Now, speaking politically for just a moment, all the world knows the main activities of every Western nation. There is free access to our great centers of activity by all the press of the world. There is news published about every main army camp, every great facility that we have, and this news goes all over the world. The scale of our military operations in our country is well known to everybody.

Now, within our country it is impossible for the Government, the Executive Government, to declare war. It can be done only by the Congress of the United States by free debate and vote. The only exception to this is when we ourselves are attacked with a full-scale military attack, as at Pearl Harbor, and then the reaction is merely that of self-defense.

Now, the treaties that bind the NATO nations together 1 provide against aggression by any one of these nations, either among themselves or against anyone else. The treaty is purely defensive, and if any one of these nations attempts to act aggressively against any other, it is immediately moved against by all the remaining nations of NATO. Militarily Germany, like all other nations in Western Europe, has certain limits set upon its forces, and, I must point out, these limits are maximum limits as well as minimum limits. In no case are any parts of the forces allowed to Germany complete or whole within themselves. They are all intertwined with the forces of the other Western nations, making it impossible for them to conduct any effective military operation of any kind by themselves.

My French colleagues can speak far better than can I about the preoccupations of the French Parliament concerning all of the measures and all of the agreements under the treaty that would prevent Germany from ever getting into a position where it would be strong enough again to attack France.

Now, besides all of these treaty provisions for making the breaking of the peace by any nation impossible, I want to make one observation about the United States. The United States is a fairly important member of NATO, and I can assure you that under no circumstances is the United States ever going to be a party to aggressive waragainst any nation. We believe in negotiation and friendly conference, and the only way that we will ever go to war is when we are attacked, as in our vital interests, in such a way that war would be the only alternative-and then it would have to be an alternative so desperate that only war could eventuate.

Perhaps I have talked overly long about my point, but my point is this. If there is any tendency to delay urgent consideration of the problem of German reunification because of the unhappiness or fear of the united Germany in NATO, then so far as it is possible for the United States to give the assurance of its pledged word, I say here and now: There is no need to fear that situation.

Treaty of Apr. 4, 1949, as amended by protocols of Oct. 17, 1951, and Oct. 23, 1954; supra, pp. 812-815, 853-854, and 871-873.

117. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

JULY 20,1955 1

Mr. Chairman, the United States Delegation is quite prepared to deal with the topic of European security, although in our opinion the topic of European security is inseparably connected with the problem of the unification of Germany. There is perhaps a difference which has been developed between the basic viewpoint of the Soviet Union and that of the three Western nations in that, I think, the three Western Powers here feel that the prolonged division of Germany is in itself a threat to European security, whereas, I gather, the Soviet Delegation feels that the division of Germany can be almost indefinitely prolonged without endangering European security, provided certain supplementary measures are taken of a kind which they suggest.

I think, at least from the standpoint of the United States Delegation, that we would feel that any discussion of European security would have to start out with an assertion that in our opinion Europe will not be very secure so long as a great nation like Germany is divided and, as far as we can judge, passionately seeks unification.

I am quite prepared to accept the apparent sincerity of the Soviet conviction that the unification of Germany would not bring it increased security but would bring it insecurity. I would like to have the Soviet Delegation believe that we are equally sincere when we assert that we would only want to see German unification occur under conditions which would in fact bring about increased security for all.

I feel that there are two very sincere positions which now seem to keep us apart, which could be perhaps drawn together if we could see somewhat more clearly the basis for the Soviet feeling that the unification of Germany would endanger it. If, for example, the Soviet Union feared that a unified Germany would mean advancing toward the east bases and military positions which endangered it, that is a specific fear which we could understand, even though we did not agree with it. It is a specific fear with which we could try to deal in a practical way. If the Soviet Union felt that a unified Germany would have a military potential which would lead it to enlarge its military establishment beyond what was reasonable or what would be the case otherwise, that again is a specific fear which, if it concerns the Soviet Union, we could grapple with in a practical way.

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by just saying this: We do feel that the prolonged division of a great nation like the German nation must itself be a cause of insecurity. We believe that that cause of insecurity can be eliminated without increasing the insecurity of others. We are very eager to see whether there cannot be found a common ground between us in that respect, because, I repeat, we wish in every sincerity to make clear to the Soviet Union that we do not want, by eliminating one cause of insecurity, to create a new

1 The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955 (Department of State publication 6046; 1955), pp. 70–71.

cause of insecurity. We believe that the two possibilities of insecurity can be dealt with at the same time, if we could understand more clearly what the basis is of the apprehension of the Soviet Union.

118. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
JULY 20, 19551

3

It would not, I think, be quite accurate to say, as I understood Mr. Molotov to indicate, that there has not yet been any serious discussion of the proposals put forward by the Head of his Delegation in his important opening statement of Monday. Certainly I myself felt that the observations which were made yesterday by President Eisenhower constituted a very eloquent and clear comment upon one of the central proposals which had been made by Marshal Bulganin in his exposition of European security. Marshal Bulganin's statement indicated that it was the Soviet view that security would be increased if we could bring about a withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of European states and re-establish in this respect a situation which existed prior to the Second World War.

President Eisenhower, speaking with the authority which comes not merely from being at present the Constitutional Commander in Chief of the United States forces but with the added authority which comes from his leadership of the Western portion of the coalition which won the Second World War and the first Commander of NATO in Europe, speaking in all three of those capacities, he expressed the very solemn and considered conclusion that the security of all of us is very greatly enhanced as there is an integration of forces of different nationalities into a single whole, which cannot effectively operate offensively without a unanimous conjunction of the wills of independent states, which in fact would be unobtainable.

He indicated that the presence in the Federal Republic of Germany of troops of the forces of the United Kingdom, of France, of Canada, and of the United States integrated into any prospective future forces of the Federal Republic of Germany would, in his opinion, constitute a great security for us all, and that it would not advance the security of any of us to revert to the situation in that respect which existed immediately prior to the Second World War.

Indeed, it seems to me that the four of us here, who suffered so terribly from the Second World War-and the three other Governments here suffered more greatly than did the United States-that we ought to view with a good deal of hesitation trying to find future security in reproducing the conditions which existed immediately prior to the Second World War and out of which the Second World War came.

1 The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18–23, 1955 (Department of State publication 6046; 1955), pp. 71–73.

Statement by Premier Bulganin, July 18, 1955; ibid., pp. 35–43.
Supra, doc. 116.

We believe that the integration of forces which can be possible under NATO, if properly conducted, can indeed greatly inure to the security of all of us, and that the liquidation of NATO as contemplated by the statement of Marshal Bulganin would not in fact promote security.

And I would like to add a word about the Brussels Treaty,' which also would be liquidated under the Soviet proposal. The United States, like the Soviet Union, is not a party to the Brussels Treaty, but we believe that the integration of many of the activities of the member countries, which is one of the purposes of that treaty, is a result which is extremely valuable for the United States and also to the Soviet Union, although neither of us are parties to that treaty and although, naturally, I would not set myself up in any way as a judge of the security of the Soviet Union. But I do make the analogy of our own feeling that it is a tremendous insurance against the type of division and separation of Western European countries, and notably of Germany and France, out of which have grown the aggressions to which President Eisenhower referred yesterday, and which has been the cause of many wars, the last two of which have been world wars involving not only the immediate parties but all of us and many others besides.

I realize, of course, that organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Brussels Treaty, like all good things, could theoretically at least be perverted to evil ends, although I think that the inherent nature of these arrangements is such as to make that highly unlikely. I also recognize that no great power is happy to have its security, or at least its peace, in part dependent upon arrangements with which it has no privity. These are all aspects of our problem which can be, and I think should be, considered between us in the spirit which happily prevails here and which I hope will be carried forward.

Furthermore, there are certain aspects of the proposals of the Head of the Soviet Delegation which, it seems to me, we could usefully study. For example, it is suggested that certain of the European states should assume mutual commitments not to use armed force against one another. It is further suggested that they could assume an obligation to hold mutual consultations in case any differences or disputes arise among them which might constitute a threat to the maintenance of peace in Europe. Certainly such suggestions, together with those that have been put forward in the last statement made by Mr. Macmillan 2those are the kinds of things I think we could usefully study as we try to evolve a system of European security which, on the one hand, will end the insecurity inherent in the continued division of Germany and, on the other hand, permit that insecurity to be removed without creating new insecurities for any of us.

1 Treaty of Mar. 17, 1948, as amended by the protocols of Oct. 23, 1954; supra, pp. 968-989.

Not printed.

119. STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT, JULY 20, 19551

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the Conference, as I listened to my colleague, Premier Bulganin,2 it seemed to me that the principal point of difference between the thinking of the Soviet Delegation and the thinking of the United States Delegation is the urgency with which we view the need for a reunified Germany.

The Soviet Delegation seems to believe that the organization of some new and over-all pact, deferring for the moment any thought of reunifying Germany, would contribute to security. We believe that the division of Germany of itself contributes to the insecurity of Europe, and that seems to us to be the principal point of difference between what he has just said to the Conference and what we believe. Now I certainly would be the last to minimize the importance of the over-all security of all Europe to the security of the world. Of course we agree to that, and I apologize for seeming to return to a question, the reunification of Germany, which we discussed at such length yesterday. But in our view these two matters are inseparable, and, therefore, I cannot help bringing them back. So I feel this is my conviction that to start this so-called security pact with this Conference, making no move toward starting the machinery or means for the reunifying of Germany, would appear to confirm instead of deploring that division, and, consequently, as we attack the broader question, which is of over-all security, it seems to me that we must, from our viewpoint, attack the problem of how do we get Germany back together.

Now, whether it will take one step or two steps or three steps, I admit my Soviet colleagues have studied it in greater detail than I, but I am sure that it would be a great mistake for us not to set up the machinery that proves once and for all that we confirm the necessity for so doing, and giving to some competent group or body the job of working out what needs to be done in order to bring this about. And I believe that until we do devise some such machinery we cannot by mere words, or saying we believe in the eventual reunification of Germany-I do not believe we can satisfy the situation that from our viewpoint confronts us, this Conference, and the world.

I think that is all I want to say at the moment because, I repeat, no one could applaud more than does the American Delegation the earnest protestations of the Soviet Delegation that we seek peace through giving peace to all and not just to a part of this great world.

The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18–23, 1955 (Department of State publication 6046; 1955), pp. 51–52.

2 Remarks not printed.