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existing agreements. The Soviet Government refused also to consider these proposals. The Western Powers offered to accept the Soviet text of every unagreed article of the Austrian State Treaty.2 But the Soviet Government, far from agreeing to sign on its own terms, attached new and unacceptable conditions which would have totally changed the treaty from one of freedom and independence to one of indefinite occupation by foreign troops.

The Soviet Government has repeated the criticisms it made at Berlin about plans for a European Defense Community. The United States Government has already stated its views on this subject. It is quite untrue to suggest that the present plans which are of limited scope are responsible for the division of Europe or aggravate the risk of war. The division of Europe was brought about by the Soviet Government, and its refusal to contemplate the reunification of Germany on the basis of free elections is one of the elements that serves to perpetuate this division. In these circumstances the Federal Republic of Germany cannot be allowed to remain without any means of defense when the Eastern Zone of Germany, as its leaders openly acknowledge, possesses substantial armed forces. The United States Government considers that the best and safest way for all concerned to solve the problem of a German contribution to defense is within the framework of an association which by its very nature would prevent Germany from taking any individual armed action.

The United States Government remains convinced of the urgent need to improve relations between states and to ensure mutual security. It suggests that progress could best be made toward the elimination of the sources of international tension if the Soviet Government would give concrete evidence of its good intentions by joining with the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States in (1) finding a speedy settlement of the Austrian question that will restore to Austria its full sovereignty and independence; (2) seeking a lasting and acceptable solution of the German problem; (3) reaching early agreement on general, progressive, balanced, and supervised disarmament: such agreement should specifically include the prohibition of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction and the control of atomic energy under adequate safeguard; (4) working for solutions of the most pressing problems in the Far East at the Geneva conference; (5) conforming their behavior in the United Nations to the principles of the Charter and so enabling the United Nations to fulfill its true role as an effective organization for collective security.

1 See Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, pp. 152, 168-169. See the United States proposal of Feb. 14, 1954; ibid., pp. 234-235.

Mr. Molotov's statements of Feb. 1 and 3, 1954; ibid., pp. 134-138, 142-146.

108. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, SEPTEMBER 10, 19541

The United States Government, in consultation with the British and French Governments, with the other NATO Governments and also with the Austrian and German Federal Governments, has studied with close attention the Soviet Government's note of July 24 2 and its oral communication of August 4.3

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In these communications the Soviet Government has repeated its proposals which were fully discussed at the Berlin Conference. The United States Government attaches great importance to European security but it cannot be usefully discussed unless the fundamental interests of all the parties concerned are safeguarded. Security in Europe cannot be brought about by the signature of a general treaty of the kind proposed by the Soviet Government. It will only result from the solution of concrete problems, of which the most pressing are those of Germany and Austria.

The United States Government notes that the Soviet Government has again alleged that NATO constitutes an "aggressive military grouping". The aims of NATO are purely defensive and are in entire conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. It was set up to enable the western democracies to defend themselves against the threat created by the establishment since 1945 of a heavily armed Soviet grouping in Eastern Europe. It now forms a free association of like-minded states, with other than purely military ties. There can be no question either of modifying or abandoning this conception.

The association of the German Federal Republic with other peaceloving states of Western Europe in a defensive system, long after the rearming of Eastern Germany, far from constituting a threat to European security, is intended to prevent any nation from having independent recourse to the threat or use of force. This is the best guarantee for the security of all Germany's neighbors, of Germany herself and of Europe as a whole.

Neither in its note of July 24 nor in its oral communication of August 4 has the Soviet Government made any new proposals for a solution of the German problem. Under the proposed Soviet security treaty the present division of Germany would be maintained contrary to the profound desire of the German people. The U.S. Government, on the other hand, believes that Germany must be re-united in freedom at the earliest possible moment and that this can only be achieved by holding free elections throughout Germany under international supervision. The U.S. Government remains prepared to negotiate. on the basis of the practical plan put forward by the three Western Powers at the Berlin Conference for the early holding of elections.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 20, 1954, pp. 397–398. The British and French Governments sent similar notes.

Ibid., pp. 398–401.

Ibid., p. 402.

* See supra, docs. 97-106.

The simplest step towards the promotion of European security remains, however, an early settlement of the Austrian question. In this connection the U.S. Government must once again express the view that conclusion of an Austrian treaty should not, as proposed by the Soviet Government, be dependent upon an all-European settlement, upon a German peace treaty, or upon any other matter extraneous to the Austrian treaty. At Berlin the U.S. Government offered, contingent upon prompt Soviet acceptance, to accept the Soviet text of all the previously unagreed articles in the Austrian state treaty. The U.S. Government is prepared to renew that offer now. If the Soviet Government will sign the treaty in these terms, agreement could thus be reached at once to restore to Austria the freedom and independence which have been promised to her since 1943.

Agreement on the question of disarmament would undoubtedly help to create the necessary atmosphere in which the problem of European security could usefully be discussed. The U.S. Government seeks the abolition of the use, possession and manufacture of all atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction, within a system which would include provisions for simultaneous and major reductions in conventional armaments and armed forces to levels to be agreed, the whole program to be carried out in accordance with an agreed timetable and under effective supervision and control. During the recent discussions in the U.N. subcommittee, the U.S. Government put forward proposals which could have led to progress.2 Although the Soviet Government was not then willing to consider these proposals, the U.S. Government will continue to seek an acceptable and effective agreement and hope that the Soviet Government will contribute to this end.

These are the problems to which practical agreed solutions must be found if there is to be genuine security in Europe. Further international discussion of them would only be useful if there is a better prospect of finding solutions than was revealed in the exhaustive discussions at the Berlin Conference or than is now revealed in the latest Soviet communications. The U.S. Government remains determined to do all in its power to make progress on these problems. It hopes that the Soviet Government will contribute to such progress by: (A) signing the Austrian state treaty with the Soviet text of the previously unagreed articles, an offer made at the Berlin Conference by the United States, United Kingdom, France and Austria which the United States Government now renews; (B) agreeing to free elections on the basis proposed by the United States Government at Berlin as the essential first step towards German reunification in freedom. If progress could be made in this way, the United States Government would then be prepared to agree to the convocation of a meeting of the foreign ministers of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to complete the action on these problems and then to consider the remaining

1 See Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18, 1954 (Department of State publication 5399; 1954), pp. 234-235.

2 See infra, pp. 2810-2817.

aspects of European security. The United States Government also sincerely hopes that the disarmament discussions in the U.N. can be brought to a successful conclusion.

109. SUMMARY OF AUSTRIAN TREATY NEGOTIATIONS, DECEMBER 20, 1952-NOVEMBER 19, 1954: Report by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, November 19, 19541

On 20 December 1952,2 the General Assembly of the United Nations, at its 409th plenary meeting, recalling the terms of the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943,3 whereby the Governments of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (joined later by France) recognized that Austria should be re-established as a free and independent State, expressed its concern that negotiations towards the conclusion of an Austrian Treaty which had been under way since 1947 had failed to bring about the proposed objective. The Assembly, therefore, addressed an earnest appeal to the Governments concerned to make a renewed and urgent effort to reach agreement on the terms of an Austrian Treaty with a view to an early termination of the occupation of Austria and the full exercise by Austria of the powers inherent in its sovereignty. The General Assembly also expressed its hope that the solution of this problem would "constitute an important step towards the elimination of other areas of disagreement and therefore towards the creation of conditions favourable to the accomplishment of world peace."

2. The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France have been working constantly since 1946 to obtain an acceptable Austrian State Treaty. They consider that the time has now come to report to the General Assembly on the results of the efforts made since 1952 to implement the Assembly's resolution. 3. In January 1953 the three Governments, in notes addressed to the Soviet Government, welcomed the Assembly's resolution and proposed that a meeting of the Austrian Treaty Deputies be held at an early date, for the purpose of concluding an Austrian Treaty. The reply of the Soviet Government, dated 27 January 1953, stated that the "Soviet Government considers it necessary to call attention to the fact that both the raising of the Austrian question in the United Nations as well as the resolution adopted on this question are illegal." They added that they were prepared to take part in a meeting of

1 U.N. doc. A/2798, Nov. 22, 1954.

General Assembly Res. 613 (VII); supra, doc. 83.

A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 11.

'French adherence took place Nov. 16, 1943; Recueil de textes à l'usage des conférences de la paix (Paris, 1946), p. 123.

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See American note of Jan. 12, 1953; supra, doc. 84.

Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 16, 1953, pp. 260–261.

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representatives of the four Powers on the Austrian question, provided that the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France were prepared to withdraw their proposal for an "abbreviated Treaty" and to negotiate on the basis of the draft State Treaty which had been the subject of the earlier abortive discussions. The three Governments felt it inappropriate to impose prior conditions, as proposed by the Soviet Government, regarding the scope of the new discussions. Nevertheless the three Governments reiterated their readiness to discuss any proposition which would lead to the end of the occupation. The Soviet Government continued at meetings of the Deputies on 6 and 9 February 1953, to insist on the preconditions previously stipulated and declined to negotiate on substance. They declined an invitation to a meeting of the Treaty Deputies on 27 May 1953 on the pretext that such a meeting (of which over 260 had already been held) could be called only by the Council of Foreign Ministers.2 The three Western Deputies denied this and reiterated that they were prepared to accept any treaty in terms which would ensure Austria's political and economic independence. On 11 June 1953, the three Governments then asked the USSR to state what kind of an Austrian settlement it was prepared to conclude. The Soviet Government ignored this request and again limited itself to a demand for withdrawal of the "abbreviated Treaty". The Soviet Government also, in notes addressed to the three Governments on 4 August," stated that "a possible successful solution of the German problem could also facilitate the solution of the Austrian question," thus apparently suggesting that hope of an Austrian Treaty must be deferred until other unrelated conditions had been met, a proposition which the three Governments were bound to oppose. On 17 August they invited the USSR to attend a meeting of the Treaty Deputies, scheduled for 31 August, and declared their preparedness not to introduce the abbreviated Treaty for consideration on the understanding that no extraneous issues would be raised. The Soviet Government chose not to attend this meeting. In late November 1953 the three Powers made yet another attempt to persuade the Soviet Government to join a discussion of the Austrian problem, offering to do so in a Foreign Ministers conference, or in a Deputies meeting, or, if the Soviet Government should prefer, to give prompt and careful consideration to any Soviet

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It will be recalled that in 1952 the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, finding the Soviet Government unwilling to complete the work carried out on the Austrian State Treaty since 1947, submitted a very brief draft treaty which eliminated the unsettled questions of the longer version, and yet included all the essential elements needed to restore Austria's independence. [Footnote in the original.] For the text of the short draft treaty of Mar. 13, 1952, see supra, doc. 80.

2 See the Soviet note of May 25, 1953; Department of State Bulletin, June 8, 1953, p. 815.

3 See the tripartite note of May 26, 1953; supra, doc. 87.

Supra, doc. 88.

5 See Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 14, 1953, pp. 352–353.

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Supra, doc. 90.

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