proposals made through diplomatic channels. This invitation remained unanswered.1

4. It was not until the meeting of the four Foreign Ministers in Berlin, between 25 January and 18 February 1954, that negotiations were resumed on the Austrian Treaty. The Austrian Foreign Minister participated in these discussions. He declared Austria's readiness to pay, if necessary to achieve freedom, the price imposed by the Treaty, including surrender to the Soviet Union of most of Austria's petroleum resources in addition to other assets. He appealed, however, for alleviation of the burdens of the Treaty, especially of article 35, and particularly asked that Austria should be allowed to pay the Soviet Union $150 million in goods instead of cash.3

5. The Soviet Foreign Minister granted this latter request but at once made fresh stipulations. The main ones were:

(I) That the withdrawal of occupation troops stationed on the territory of the respective Zones of Austria should be postponed pending the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Germany. (At the same time, it was proposed that all Allied troops should be withdrawn from Vienna).

(II) That Austria should undertake not to enter into any coalition or military alliance directed against any Power which participated with its armed forces in the war against Germany and in the liberation of Austria."

6. The Austrian Government and the three Governments objected. to the proposals of the Soviet Government, which would make the conclusion of an Austrian Treaty dependent on the unconnected problem of a settlement in Germany and impose the burden of continued foreign occupation on the Austrian people for an indefinite future. They also pointed out that the second proposal contained conditions which had both military and non-military implications and should not be imposed on any sovereign State. They considered that Austria should be free to decide her own international relations in accordance with the United Nations Charter. The Austrian Government gave assurances during the Conference that Austria would not enter into any military alliance but also emphasized that they could not accept, as a condition of reaching agreement upon the State Treaty, that occupation troops should remain in Austria until the signing of a German Peace Treaty.

7. In an effort to obtain agreement, the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France expressed their

1 See the American note of Nov. 25, 1953; supra, doc. 95. See supra, docs. 97-106.

See Dr. Figl's statement of Feb. 12, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18, 1954 (Department of State publication 5399; 1954), pp. 175–178.

See Mr. Molotov's statement of Feb. 12, 1954 (ibid., pp. 180-183) and his proposal of the same date (ibid., pp. 233–234).

willingness to conclude the Treaty by accepting the versions of the unagreed articles supported by the USSR up to that time.1

8. The Austrian Government, as a final concession, offered, if it were agreed by the four Governments, to accept an extension of the period for the withdrawal of occupation forces from Austria provided that that extension was for a definite period and that such a concession would enable the Treaty to be concluded. They suggested that the date of withdrawal should be fixed at the latest at 30 June 1955.2

9. The Soviet Government proved unwilling to accept any of these proposals. Accordingly, no Treaty could be concluded during the Berlin Conference. The three Governments, however, made clear their willingness to resume negotiations as soon as the Soviet Government were prepared to agree to the restoration of Austrian sovereignty and independence, which would of necessity include the withdrawal of all foreign troops.

10. Exchanges of correspondence since the Berlin Conference have failed to indicate any change thus far in the Soviet attitude which would permit the withdrawal of all occupation forces and conclusion of a Treaty. In a note of 7 May 1954, to the Soviet Government the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France again urged conclusion of an Austrian Treaty as a means of eliminating sources of international tensions.3 The Soviet Government, in a note of 12 August addressed to the Austrian Government, rejected the latter's proposal for a five-Power committee to consider alleviating Austria's occupation burdens. The Soviet Government instead suggested convocation of a committee to examine the unresolved questions pertaining to the Austrian Treaty and other related questions, but again referred to the Soviet proposals made at the Berlin Conference and failed to indicate a willingness to withdraw its troops from Austria, a fundamental requirement for the restoration of Austria's freedom and independence. On 10 September the three Western Powers sent a further note to the USSR in which they renewed their offer made at Berlin in February to conclude the Treaty by accepting the versions of the unagreed articles supported by the USSR up to that time. The Austrian Government, in replying on 12 October to the Soviet note of 12 August, said that it was prepared to participate in new treaty discussion but pointed out that the withdrawal of all occupation forces would be requisite to the conclusion of a Treaty." 11. The Soviet Government, in notes addressed to the Western Powers on 23 October, ignored the offer contained in the Western notes of 10 September to sign the Austrian Treaty but instead referred to the same proposal made in its note of 12 August to the Austrian Government for a conference of Ambassadors in Vienna for "ex1 See the American proposal of Feb. 14, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting, Berlin Discussions, pp. 234 ff.

7

2 See Dr. Figl's statement of Feb. 18, 1954; ibid., p. 207.

3 Supra, doc. 107.

See Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954 (New York, 1955), p. 239. 5 Supra, doc. 108.

The Austrian note of Oct. 12, 1954, has not been printed. "Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 13, 1954, pp. 902-905.

amination of questions connected with the conclusion of a State Treaty". These new notes also contained no indication of the Soviet Government's willingness to withdraw its occupation troops from Austria which, as previously stressed by the Austrian Government and the three Western Powers, is requisite to conclusion of an Austrian Treaty.

12. The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France deeply regret that their efforts to conclude a Treaty and to grant Austria its freedom and independence in compliance with the United Nations General Assembly resolution have been unavailing. The three Governments will continue to seek means whereby Austrian independence may be re-established and will continue to press for the earliest possible conclusion of a just and acceptable State Treaty. Further progress depends upon the attitude of the Soviet Government.

110. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, NOVEMBER 29, 1954 1

The United States Government, in consultation with the French and British Governments, with the other NATO Governments and with the German Federal Government, has considered the note of October 23 in which the Soviet Government proposed a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the four powers in November. They have at the same time, in consultation with the interested governments, considered the Soviet Government's note of November 13 proposing a conference "on the question of creating a system of collective security in Europe." 3

The United States Government is disappointed to find that, except for a suggestion for the hurried convocation of a European conference on November 29, neither of the Soviet notes contains any new proposal, whether on Germany, Austria or European security, which has not already been considered by the Western powers at the Berlin Conference.

The Soviet note of November 13 is openly and explicitly aimed at delaying or preventing the ratification of the Paris agreements. The United States Government for its part is resolved to bring the Paris agreements into force as soon as possible and they do not intend to be deflected from this course. The United States Government does. not believe that the cause of European security can be served by the destruction of defensive associations between states inspired by the ideal of a common civilization. It would in no sense further security

Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 13, 1954, pp. 901-902. The British and French Governments sent similar notes.

Ibid., pp. 902-905.

Ibid., pp. 905–907.

Agreements of Oet. 23, 1954, relating to Germany (supra, pp. 483-612), the North Atlantic Treaty (supra, pp. 871-873), and Western European Union (supra, pp. 972-989).

to replace such associations by new organizations which would leave fundamental divergencies unresolved and would thus constitute no more than a deceptive facade. The United States is convinced that the Paris agreements provide the basis for the solution of some of the most difficult problems confronting Europe and that far from making the question of European security more difficult to solve they will serve its promotion and contribute to the cause of peace.

The unity which is being built up in the west is far broader in its scope and significance than a purely military alliance. The association of the western nations is based on their common civilization and traditions. The achievement of a close union in all fields is a deeply rooted aspiration of their peoples. It is a development of great importance in the history of Europe and is gaining in strength and purpose. By settling old rivalries and forming new ties it will promote the cause of peace in a region which in the past has given birth to so many wars.

Since the end of the war rearmament in the countries of the Soviet Bloc, including the Soviet zone of Germany, has been centrally imposed, massive and unrestricted, thus compelling the western powers to strengthen their common defense. Under the Paris agreements, however, they have of their own free will accepted a system of controls, limitations and prohibitions to be applied to their forces and armaments. This system is designed to prevent any member nation from having independent recourse to the threat or use of force.

As regards Germany, the United States Government has noted that the Soviet Government states that a settlement of the German problem is of decisive importance for ensuring security in Europe. In previous notes, the United States Government has emphasized that free all-German elections are the essential first step in the process of German reunification in freedom. In its note of October 23 the Soviet Government has given no indication of its view on this point nor of its attitude towards the practical plan for the holding of early elections, which was put forward by the Governments of France, the United States and the United Kingdom at the Berlin Conference. Nor has the Soviet Government advanced specific alternative proposals. The United States Government awaits a precise indication of any concrete proposal which the Soviet Government may now have to make concerning both the timing and nature of the free all-German elections which are the essential first step for the re-establishment of a united Germany.

As regards Austria, the United States Government can see no justification for the continued denial to that country of the freedom and independence promised her by the four powers in the Moscow Declaration of 1943.2 The governments of the United Kingdom, United States and France expressed themselves ready at the Berlin Conference to sign the Austrian State Treaty with the Soviet text

1 See Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25–February 18, 1954 (Department of State publication 5399; 1954), pp. 223–225.

2 Declaration of Nov. 1, 1943; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 11.

of the previously unagreed articles.1 The Austrian Government for its part made it plain that it concurred in this view, and this remains its position. There should therefore be no further obstacle in the way of the signature of the treaty and the termination of the occupation and the withdrawal of all foreign forces as prescribed therein. The United States Government notes with disappointment that the Soviet Government nonetheless propose a meeting at Vienna to "consider the remaining unsettled questions relating to the draft state treaty and other questions connected with the conclusion of this treaty." The United States Government is at a loss as to the nature of the questions referred to by the Soviet Government. If the Soviet Government wishes to furnish the necessary clarifications, the United States Government suggests that this could appropriately be done in exchanges between the Ambassadors in Vienna. Meanwhile, the United States Government for its part reaffirms its desire as expressed in the note of September 102 to proceed as soon as possible to the signature of the Austrian State Treaty.

The United States Government has on many occasions given proof of their desire to settle questions in dispute by negotiations conducted in a spirit of mutual respect for the essential interests of all the participants. They remain convinced that this is the best way of promoting the cause of peace. This cause would be ill-served by a conference ending in failure. In order that negotiations may be undertaken with a reasonable prospect of success, they consider that a basis of agreement should have been carefully prepared and established in advance. The essential basis for a useful conference whether on Germany, Austria or the remaining aspects of European security does not, in their view, at present exist.

In order to establish such a basis and to deal with the foregoing questions in due order, the United States Government proposes the following:

(1) Agreement to sign the Austrian State Treaty;

(2) Clarification by the Soviet Government of its position on the question of free elections in Germany which are the essential first steps to German reunification;

(3) Exchanges through diplomatic channels on any other European questions of common interest which might suitably be examined at a later four-power meeting, in particular, questions relating to European security;

(4) A meeting of the four-power Ministers as soon as it should appear that there is a real prospect of finding solutions and after ratification of the Paris agreements by the countries concerned; (5) Should it thereafter appear useful, a wider conference of European and other interested powers to consider the remaining aspects of European security.