111. DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND FRANCE, APRIL 5, 19551

For many years the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and France have sought to conclude an Austrian state treaty. They have made ceaseless efforts thus to bring about the restoration of Austrian freedom and independence at the earliest possible moment.

At the Berlin conference in 1954 the three governments expressed their readiness to sign the draft state treaty with the Soviet texts of the previously unagreed articles. This would have resulted in the termination of the occupation and the withdrawal of all foreign troops within three months of the entry into force of the treaty. But the Soviet Government declined and insisted on putting forward new and unacceptable conditions which would have infringed Austrian sovereignty.2

The three governments have followed closely the recent exchanges between the Austrian Government and the Soviet Government on matters relating to the state treaty. From these exchanges it appears that the Soviet Government may now have certain clarifications to offer regarding their policy toward Austria, in particular on the question of the independence and sovereignty of that country already provided for in the first five articles of the draft treaty. The three governments trust that the decision of the Austrian Government to accept the Soviet invitation to Moscow will result in useful clarifications.

Questions relating to the conclusion of the state treaty are of concern to the governments of all four responsible powers, as well as to the Austrian Government. The Governments of the United Kingdom, United States and France accordingly consider that if the Soviet Government should offer proposals which hold clear promise of the restoration of freedom and independence to Austria, these could appropriately be discussed by the four Ambassadors in Vienna with the participation of the Austrian Government.

It remains the earnest desire of the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom and France to conclude the state treaty as soon as possible in conformity with principles which would insure Austria's full freedom and independence.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 18, 1955, pp. 647–648.

2 See Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18, 1954 (Department of State publication 5399; 1954), pp. 175–208 and 232–241; and supra, doc. 106.

112. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, APRIL 22, 1955 1

1

The Government of the United States, in consultation with the British and French Governments, has considered the Soviet Government's note of April 19 2 proposing a conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the U.K., the Soviet Union, the U.S. and France, with Austrian representatives participating, in order to discuss the question of concluding a State Treaty for the reestablishment of an independent democratic Austria and in order to sign that Treaty.

The Government of the United States welcomes the Soviet Government's view that the possibility now exists of concluding the Austrian State Treaty. It would be pleased to participate at the earliest possible moment in a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the four powers together with the representatives of Austria in order to sign the Treaty.

From the information it has received regarding the exchanges between the Austrian and Soviet Ministers in Moscow it is clear that some preparatory work still remains to be done. Recalling the tripartite declaration of April 5,3 it suggests that the Ambassadors of the four powers in Vienna should meet at a very early date, with the participation of Austrian representatives, in order to examine the results of the exchanges in Moscow and to reach the necessary agreements for the early signature of the State Treaty by the Foreign Ministers. It would therefore propose that the Ambassadors together with Austrian representatives should meet in Vienna on May 2.

As soon as the necessary preparations have been completed, the earliest practicable date should then be set for the Foreign Ministers to meet and sign the treaty.

[For the text of the Austrian State Treaty of May 15, 1955, see supra, pp. 643-675.]

113. STATEMENT AT A PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE, MAY 24, 19551

At his news conference on May 24, Secretary Dulles was asked about the policy of the United States with respect to neutrality, particularly as it would affect Germany. The Secretary replied:

It is the view of the United States that a policy of neutrality has no application to a country of the character of Germany. It is all well to talk about neutrality for a country such as Austria, a small country with 7 million people. But I do not believe that anybody realistically believes that the German people, 70-odd million of them,

1 Department of State Bulletin, May 2, 1955, p. 733; similar notes were delivered by the British and French Embassies.

1

are destined to play the role of a neutral country. Furthermore, as President Eisenhower has pointed out, the kind of neutrality which was discussed in terms of Austria is an armed neutrality, and there is no limit in the Austrian State Treaty upon the size of the Austrian Army. I do not think that the German people or the Soviet people or the Western European people want to see applied to Germany the concept of it being an independent state with an unlimited army.

1. DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEMS OF GERMANY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, JULY 18-23, 1955

114. NOTE FROM THE UNITED STATES, BRITISH, AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, MAY 10, 1955 2

The Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States believe that the time has now come for a new effort to resolve the great problems which confront us. We, therefore, invite the Soviet Government to join with us in an effort to remove sources of conflict between us.

We recognize that the solution of these problems will take time and patience. They will not be solved at a single meeting nor in a hasty manner. Indeed, any effort to do so could set back real progress toward their settlement. Accordingly, we think it would be helpful to try a new procedure for dealing with these problems.

In view of their complexity and importance, our suggestion is that these problems be approached in two stages. We think it would be fruitful to begin with a meeting of the Heads of Government, accompanied by their Foreign Ministers, for an exchange of views. In the limited time for which the Heads of Government could meet, they would not undertake to agree upon substantive answers to the major difficulties facing the world. Such a meeting could, however, provide a new impetus by establishing the basis for the detailed work which will be required.

For this purpose the Heads of Government could devote themselves to formulating the issues to be worked on and to agreeing on methods to be followed in exploring solutions. We further propose that the Foreign Ministers, to assist the Heads of Government in their task, should come together shortly in advance of the meeting of the Heads of Government and at the same place.

1 Treaty of May 15, 1955; supra, pp. 643-675.

2 Department of State Bulletin, May 23, 1955, pp. 832-833; see also ibid., June 20, 1955, pp. 989 ff.; June 27, 1955, pp. 1030-1031; and July 4, 1955, pp.

This first stage would lay the foundation for the second stage in which the problems would be examined in detail by such methods, organs, and participants as it appears will be most fruitful according to the nature of the issues. This work should be started as soon as practicable after the meeting of the Heads of Government.

This procedure would facilitate the essential preparation and orderly negotiation most likely to bring about agreements by progressive stages. The important thing is to begin the process promptly and to pursue it with patience and determination.

We hope that this proposal will commend itself to the Soviet Union as a useful basis for progress toward better relations between us. If the Soviet Union agrees that an early meeting of Heads of Government to explore such a program would be useful, we suggest that our Foreign Ministers settle through diplomatic channels or otherwise upon a time and place for such a meeting. The forthcoming meeting of the Foreign Ministers at Vienna for the signing of the Austrian State Treaty might provide an opportunity for preliminary discussion of this proposal.

[For text of President Eisenhower's address of July 15, 1955, see infra, pp. 2005-2008.]

115. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

JULY 19, 1955 (Excerpts) 2

. I would say with reference to the official text [of Premier Bulganin's statement of July 18, 19553] that it was delivered to the United States Delegation this morning. I had not received it when I started to speak. I have just received a copy of it since, and I am prepared in a very preliminary way to touch on the matters as to which Mr. Molotov indicates he would like to have the views of the United States Delegation.

With respect to the policy of neutrality, the views of the United States have been made clear in connection with the proposed declaration of neutrality by the Austrian Government. There we indicated that we were prepared to respect the free action of that country in adopting for themselves a policy of neutrality. However, we doubt that a policy of so-called neutrality should be encouraged generally, because we believe in the principle of the United Nations Charter, which is that there is a duty, broadly speaking, upon nations-always subject to minor exceptions-but there is a duty upon nations to be prepared to take collective action for the preservation of peace and

1 Treaty of May 15, 1955; supra, pp. 643-675.

The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18–23, 1955 (Department of State publication 6046; 1955), pp. 69–70.

Ibid., pp. 35-43.

This declaration was later made in the Austrian Government's note of Nov. 14, 1955; Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 19, 1955, pp. 1011-1012.

the prevention and removal of threats to the peace. We particularly consider that neutrality is a quite unrealistic policy for, for example, a country of the large population and geographical location of Germany. That was expressed very forcibly yesterday by M. Faure,' and the United States entirely agrees with that. I recall that the United States tried neutrality in 1914 and in 1939 and we found that it was a dangerous policy, not only for ourselves but for our friends; and I recall that when the United Nations was originally founded there were excluded from the founding countries all nations which had pursued a policy of neutrality in the Second World War.

116. STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT, JULY 19, 1955

Now I would address myself, then, as others, to this German problem. I do not wish to go over the same ground that others have, but I would like to talk a little bit about NATO as it was conceived, as it has been organized, and as it has been administered, possibly a little bit from the political sense, but also from the military. I would particularly like my friend, Marshal Zhukov, to listen carefully to what I have now to say. I have known him for a long time and he knows that, speaking as soldier to soldier, I have never uttered a single word that I did not believe to be the truth.

In December of 1950, or January 1951, I returned to Europe as the head of SHAPE, the forces that the NATO countries had brought together into a single headquarters in Paris. I assure you that I accepted that job--because I had been retired-I accepted that job because I believed it to be a true agency for peace. Personally I have had enough of war and I would not have accepted that command had I conceived it to be an organization getting ready really to fight

a war.

One of the great problems then facing the Western world was Germany. Germany, if allowed to become a military vacuum, if allowed to become again a fertile ground for the propagation of a Hitler, could be of the gravest danger. Now, admittedly, we were not at that moment thinking of danger to the Soviet Union: we were thinking of danger to Western Europe.

Let us not forget that our Allied friend within a matter of 85 years has three times been locked in mortal combat with Germany, and always as a result of German aggression.

Let us draw Germany into such a position that she would not be a prey to a Hitler, a dissatisfied, unhappy nation suffering from an inferiority complex, but one which could play a respectable part in its own defense, but which could not gain the power to attack.

1 Mr. Edgar Faure, French Premier; The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, pp. 22-31.

Ibid., pp. 45-47.