High Commissioner. As regards Berlin, the three Governments reaffirm their abiding interest in the security of the city as expressed in the Tripartite Declaration of May 27, 1952.2 They will do all in their power to improve conditions in Berlin and to promote the economic welfare of the city.

The three Western Ministers did their utmost to secure agreement upon the Austrian State Treaty. They accepted the Soviet version of all the remaining disagreed articles. The Austrian Foreign Minister, who was present at all the discussions on this question, declared himself ready to sign the treaty in this form. The Soviet Foreign Minister, however, insisted upon adding new provisions to the treaty.5 The effect of these would have been to leave foreign troops in Austria for an indefinite period after the entry into force of the treaty, and to impair Austria's right to play her full part in international life. The treaty could therefore not be concluded in Berlin, despite an Austrian offer accepted by the Western Ministers, that troops of the Four Powers should remain in Austria until the 30th of June 1955.6 The three Governments are prepared to continue their efforts to conclude the Austrian State Treaty, but progress depends on the Soviet Union modifying its attitude. Meanwhile, they will continue to seek every means of lightening the burden of occupation on Austria. The three Governments remain ready to take advantage of any further opportunity which may arise to promote, by renewal of the contacts established at Berlin or by other means, a solution of the German and Austrian problems.

The three Ministers explained and reaffirmed the purely defensive character of Western security arrangements..

Offers were made to discuss how the undertakings which already protect the Soviet Union against aggression could be reinforced." The Soviet delegation made no response to these offers. Their own proposals would have involved the dissolution of the Western security system, while the military power of the Soviet bloc in Europe remained intact. The Three Powers do not intend to be deflected from their efforts to develop the system of defense on which their survival depends.

[For the text of Secretary Dulles' report of February 24, 1954, on the Berlin Conference, see supra, pp. 85-90.]

1 See Mr. Eden's statement of Feb. 18, 1954; ibid., pp. 128-130.

2 Supra, pp. 1197-1198.

See Foreign Ministers Meeting.

pp. 234-235.

*See Dr. Figl's statement of Feb. 16, 1954; ibid., pp. 200 202.

See ibid., pp. 239-240.

See Dr. Figl's statement of Feb. 18, 1954; ibid., p. 207.

See M. Bidault's statement of Feb. 15, 1954; ibid., pp. 164–170.

See the two proposals made by the Soviet Union, Feb. 10, 1954; ibid., pp.

230-232.

H. NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY, 1954–1955

107. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, MAY 7, 1954 1

The United States Government has consulted the British and French Governments and the other interested governments, and in particular those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, on those aspects of the problem of European security which were fully discussed by the four Foreign Ministers at Berlin and to which the Soviet Government again drew attention in its note of March 31.2

The United States Government has long been striving for the universal reduction of armaments, to include the prohibition of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction and the control of atomic energy. In the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, the United Nations Commission on Conventional Armaments, and subsequently in the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the United States Government has worked to secure international agreement on disarmament and to put an end to the competition in armaments which is imposing such a burden upon the peoples of the world. Such agreement can only be reached by progressive and balanced disarmament with effective safeguards which would remove the dangers of aggression from any quarter. The United States Government is determined to do everything in its power to bring to a successful conclusion the conversations started as a result of President Eisenhower's initiative as well as the disarmament negotiations which will shortly begin again in the United Nations. It hopes that the Soviet Government will make a constructive contribution to the solution of these problems.

3

5

If these negotiations are to succeed, a sense of security and confidence must first be established. It is in this light that the United States Government has again carefully studied the Soviet proposals on European security first put forward in Berlin and now repeated in the Soviet Government's note. In these the Soviet Government does not attempt to remove the actual causes of European tension. Instead it proposes a new collective security treaty which is avowedly based on the neutralization and continued division of Germany while leaving unchanged the Soviet Government's close political, economic and military control over the countries of Eastern Europe. This can only prolong insecurity and division in Europe. These proposals,

1 Department of State Bulletin, May 17, 1954, pp. 756-757. 2 Ibid., pp, 757-759.

3 See President Eisenhower's address of Dec. 8, 1953, infra, pp. 2798-2805. See infra, pp. 2810-2823.

5 Proposals of Feb. 10, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18, 1954 (Department of State publication 5399; 1954), pp. 230-232.

even when amended to permit United States participation, do not provide any foundation for genuine security.

The addition to the United Nations of such an organization as that proposed by the Soviet Government, embracing the Soviet Union, the United States and all European countries would contribute nothing to what is already a world-wide security organization. It would not only be useless but also dangerous because it would inevitably tend to destroy the authority of the United Nations. The United States Government cannot therefore accept the Soviet proposal. Collective security would best be safeguarded if the Soviet Government would permit the United Nations to function as the Charter intended.

The Soviet Government has also suggested that its proposed Collective Security Pact should be accompanied by an extension of the Atlantic Pact through the adherence of the Soviet Union to the North Atlantic Treaty. It is unnecessary to emphasize the completely unreal character of such a suggestion. It is contrary to the very principles on which the defense system and the security of the Western Nations depend. These nations have bound themselves by close ties of mutual confidence. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is much more than a purely military arrangement, is founded on the principle of individual liberty and the rule of law. The means of defense of its members have been pooled to provide collectively the security which they cannot attain individually, in the face of the military preponderance which the Soviet Union has attained in Europe since 1945 and of the westward expansion of a political, economic and military system subject to its sole control. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is wholly defensive. There is free and full exchange of information between all its members. All its decisions are taken by unanimous consent. The Soviet Union as a member of the organization would therefore be in a position to veto every decision. None of the member states is prepared to allow their joint defense system to be disrupted in this way.

European and world security will not be promoted by the disruption of defensive associations of like-minded states and the substitution of new illusory security organizations. The United States Government remains convinced that the only way to remove the sense of insecurity which weighs on the world is through step-by-step solutions of individual problems. It does not believe that a lasting settlement can be achieved by erecting a new façade of security behind which the fundamental difficulties and divisions remain unchanged.

With these thoughts in mind, the Western Powers at Berlin advocated a plan which would have constituted a first step towards the solution of the German problem.2 The Soviet Government would not even discuss this plan. The Western Powers also put forward proposals designed to reinforce the security of Europe on the basis of

Treaty of Apr. 4, 1949, as amended by protocol of Oct. 17, 1951; supra, pp. 812-815, 853-854.

See the "Eden plan" of Jan. 29, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, pp. 223-225.

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