120. STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT, JULY 20, 19551

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I have only a brief observation to make [with respect to comments made, in turn, by Premier Faure, Prime Minister Eden, and Premier Bulganin concerning the Soviet proposal on European security 2]. These ideas, of course, have tremendous interest for all of us, and naturally each of us is going to study carefully the draft that the Soviet Delegation has submitted. But I should like to say, for my part, I have talked individually, I think, to each member of the Delegation of the Soviet Republic, which now we find differing from the other three of us on a particular point in a suggestion. And I want to make clear I believe they are earnestly desirous of finding peace, as are we.

The problem becomes how to find a bridge between these differing viewpoints.

Now, we have taken up matters that manifestly we cannot handle in detail in this Conference. It's impossible, because we are inviting, presumably, a number of other countries into a pact, and they will have to be dealt with.

3

I noted that in Premier Bulganin's speech of the 15th of July, which I read with great interest, he pointed out that this Conference could be only a beginning. But if we could here establish a real spirit of conciliation and an effort to get along together, our Foreign Ministers and other agencies that could be set up through them, or by them or by us, might solve some of these problems and build the kind of bridge of which I speak.

I believe we have come to the point with this subject where we should ask our Foreign Ministers, can they suggest the kind of machinery that we would like to set up, or when they would like to undertake a more detailed conference on these subjects of the unification. of Germany and the community security of Europe-the two subjects now so far on our agenda-how would they like to approach it? And possibly they could present it to us in such a way that we, the Heads of Government, could give them a directive.

I am sure that all of us will agree to the importance of one thing. We must not leave this Conference without showing a determined, honest effort of all of us to approach peace in some way.

Now, I submit again that we have gotten into details now that we couldn't possibly settle here. And therefore we must find some body, some machinery, that can handle this in better fashion.

1 The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955 (Department of State publication 6046; 1955), pp. 52–53.

2 Proposal of July 20, 1955; ibid., pp. 48–51.

New York Times, July 16, 1955.

121. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
JULY 21, 1955 (Excerpt) 1

1

the Delegations of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have tried, in the spirit which happily animates this Conference, to fairly reflect the points of view which have heretofore been expressed by the four Delegations.

The concept that Germany should be reunified in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the security of Europe is, I think, almost in the precise words which were used by Marshal Bulganin in his opening statement.2

And the concept that security for Europe should be sought by effective means which will further the legitimate interests of all, including the inherent right of individual and collective self-defensethat, again, is an effort to reflect the point of view which Marshal Bulganin expressed in this matter.

The particular suggestions made as to what the representatives of the Four Powers should take into consideration, ... also is designed to include a reference to some of the major suggestions which have been made here by the Heads of Government, notably by Marshal Bulganin, Prime Minister Eden, and Premier Faure. We naturally, however, indicate that there may be other possibilities, so as not to limit unduly the resourcefulness and inventiveness of the Foreign Ministers for the future, and their advisers.

122. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

3

JULY 21, 1955 3

4

Mr. President, I think we all appreciate the approach which has been reflected by the remarks which have been made around this table and which, I think, indicate a genuine desire to reach an agreement on this [proposed] directive [to the Foreign Ministers] and, as Mr. Molotov has said, not to make this topic a matter of propaganda discussion among us. I will try to maintain that spirit in making merely one or two further remarks.

There is undoubtedly a difference between us in that the Soviet Union, as I understand, would make the primary task the establishment of a new European security system and would treat the unification of Germany as a secondary problem which could be resolved perhaps as a by-product of the first. I think I can say that the view of the three Western Powers represented here is that the primary problem is a problem of the unification of Germany, and that there is really no need for a new European security pact, having regard 1 The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18–23, 1955 (Department of State publication 6046; 1955), p. 74.

Ibid., pp. 35-43.

Ibid., pp. 74-75.

For the final text of the directive (July 23, 1955), see infra.

to the entirely defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Brussels Treaty, all of which fall within the overriding framework of the United Nations Charter. It already reflects a very genuine effort at conciliation on the part of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

We are willing to put these two problems in essence on a parity. I hope very much that the Soviet Union will feel able to meet us in that respect and not insist upon a subordination of the problem of German unification.

If I understood correctly the interpretation of an earlier remark of Mr. Molotov,' he said in substance that he feared that if we addressed ourselves to the task of German unification that would imply an indefinite postponement of European security. It could equally be said if we address ourselves to the task of European security that would involve an indefinite postponement of the unification of Germany.

I do not think that any of us should strive to bring about either result, that is, neither of us should try to bring about any indefinite postponement, either of European security or of German unification.

As President Eisenhower said yesterday, and I quote from our transcript of his remarks: "in our view these two matters are inseparable". I hope, therefore, that we can find a directive which will reflect the view that the two problems must be considered concurrently, that neither can be indefinitely postponed in favor of the other. I am encouraged by what Mr. Molotov has said to hope that the Soviet Delegation would find acceptable that approach which we have sought to embody in the draft directive which I have had the honor to present on behalf of the Delegations of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. I will just add this one further word, that I am very happy that as a matter of first impression, at least, Mr. Molotov indicates that important portions of this Three-Power proposed directive3 are acceptable,

123. DIRECTIVE OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE FOUR POWERS TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, JULY 23, 1955 (Excerpt)5

The Heads of Government of France, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., guided by the desire to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and to the consolidation of confidence between states, instruct their Foreign Ministers to continue the consideration of the following questions with regard to which an exchange of views has taken place at the Geneva Conference, and to 1 Not printed.

2 Supra, doc. 119.

Text not printed.

4 Ellipsis in original.

The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955 (Department of State publication 6046; 1955), pp. 67-68. The portions of this Directive which deal with the questions of disarmament and the development of contacts between East and West are printed infra, pp. 2015–2016

propose effective means for their solution, taking account of the close link between the reunification of Germany and the problems of European security, and the fact that the successful settlement of each of these problems would serve the interests of consolidating peace.

1. European Security and Germany. For the purpose of establishing European security with due regard to the legitimate interests of all nations and their inherent right to individual and collective selfdefense, the Ministers are instructed to consider various proposals to this end, including the following: A security pact for Europe or for a part of Europe, including provisions for the assumption by member nations of an obligation not to resort to force and to deny assistance to an aggressor; limitation, control, and inspection in regard to armed forces and armaments; establishment between East and West of a zone in which the disposition of armed forces will be subject to mutual agreement; and also to consider other possible proposals pertaining to the solution of this problem.

The Heads of Government, recognizing their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the re-unification of Germany, have agreed that the settlement of the German question. and the re-unification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security. The Foreign Ministers will make whatever arrangements they may consider desirable for the participation of, or for consultation with, other interested parties.

J. DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEMS OF GERMANY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY AT THE GENEVA MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, OCTOBER 27-NOVEMBER 16, 1955

124. PROPOSAL BY THE AMERICAN, BRITISH, AND FRENCH DELEGATIONS, OCTOBER 27, 19551

Reunification of Germany and Security

At the Geneva Conference, the Heads of Government recognised, in their Directive to the Foreign Ministers,2 the common responsibility of the Four Powers for the reunification of Germany by means of

The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955 (Department of State publication 6156; 1955), pp. 27-33. The French Foreign Minister submitted this proposal on Oct. 27 on behalf of the three delegations. Discussion began on Oct. 28, when the proposal was read to the Conference by the British Foreign Secretary.

2 Supra.

free elections in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security.

France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America have striven unceasingly for the reunification of Germany in freedom in order to promote real stability in Europe. Last year they put forward, in the Eden Plan, proposals which offer the German nation the means to recover its unity in accordance with the rights of peoples and liberty of the individual. They renew these proposals in the paper attached hereto.

Free elections leading to the formation of a single Government for the whole of Germany are the right way of ensuring full participation of the German people in the solution of the German problem, which the Soviet Government says it also desires. If agreement in principle is reached during the present Conference, it should be possible to settle without delay questions concerning the electoral law and the supervision of the elections, which could take place as early as 1956.

Without German unity, any system of European security would be an illusion. The division of Germany can only perpetuate friction and insecurity as well as grave injustice. France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America are not prepared to enter into a system of European security which, as in the Soviet proposals put forward at Geneva,2 does not end the division of Germany.

At the Geneva Conference the Soviet Government expressed concern about the policy and associations of a reunified German Government. The Soviet Union appears to fear that a unified Germany, established by free elections and free to choose its associates in collective defence, would constitute a threat to the security of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The fact is that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Western European Union are strictly defensive organisations. Far from constituting a threat to peace, they contribute to the security not only of their members but of all states. This is evident. from the various limitations and restrictions which the members of the Western European Union have assumed and from the restraint on individual action which the NATO system imposes on its members. If a reunified Germany elects to associate itself with these organisations, the inherent obligations of restraint and control would enhance rather than detract from Soviet security.

Nevertheless, to remove any possible grounds for Soviet refusal to reunify Germany promptly, France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America are prepared to take further steps to meet the concern expressed by the Soviet Government. They accordingly propose the conclusion of a treaty in the terms set forth below, concurrently with the conclusion of an agreement to reunify Germany under the Eden Plan. This treaty would comprise undertakings to refrain from the use of force and to withhold aid from an aggressor, provisions for the limitation and control of forces and armaments, and

1 Proposal of Jan. 29, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18, 1954 (Department of State publication 5399; 1954), pp. 223-225.

2 Proposal of July 20, 1955; The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955, pp. 48–51.